TESTIMONY 1AC:

ALL brackets for clarity/gendered language. **I value morality.** We cannot derive ethics from nothing or some tiny component of life; nor can we deny it. Ethical understanding transcends particular tradition and culture. These principles are not only authoritative but authority itself. **C.S. LEWIS[[1]](#footnote-1):** Until quite modern times all teachers and even all men believed the universe to be such that certain emotional reactions on our part could be either congruous or incongruous to it—believed, in fact, that objects did not merely receive, but could merit, our approval or disapproval, our reverence or our contempt. The reason why Coleridge agreed with the tourist who called the cataract sublime and disagreed with the one who called it pretty was of course that he believed inanimate nature to be such that certain responses could be more 'just' or 'ordinate' or 'appropriate' to it than others. And he believed (correctly) that the tourists thought the same. The man who called the cataract sublime was not intending simply to describe his own emotions about it: he was also claiming that the object was one which merited those emotions. But for this claim there would be nothing to agree or disagree about. To disagree with This is pretty if those words simply described the lady's feelings, would be absurd: if she had said I feel sick Coleridge would hardly have replied No; I feel quite well. When Shelley, having compared the human sensibility to an Aeolian lyre, goes on to add that it differs from a lyre in having a power of 'internal adjustment' whereby it can 'accommodate its chords to the motions of that which strikes them',9 he is assuming the same belief. 'Can you be righteous', asks Traherne, 'unless you be just in rendering to things their due esteem? All things were made to be yours and you were made to prize them according to their value.'10 St Augustine defines virtue as ordo amoris, the ordinate condition of the affections in which every object is accorded that kind of degree of love which is appropriate to it.11 Aristotle says that the aim of education is to make[s] the pupil like and dislike what [they] ought.12 When the age for reflective thought comes, the pupil who has been thus trained in 'ordinate affections' or 'just sentiments' will easily find the first principles in Ethics; but to the corrupt man they will never be visible at all and he can make no progress in that science.13 Plato before him had said the same. The little human animal will not at first have the right responses. It must be trained to feel pleasure, liking, disgust, and hatred at those things which really are pleasant, likeable, disgusting and hateful.14 In the Republic, the well-nurtured youth is one 'who would see most clearly whatever was amiss in ill-made works of man or ill-grown works of nature, and with a just distaste would blame and hate the ugly even from his earliest years and would give delighted praise to beauty, receiving it into his soul and being nourished by it, so that he becomes a man of gentle heart. All this before he is of an age to reason; so that when Reason at length comes to him, then, bred as he has been, he will hold out his hands in welcome and recognize her because of the affinity he bears to her.'15 In early Hinduism that conduct in men which can be called good consists in conformity to, or almost participation in, the Rta—that great ritual or pattern of nature and supernature which is revealed alike in the cosmic order, the moral virtues, and the ceremonial of the temple. Righteousness, correctness, order, the Rta, is constantly identified with satya or truth, correspondence to reality. As Plato said that the Good was 'beyond existence' and Wordsworth that through virtue the stars were strong, so the Indian masters say that the gods themselves are born of the Rta and obey it.16 The Chinese also speak of a great thing (the greatest thing) called the Tao. It is the reality beyond all predicates, the abyss that was before the Creator Himself. It is Nature, it is the Way, the Road. It is the Way in which the universe goes on, the Way in which things everlastingly emerge, stilly and tranquilly, into space and time. It is also the Way which every man should tread in imitation of that cosmic and supercosmic progression, conforming all activities to that great exemplar.17 'In ritual', say the Analects, 'it is harmony with Nature that is prized.'18 The ancient Jews likewise praise the Law as being 'true'.19 This conception in all its forms, Platonic, Aristotelian, Stoic, Christian, and Oriental alike, I shall henceforth refer to for brevity simply as 'the Tao'. Some of the accounts of it which I have quoted will seem, perhaps, to many of you merely quaint or even magical. But what is common to them all is something we cannot neglect. It is the doctrine of objective value, the belief that certain attitudes are really true, and others really false, to the kind of thing the universe is and the kind of things we are. Those who know the Tao can hold that to call children delightful or old men venerable is not simply to record a psychological fact about our own parental or filial emotions at the moment, but to recognize a quality which demands a certain response from us whether we make it or not. I myself do not enjoy the society of small children: because I speak from within the Tao I recognize this as a defect in myself—just as a man may have to recognize that he is tone deaf or colour blind. And because our approvals and disapprovals are thus recognitions of objective value or responses to an objective order, therefore emotional states can be in harmony with reason (when we feel liking for what ought to be approved) or out of harmony with reason (when we perceive that liking is due but cannot feel it). No emotion is, in itself, a judgement; in that sense all emotions and sentiments are a-logical. But they can be reasonable or unreasonable as they conform to Reason or fail to conform. The heart never takes the place of the head: but it can, and should, obey it. Over against this stands the world of The Green Book. In it the very possibility of a sentiment being reasonable—or even unreasonable—has been excluded from the outset. It can be reasonable or unreasonable only if it conforms or fails to conform to something else. To say that the cataract is sublime means saying that our emotion of humility is appropriate or ordinate to the reality, and thus to speak of something else besides the emotion; just as to say that a shoe fits is to speak not only of shoes but of feet. But this reference to something beyond the emotion is what Gaius and Titius exclude from every sentence containing a predicate of value. Such statements, for them, refer solely to the emotion. Now the emotion, thus considered by itself, cannot be either in agreement or disagreement with Reason. It is irrational not as a paralogism is irrational, but as a physical event is irrational: it does not rise even to the dignity of error. On this view, the world of facts, without one trace of value, and the world of feelings, without one trace of truth or falsehood, justice or injustice, confront one another, and no rapprochement is possible. Hence the educational problem is wholly different according as you stand within or without the Tao. For those within, the task is to train in the pupil those responses which are in themselves appropriate, whether anyone is making them or not, and in making which the very nature of man consists. Those without, if they are logical, must regard all sentiments as equally non-rational, as mere mists between us and the real objects. As a result, they must either decide to remove all sentiments, as far as possible, from the pupil's mind; or else to encourage some sentiments for reasons that have nothing to do with their intrinsic 'justness' or 'ordinacy'. The latter course involves them in the questionable process of creating in others by 'suggestion' or incantation a mirage which their own reason has successfully dissipated. Perhaps this will become clearer if we take a concrete instance. When a Roman father told his son that it was a sweet and seemly thing to die for his country, he believed what he said. He was communicating to the son an emotion which he himself shared and which he believed to be in accord with the value which his judgement discerned in noble death. He was giving the boy the best he had, giving of his spirit to humanize him as he had given of his body to beget him. But Gaius and Titius cannot believe that in calling such a death sweet and seemly they would be saying 'something important about something'. Their own method of debunking would cry out against them if they attempted to do so. For death is not something to eat and therefore cannot be dulce in the literal sense, and it is unlikely that the real sensations preceding it will be dulce even by analogy. And as for decorum—that is only a word describing how some other people will feel about your death when they happen to think of it, which won't be often, and will certainly do you no good. There are only two courses open to Gaius and Titius. Either they must go the whole way and debunk this sentiment like any other, or must set themselves to work to produce, from outside, a sentiment which they believe to be of no value to the pupil and which may cost him his life, because it is useful to us (the survivors) that our young men should feel it. If they embark on this course the difference between the old and the new education will be an important one. Where the old initiated, the new merely 'conditions'. The old dealt with its pupils as grown birds deal with young birds when they teach them to fly; the new deals with them more as the poultry-keeper deals with young birds— making them thus or thus for purposes of which the birds know nothing. In a word, the old was a kind of propagation—men transmitting manhood to men; the new is merely propaganda. It is to their credit that Gaius and Titius embrace the first alternative. Propaganda is their abomination: not because their own philosophy gives a ground for condemning it (or anything else) but because they are better than their principles. They probably have some vague notion (I will examine it in my next lecture) that valour and good faith and justice could be sufficiently commended to the pupil on what they would call 'rational' or 'biological' or 'modern' grounds, if it should ever become necessary. In the meantime, they leave the matter alone and get on with the business of debunking. But this course, though less inhuman, is not less disastrous than the opposite alternative of cynical propaganda. Let us suppose for a moment that the harder virtues could really be theoretically justified with no appeal to objective value. It still remains true that no justification of virtue will enable a man to be virtuous. Without the aid of trained emotions the intellect is powerless against the animal organism. I had sooner play cards against a man who was quite sceptical about ethics, but bred to believe that 'a gentleman does not cheat', than against an irreproachable moral philosopher who had been brought up among sharpers. In battle it is not syllogisms that will keep the reluctant nerves and muscles to their post in the third hour of the bombardment. The crudest sentimentalism (such as Gaius and Titius would wince at) about a flag or a country or a regiment will be of more use. We were told it all long ago by Plato. As the king governs by his executive, so Reason in man must rule the mere appetites by means of the 'spirited element'.20 The head rules the belly through the chest—the seat, as Alanus tells us, of Magnanimity,21 of emotions organized by trained habit into stable sentiments. The Chest-Magnanimity-Sentiment—these are the indispensable liaison officers between cerebral man and visceral man. It may even be said that it is by this middle element that man is man: for by his intellect he is mere spirit and by his appetite mere animal. The operation of The Green Book and its kind is to produce what may be called Men without Chests. It is an outrage that they should be commonly spoken of as Intellectuals. This gives them the chance to say that he who attacks them attacks Intelligence. It is not so. They are not distinguished from other men by any unusual skill in finding truth nor any virginal ardor to pursue her. Indeed it would be strange if they were: a persevering devotion to truth, a nice sense of intellectual honour, cannot be long maintained without the aid of a sentiment which Gaius and Titius could debunk as easily as any other. It is not excess of thought but defect of fertile and generous emotion that marks them out. Their heads are no bigger than the ordinary: it is the atrophy of the chest beneath that makes them seem so. And all the time—such is the tragi-comedy of our situation—we continue to clamour for those very qualities we are rendering impossible. You can hardly open a periodical without coming across the statement that what our civilization needs is more 'drive', or dynamism, or self-sacrifice, or 'creativity'. In a sort of ghastly simplicity we remove the organ and demand the function. We make men without chests and expect of them virtue and enterprise. We laugh at honour and are shocked to find traitors in our midst. We castrate and bid the geldings be fruitful. The practical result of education in the spirit of The Green Book must be the destruction of the society which accepts it. But this is not necessarily a refutation of subjectivism about values as a theory. The true doctrine might be a doctrine which if we accept we die. No one who speaks from within the Tao could reject it on that account: 'εν δε φαει και 'δλεσσου. But it has not yet come to that. There are theoretical difficulties in the philosophy of Gaius and Titius However subjective they may be about some traditional values, Gaius and Titius have shown by the very act of writing *The Green Book* that there must be some other values about which they are not subjective at all. They write in order to produce certain states of mind in the rising generation, if not because they think those states of mind intrinsically just or good, yet certainly because they think them to be the means to some state of society which they regard as desirable. It would not be difficult to collect from various passages in *The Green Book* what their ideal is. But we need not. The important point is not the precise nature of their end, but the fact that they have an end at all. They must have, or their book (being purely practical in intention) is written to no purpose. And this end must have real value in their eyes. To abstain from calling it good and to use, instead, such predicates as 'necessary' or 'progressive' or 'efficient' would be a subterfuge. They could be forced by argument to answer the questions 'necessary for what?', 'progressing towards what?', 'effecting what?'; in the last resort they would have to admit that some state of affairs was in their opinion good for its own sake. And this time they could not maintain that 'good' simply described their own emotion about it. For the whole purpose of their book is so to condition theyoung reader that he will share their approval, and this would be either a fool's or a villain's undertaking unless they held that [they were] their approval was in some way valid or correct. In actual fact Gaius and Titius will be found to hold, with complete uncritical dogmatism, the whole system of values which happened to be in vogue among moderately educated young men of the professional classes during the period between the two wars.1 Their scepticism about values is on the surface: it is for use on other people's values; about the values current in their own set they are not nearly sceptical enough. And this phenomenon is very usual. A great many of those who 'debunk' traditional or (as they would say) 'sentimental' values have in the background values of their own which they believe to be immune from the debunking process. They claim to be cutting away the parasitic growth of emotion, religious sanction, and inherited taboos, in order that 'real' or 'basic' values may emerge. I will now try to find out what happens if this is seriously attempted. Let us continue to use the previous example—that of death for a good cause—not, of course, because virtue is the only value or martyrdom the only virtue, but because this is the *experimentum crucis* which shows different systems of thought in the clearest light. Let us suppose that an Innovator in values regards *dulce et decorum* and *greater love hath no man* as mere irrational sentiments which are to be stripped off in order that we may get down to the 'realistic' or 'basic' ground of this value. Where will he find such a ground? First of all, he might say that the real value lay in the utility of such sacrifice to the community. 'Good', he might say, *'means* what is useful to the community.' But of course the death of the community is not useful to the community—only the death of some of its members. What is really meant is that the death of some men is useful to other men. That is very true. But on what ground are some men being asked to die for the benefit of others? Every appeal to pride, honour, shame, or love is excluded by hypothesis. To use these would be to return to sentiment and the Innovator's task is, having cut all that away, to explain to men, in terms of pure reasoning, why they will be well advised to die that others may live. He may say 'Unless some of us *risk* death all of us are *certain* to die.' But that will be true only in a limited number of cases; and even when it is true it provokes the very reasonable counter question 'Why should I be one of those who take the risk?' At this point the Innovator may ask why, after all, selfishness should be more 'rational' or 'intelligent' than altruism. The question is welcome. If by Reason we mean the process actually employed by Gaius and Titius when engaged in debunking (that is, the connecting by inference of propositions, ultimately derived from sense data, with further propositions), then the answer must be that a refusal to sacrifice oneself is no more rational than a consent to do so. And no less rational. Neither choice is rational—or irrational—at all. From propositions about fact alone no *practical* conclusion can ever be drawn. *This will preserve society* cannot lead to *do this* except by the mediation of *society ought to be preserved. This will cost you your life* cannot lead directly to *do not do this:* it can lead to it only through a felt desire or an acknowledged duty of self-preservation. The Innovator is trying to get a conclusion in the imperative mood out of premisses in the indicative mood: and though he continues trying to all eternity he cannot succeed, for the thing is impossible. We must therefore either extend the word Reason to include what our ancestors called Practical Reason and confess that judgements such as *society ought to be preserved* (though they can support themselves by no reason of the sort that Gaius and Titius demand) are not mere sentiments but are rationality itself; or else we must give up at once, and for ever, the attempt to find a core of 'rational' value behind all the sentiments we have debunked. The Innovator will not take the first alternative, for practical principles known to all men by Reason are simply the *Tao* which he has set out to supersede. He is more likely to give up the quest for a 'rational' core and to hunt for some other ground even more 'basic' and 'realistic'. This he will probably feel that he has found in Instinct. The preservation of society, and of the species itself, are ends that do not hang on the precarious thread of Reason: they are [Is] given by Instinct. That is why there is no need to argue against the man who does not acknowledge them. We have an instinctive urge to preserve our own species. That is why men ought to work for posterity. We have no instinctive urge to keep promises or to respect individual life: that is why scruples of justice and humanity—in fact the *Tao*—can be properly swept away when they conflict with our real end, the preservation of the species. That, again, is why the modern situation permits and demands a new sexual morality: the old taboos served some real purpose in helping to preserve the species, but contraceptives have modified this and we can now abandon many of the taboos. For of course sexual desire, being instinctive, is to be gratified whenever it does not conflict with the preservation of the species. It looks, in fact, as if an ethics based on instinct will give the Innovator all he wants and nothing that he does not want. In reality we have not advanced one step. I will not insist on the point that Instinct is a name for we know not what (to say that migratory birds find their way by instinct is only to say that we do not know how migratory birds find their way), for I think it is here being used in a fairly definite sense, to mean an unreflective or spontaneous impulse widely felt by the members of a given species. In what way does Instinct, thus conceived, help us to find 'real' values? Is it maintained that we *must* obey Instinct, that we cannot do otherwise? But if so, why are *Green Books* and the like written? Why this stream of exhortation to drive us where we cannot help going? Why such praise for those who have submitted to the inevitable? Or is it maintained that if we do obey Instinct we shall be happy and satisfied? But the very question we are considering was that of facing death which (so far as the Innovator knows) cuts off every possible satisfaction: and if we have an instinctive desire for the good of posterity then this desire, by the very nature of the case, can never be satisfied, since its aim is achieved, if at all, when we are dead. It looks very much as if the Innovator would have to say not that we must obey Instinct, nor that it will satisfy us to do so, but that we *ought* to obey it.2 But why ought we to obey Instinct? Is there another instinct of a higher order directing us to do so, and a third of a still higher order directing us to obey *it*?—an infinite regress of instincts? This is presumably impossible, but nothing else will serve. From the statement about psychological fact 'I have an impulse to do so and so' we cannot by any ingenuity derive the practical principle 'I ought to obey this impulse'. Even if it were true that men had a spontaneous, unreflective impulse to sacrifice their own lives for the preservation of their fellows, it remains a quite separate question whether this is an impulse they should control or one they should indulge. For even the Innovator admits that many impulses (those which conflict with the preservation of the species) have to be controlled. And this admission surely introduces us to a yet more fundamental difficulty. Telling us to obey Instinct is like telling us to obey 'people'. People say different things: so do instincts. Our instincts are at war. If it is held that the instinct for preserving the species should always be obeyed at the expense of other instincts, whence do we derive this rule of precedence? To listen to that instinct speaking in its own cause and deciding it in its own favour would be rather simple-minded. Each instinct, if you listen to it, will claim to be gratified at the expense of all the rest. By the very act of listening to one [instinct] rather than to others we have already prejudged the case. If we did not bring to the examination of our instincts knowledge of their comparative dignity we could never learn it from them. And that knowledge cannot itself be instinctive: the judge cannot be one of the parties judged; or, if he is, the decision [has] is worthless and there is no ground for placing the preservation of the species above self-preservation or sexual appetite. The idea that, without appealing to any court higher than the instincts themselves, we can yet find grounds for preferring one instinct above its fellows dies very hard. We grasp at useless words: we call it the 'basic', or 'fundamental', or 'primal', or 'deepest' instinct. It is of no avail. Either these words conceal a value judgement passed *upon* the instinct and therefore not derivable *from* it, or else they merely record its felt intensity, the frequency of its operation and its wide distribution. If the former, the whole attempt to base value upon instinct has been abandoned: if the latter, these observations about the quantitative aspects of a psychological event lead to no practical conclusion. It is the old dilemma. Either the premises already concealed an imperative or the conclusion remains merely in the indicative.3 Finally, it is worth inquiry whether there *is* any instinct to care for posterity or preserve the species. I do not discover it in myself: and yet I am a man rather prone to think of remote futurity—a man who can read Mr Olaf Stapledon with delight. Much less do I find it easy to believe that the majority of people who have sat opposite me in buses or stood with me in queues feel an unreflective impulse to do anything at all about the species, or posterity. Only people educated in a particular way have ever had the idea 'posterity' before their minds at all. It is difficult to assign to instinct our attitude towards an object which exists only for reflective men. What we have by nature is an impulse to preserve our own children and grandchildren; an impulse which grows progressively feebler as the imagination looks forward and finally dies out in the 'deserts of vast futurity'. No parents who were guided by this instinct would dream for a moment of setting up the claims of their hypothetical descendants against those of the baby actually crowing and kicking in the room. Those of us who accept the *Tao* may, perhaps, say that they ought to do so: but that is not open to those who treat instinct as the source of value. As we pass from mother love to rational planning for the future we are passing away from the realm of instinct into that of choice and reflection: and if instinct is the source of value, planning for the future ought to be less respectable and less obligatory than the baby language and cuddling of the fondest mother or the most fatuous nursery anecdotes of a doting father. If we are to base ourselves upon instinct, these things are the substance, and care for posterity the shadow—the huge, flickering shadow of the nursery happiness cast upon the screen of the unknown future. I do not say this projection is a bad thing: but then I do not believe that instinct is the ground of value judgements. What is absurd is to claim that your care for posterity finds its justification in instinct and then flout at every turn the only instinct on which it could be supposed to rest, tearing the child almost from the breast to creche and kindergarten in the interests of progress and the coming race. The truth finally becomes apparent that neither in any operation with factual propositions nor in any appeal to instinct can the Innovator find the basis for a system of values. None of the principles he requires are to be found there: but they are all to be found somewhere else. 'All within the four seas are his brothers' (xii. 5) says Confucius of the *Chün-tzu,* the *cuor gentil* or gentleman. *Humani nihil a me alienum puto* says the Stoic. 'Do as you would be done by,' says Jesus. 'Humanity is to be preserved,' says Locke.4 All the practical principles behind the Innovator's case for posterity, or society, or the species, are there from time immemorial in the *Tao.* But they are nowhere else. Unless you accept [practical principles] without question as being to the world of action what axioms are to the world of theory, you can have no practical principles whatever. You cannot reach them as conclusions: they are premisses. You may, since they can give no 'reason' for themselves of a kind to silence Gaius and Titius, regard them as sentiments: but then you must give up contrasting 'real' or 'rational' value with sentimental value. All value will be sentimental; and you must confess (on pain of abandoning every value) that all sentiment is not 'merely' subjective. You may, on the other hand, regard them as rational—nay as rationality itself—as things so obviously reasonable that they neither demand nor admit proof. But then you must allow that Reason can be practical, that an *ought* must not be dismissed because it cannot produce some *is* as its credential. If nothing is self-evident, nothing can be proved. Similarly if nothing is obligatory for its own sake, nothing is obligatory at all. To some it will appear that I have merely restored under another name what they always meant by basic or fundamental instinct. But much more than a choice of words is involved. The Innovator attacks traditional values (the *Tao)* in defence of what he at first supposes to be (in some special sense) 'rational' or 'biological' values. But as we have seen, all the values which he uses in attacking the *Tao,* and even claims to be substituting for it, are themselves derived from the *Tao.* If he had really started from scratch, from right outside the human tradition of value, no jugglery could have advanced him an inch towards the conception that a man should die for the community or work for posterity. If the *Tao* falls, all his own conceptions of value fall with it. Not one of them can claim any authority other than that of the *Tao.* Only by such shreds of the *Tao* as he has inherited is he enabled even to attack it. The question therefore arises what title he has to select bits of it for acceptance and to reject others. For if the bits he rejects have no authority, neither have those he retains: if what he retains is valid, what he rejects is equally valid too. The Innovator, for example, rates high the claims of posterity. He cannot get any valid claim for posterity out of instinct or (in the modern sense) reason. He is really deriving our duty to posterity from the *Tao;* our duty to do good to all men is an axiom of Practical Reason, and our duty to do good to our descendants is a clear deduction from it. But then, in every form of the *Tao* which has come down to us, side by side with the duty to children and descendants lies the duty to parents and ancestors. By what right do we reject one and accept the other? Again, the Innovator may place economic value first. To get people fed and clothed is the great end, and in pursuit of its scruples about justice and good faith may be set aside. The *Tao* of course agrees with him about the importance of getting the people fed and clothed. Unless the Innovator were himself using the *Tao* he could never have learned of such a duty. But side by side with it in the *Tao* lie those duties of justice and good faith which he is ready to debunk. What is his warrant? He may be a Jingoist, a Racialist, an extreme nationalist, who maintains that the advancement of his own people is the object to which all else ought to yield. But no kind of factual observation and no appeal to instinct will give him a ground for this option. Once more, he is in fact deriving it from the *Tao:* a duty to our own kin, because they are our own kin, is a part of traditional morality. But side by side with it in the *Tao,* and limiting it, lie the i]]nflexible demands of justice, and the rule that, in the long run, all men are our brothers. Whence comes the Innovator's authority to pick and choose? Since I can see no answer to these questions, I draw the following conclusions. This thing which I have called for convenience the *Tao,* and which others may call Natural Law or Traditional Morality or the First Principles of Practical Reason or the First Platitudes, is not one among a series of possible systems of value. It is the sole source of all value judgements. If it is rejected, all value is rejected. If any value is retained, it is retained. The effort to refute it and raise a new system of value in its place is self-contradictory. There has never been, and never will be, a radically new judgement of value in the history of the world. What purport to be new systems or (as they now call them) 'ideologies', all consist of fragments from the *Tao* itself, arbitrarily wrenched from their context in the whole and then swollen to madness in their isolation, yet still owing to the *Tao* and to it alone such validity as they possess. If my duty to my parents is a superstition, then so is my duty to posterity. If justice is a superstition, then so is my duty to my country or my race. If the pursuit of scientific knowledge is a real value, then so is conjugal fidelity. The rebellion of new ideologies against the *Tao* is a rebellion of the branches against the tree: if the[y] rebels could succeed they would find that they had destroyed themselves. The human mind has no more power of inventing a new value than of imagining a new primary colour, or, indeed, of creating a new sun and a new sky for it to move in. Does this mean, then, that no progress in our perceptions of value can ever take place? That we are bound down for ever to an unchanging code given once for all? And is it, in any event, possible to talk of obeying what I call the *Tao?* If we lump together, as I have done, the traditional moralities of East and West, the Christian, the Pagan, and the Jew, shall we not find many contradictions and some absurdities? I admit all this. Some criticism, some removal of contradictions, even some real development, is required. But there are two very different kinds of criticism. A theorist about language may approach his native tongue, as it were from outside, regarding its genius as a thing that has no claim on him and advocating wholesale alterations of its idiom and spelling in the interests of commercial convenience or scientific accuracy. That is one thing. A great poet, who has 'loved, and been well nurtured in, his mother tongue', may also make great alterations in it, but his changes of the language are made in the spirit of the language itself: he works from within. The language which suffers, has also inspired the changes. That is a different thing—as different as the works of Shakespeare are from Basic English. It is the difference between alteration from within and alteration from without: between the organic and the surgical. In the same way, the *Tao* admits development from within. There is a difference between a real moral advance and a mere innovation. From the Confucian 'Do not do to others what you would not like them to do to you' to the Christian 'Do as you would be done by' is a real advance. The morality of Nietzsche is a mere innovation. The first is an advance because no one who did not admit the validity of the old maxim could see reason for accepting the new one, and anyone who accepted the old would at once recognize the new as an extension of the same principle. If he rejected it, he would have to reject it as a superfluity, something that went too far, not as something simply heterogeneous from his own ideas of value. But the Nietzschean ethic can be accepted only if we are ready to scrap traditional morals as a mere error and then to put ourselves in a position where we can find no ground for any value judgements at all. It is the difference between a man who says to us: 'You like your vegetables moderately fresh; why not grow your own and have them perfectly fresh?' and a man who says, 'Throw away that loaf and try eating bricks and centipedes instead.' Those who understand the spirit of the *Tao* and who have been led by that spirit can modify it in directions which that spirit itself demands. Only they can know what those directions are. The outsider knows nothing about the matter. His attempts at alteration, as we have seen, contradict themselves. So far from being able to harmonize discrepancies in its letter by penetration to its spirit, he merely snatches at some one precept, on which the accidents of time and place happen to have riveted his attention, and then rides it to death—for no reason that he can give. From within the *Tao* itself comes the only authority to modify the *Tao.* This is what Confucius meant when he said 'With those who follow a different Way it is useless to take counsel'.5 This is why Aristotle said that only those who have been well brought up can usefully study ethics: to the corrupted man, the man who stands outside the *Tao,* the very starting point of this science is invisible.6 He may be hostile, but he cannot be critical: he does not know what is being discussed. This is why it was also said 'This people that knoweth not the Law is accursed'7 and 'He that believeth not shall be damned'.8 An open mind, in questions that are not ultimate, is useful. But an open mind about the ultimate foundations either of Theoretical or of Practical Reason is idiocy. If a man's mind is open on these things, let his mouth at least be shut. He can say nothing to the purpose. Outside [it] the *Tao* there is no ground for criticizing either the *Tao* or anything else. In particular instances it may, no doubt, be a matter of some delicacy to decide where the legitimate internal criticism ends and the fatal external kind begins. But wherever any precept of traditional morality is simply challenged to produce its credentials, as though the burden of proof lay on it, we have taken the [are] wrong position. The legitimate reformer endeavours to show[s] that the precept in question conflicts with some precept which its defenders allow to be more fundamental, or that it does not really embody the judgement of value it professes to embody. The direct frontal attack 'Why?'—'What good does it do?'—'Who said so?' is never permissible; not because it is harsh or offensive but because no values at all can justify themselves on that level. If you persist in *that* kind of trial you will destroy all values, and so destroy the bases of your own criticism as well as the thing criticized. You must not hold a pistol to the head of the *Tao.* Nor must we postpone obedience to a precept until its credentials have been examined. Only those who are practising the *Tao* will understand it. It is the well-nurtured man, the *cuor gentil,* and he alone, who can recognize Reason when it comes.9 It is Paul, the Pharisee, the man 'perfect as touching the Law' who learns where and how that Law was deficient.10 In order to avoid misunderstanding, I may add that though I myself am a Theist, and indeed a Christian, I am not here attempting any indirect argument for Theism. I am simply arguing that if we are to have values at all we must accept the ultimate platitudes of Practical Reason as having absolute validity: that any attempt, having become sceptical about these, to reintroduce value lower down on some supposedly more 'realistic' basis, is doomed. Whether this position implies a supernatural origin for the *Tao* is a question I am not here concerned with.

This is an inescapable component of life. We understand our practices in terms of ethical categories. **READER[[2]](#footnote-2):** What is the alternative? To understand ethics in its own terms. This deprives us of explanatory naturalism. We can't without error expect to understand ethics in any terms but ethical. This has seemed to many philosophers to be unduly restrictive, and to threaten relativism.8 But in fact it does not lead to these difficulties ? or, more accurately, it doesn't exac erbate them. The problem of displaying the rationality of ethics in a com pelling way is real. But it is also general. It is the same as the problem of displaying the rationality of all the other things we do: playing games, conducting scientific enquiry, writing philosophy papers. We might be able to make connections between activities using an analogy with another game, say, to illuminate the game of chess for someone. But all we will ever be able to lay our hands on in the activity of explaining, is more of the same: parts of our life. The idea of our being able to use 'the world as it is in itself to explain any of our activities is practically contradictory. And the idea that rationality supernature, rather than first nature can be used to explain ethics in this way, involves a similar error. The way we think acquire beliefs, deliberate, justify ourselves is also part of our life. It is as 'fundamental' in that life as ethics is, but no more so, no more knowable 'in itself, as Aristotle, in the grip of a similar error to our own, would have put it, than it is 'to us', here and now, living as we live. So explanatory accounts of ethics, whether they invoke first-nature or super natural reason, are mistaken. Explicatory naturalism is as far as we can go. And as far as we need to go.

We cannot derive an ethic or hash out intricacies of confounding influences. Ethics is practical; it is learned by trying to live ethically, not studying ethics. To resolve disagreement we must appeal to individual who act as moral pioneers. **LEWIS (2):** Does this mean, then, that no progress in our perceptions of value can ever take place? That we are bound down for ever to an unchanging code given once for all? And is it, in any event, possible to talk of obeying what I call the Tao? If we lump together, as I have done, the traditional moralities of East and West, the Christian, the Pagan, and the Jew, shall we not find many contradictions and some absurdities? I admit all this. Some criticism, some removal of contradictions, even some real development, is required. But there are two very different kinds of criticism[s]. A theorist about language may approach [their] native tongue, as it were from outside, regarding its genius as a thing that has no claim on him and advocating wholesale alterations of its idiom and spelling in the interests of commercial convenience or scientific accuracy. That is one thing. A great poet, who has 'loved, and been well nurtured in [their] his mother tongue', may also make great alterations in it, but [their] his changes of the language are made in the spirit of the language itself: [they] works from within. The language which suffers, has also inspired the changes. That is a different thing—as different as the works of Shakespeare are from Basic English. It is the difference between alteration from within and alteration from without: between the organic and the surgical. In the same way, the Tao admits development from within. There is a difference between a real moral advance and a mere innovation. From the Confucian 'Do not do to others what you would not like them to do to you' to the Christian 'Do as you would be done by' is a real advance. The morality of Nietzsche is a mere innovation. The first is an advance because no one who did not admit the validity of the old maxim could see reason for accepting the new one, and anyone who accepted the old would at once recognize the new as an extension of the same principle. If he rejected it, he would have to reject it as a superfluity, something that went too far, not as something simply heterogeneous from his own ideas of value. But the Nietzschean ethic can be accepted only if we are ready to scrap traditional morals as a mere error and then to put ourselves in a position where we can find no ground for any value judgements at all. It is the difference between a man who says to us: 'You like your vegetables moderately fresh; why not grow your own and have them perfectly fresh?' and a man who says, 'Throw away that loaf and try eating bricks and centipedes instead.' Those who understand the spirit of the Tao and who have been led by that spirit can modify it in directions, which that spirit itself demands. Only they can know what those directions are. The outsider knows nothing about the matter. His attempts at alteration, as we have seen, contradict themselves. So far from being able to harmonize discrepancies in its letter by penetration to its spirit, he merely snatches at some one precept, on which the accidents of time and place happen to have riveted his attention, and then rides it to death—for no reason that he can give. From within the Tao itself comes the only authority to modify the Tao. This is what Confucius meant when he said 'With those who follow a different Way it is useless to take counsel'.5 This is why Aristotle said that only those who have been well brought up can usefully study ethics: to the corrupted man, the man who stands outside the Tao, the very starting point of this science is invisible.6 He may be hostile, but he cannot be critical: he does not know what is being discussed. This is why it was also said 'This people that knoweth not the Law is accursed'7 and 'He that believeth not shall be damned'.8 An open mind, in questions that are not ultimate, is useful. But an open mind about the ultimate foundations either of Theoretical or of Practical Reason is idiocy. If a man's mind is open on these things, let his mouth at least be shut. He can say nothing to the purpose. Outside the Tao there is no ground for criticizing either the Tao or anything else. In particular instances it may, no doubt, be a matter of some delicacy to decide where the legitimate internal criticism ends and the fatal external kind begins. But wherever any precept of traditional morality is simply challenged to produce its credentials, as though the burden of proof lay on it, we have taken the wrong position. The legitimate reformer endeavours to show that the precept in question conflicts with some precept which its defenders allow to be more fundamental, or that it does not really embody the judgement of value it professes to embody. The direct frontal attack 'Why?'—'What good does it do?'—'Who said so?' is never permissible; not because it is harsh or offensive but because no values at all can justify themselves on that level. If you persist in that kind of trial you will destroy all values, and so destroy the bases of your own criticism as well as the thing criticized. You must not hold a pistol to the head of the Tao. Nor must we postpone obedience to a precept until its credentials have been examined. Only those who are practising the Tao will understand it. It is the well-nurtured man, the cuor gentil, and he alone, who can recognize Reason when it comes.9 It is Paul, the Pharisee, the man 'perfect as touching the Law' who learns where and how that Law was deficient.10 In order to avoid misunderstanding, I may add that though I myself am a Theist, and indeed a Christian, I am not here attempting any indirect argument for Theism. I am simply arguing that if we are to have values at all we must accept the ultimate platitudes of Practical Reason as having absolute validity: that any attempt, having become sceptical about these, to reintroduce value lower down on some supposedly more 'realistic' basis, is doomed. Whether this position implies a supernatural origin for the Tao is a question I am not here concerned with.

The standard is **using testimony from qualified moral authorities.** This means we trust people *directly*; we are not qualified to draw new implications from their philosophy. We weigh by comparing the lives of the people we appeal to and their relation to the issues addressed.

1) Given epistemic superiority of others, reason requires appealing to them. Prejudice is inevitable, we always interpret within a context. **GADAMER[[3]](#footnote-3):** The Enlightenment's distinction between faith in authority and using one's own reason is, in itself, legitimate. If the prestige of authority displaces one's own judgment, then authority is in fact a source of prejudices. But this does not preclude its being a source of truth, and that is what the Enlightenment failed to see when it denigrated all authority. To be convinced of this, we need only consider one of the greatest forerunners of the European Enlightenment, namely Descartes. Despite the radicalness of his methodological thinking, we know that Descartes excluded morality from the total reconstruction of all truths by reason. This was what he meant by his provisional morality. It seems to me symptomatic that he did not in fact elaborate his definitive morality and that its principles, as far as we can judge from his letters to Elizabeth, contain hardly anything new. It is obviously unthinkable to defer morality until modern science has progressed enough to provide a new basis for it. In fact the denigration of authority is not the only prejudice established by the Enlightenment. It also distorted the very concept of authority. Based on the Enlightenment conception of reason and freedom, the concept of authority could be viewed as diametrically opposed to reason and freedom: to be, in fact, blind obedience. This is the meaning that we find in the language critical of modern dictatorships. But this is not the essence of authority. Admittedly, it is primarily persons that have authority; but the authority of persons is ultimately based not on the subjection and abdication of reason but on an act of acknowledgment and knowledge—the knowledge, namely, that the other is superior to oneself in judgment and insight and that for this reason his judgment takes precedence—i.e., it has priority over one's own. This is connected with the fact that authority cannot actually be bestowed but is earned, and must be earned if someone is to lay claim to it. It rests on acknowledgment and hence on an act of reason itself which, aware of its own limitations, trusts to the better insight of others. Authority in this sense, properly understood, has nothing to do with blind obedience to commands. Indeed, authority has to do not with obedience but rather with knowledge. It is true that authority implies the capacity to command and be obeyed. But this proceeds only from the authority that a person has. Even the anonymous and impersonal authority of a superior which derives from his office is not ultimately based on this hierarchy, but is what makes it possible. Here also its true basis is an act of freedom and reason that grants the authority of a superior fundamentally because he has a wider view of things or is better informed—i.e., once again, because he knows more.22 Thus, acknowledging authority is always connected with the idea that what the authority says is not irrational and arbitrary but can, in principle, be discovered to be true. This is the essence of the authority claimed by the teacher, the superior, the expert. The prejudices that they implant are legitimized by the person who presents them. But in this way they become prejudices not just in favor of a person but a content, since they effect the same disposition to believe something that can be brought about in other ways—e.g., by good reasons. Thus the essence of authority belongs in the context of a theory of prejudices free from the extremism of the Enlightenment. Here we can find support in the romantic criticism of the Enlightenment; for there is one form of authority particularly defended by romanticism, namely tradition. That which has been sanctioned by tradition and custom has an authority that is nameless, and our finite historical being is marked by the fact that the authority of what has been handed down to us—and not just what is clearly grounded—always has power over our attitudes and behavior. All education depends on this, and even though, in the case of education, the educator loses his function when his charge comes of age and sets his own insight and decisions in the place of the authority of the educator, becoming mature does not mean that a person becomes his own master in the sense that he is freed from all tradition. The real force of morals, for example, is based on tradition. They are freely taken over but by no means created by a free insight or grounded on reasons. This is precisely what we call tradition: the ground of their validity. And in fact it is to romanticism that we owe this correction of the Enlightenment: that tradition has a justification that lies beyond rational grounding and in large measure determines our institutions and attitudes. What makes classical ethics superior to modern moral philosophy is that it grounds the transition from ethics to "politics," the art of right legislation, on the indispensability of tradition.

2) Only by assuming testimony of others can we answer moral questions. **CHESTERTON[[4]](#footnote-4):** My objection to Mr. Lowes Dickinson and the reassertors of the pagan ideal is, then, this. I accuse them of ignoring definite human discoveries in the moral world, discoveries as definite, though not as material, as the discovery of the circulation of the blood. We cannot go back to an ideal of reason and sanity. For mankind has discovered that reason does not lead to sanity. We cannot go back to an ideal of pride and enjoyment. For mankind has discovered that pride does not lead to enjoyment. I do not know by what extraordinary mental accident modern writers so constantly connect the idea of progress with the idea of independent thinking Progress is obviously the antithesis of independent thinking. For under independent or individualistic thinking, every man [one] starts at the beginning, and goes, in all probability, just as far as [their] his [mother or] father before [them] him. But if there really be anything of the nature of progress, it must mean, above all things, the careful study and assumption of the whole of the past. I accuse Mr. Lowes Dickinson and his school of reaction in the only real sense. If he likes, let him ignore these great historic mysteries—the mystery of charity, the mystery of chivalry, the mystery of faith. If he likes, let him ignore the plough or the printing-press. But if we do revive and pursue the pagan ideal of a simple and rational self-completion we shall end—where Paganism ended. I do not mean that we shall end in destruction. I mean that we shall end in Christianity.

3) The content of moral principles is not that we follow authorities, but that the best way to conform to the true principle is through testimonial. Listening to doctors doesn’t make you healthier, but one is likely to take healthier actions if they listen to their doctor. Other moral principles are not competitive with the AC. They may be true, but if so they were likely already synthesized by the AC moral experts and do not act as counter evidence, anymore than an anecdote can be counter-evidence to a study that uses that anecdote as a data point.

4) Testimony is inescapable. You accept the testimony of your authors in their descriptions of the world. The judge accepts your testimony in believing your authors say what you claim. We accepted the testimony of the tournament staff. We cannot reason without accepting testimony to provide reasonable starting points. Responses to the framework cannot challenge testimony, as it is inescapable, but prove moral testimony is uniquely illegitimate.

underview:

Util challenges assumptions about **intrinsic, unconditional badness.** No action could be intrinsically bad from this standpoint, even genocide or gruesome torture. Any action is potentially permissible or even **obligatory** if performing it led to better consequences. **ANSCOMBE:[[5]](#footnote-5)** It is a necessary feature of consequentialism that it is a shallow philosophy. For there are always borderline cases in ethics. Now if you are either an Aristotelian, or a believer in divine law, you will deal with a borderline case by considering whether doing such‐and‐such in such‐and‐such circumstances is, say, murder, or is an act of injustice; and according as you decide it is or it isn't, you judge it to be a thing to do or not. This would be the method of casuistry; and while it may lead you to stretch a point on the circumference, it will not permit you to destroy the center. But if you are a consequentialist, the question "What is it right to do in such‐and‐such circumstances?" is a stupid one to raise. The casuist raises such a question only to ask "Would it be permissible to do so‐and‐so?" or "Would it be permissible not to do so‐and‐so?" Only if it would not be permissible not to do so‐and‐so could [s]he say "This would be the thing to do."[6] Otherwise, though [s]he may speak against some action, [s]he cannot prescribe [it] any‐for in an actual case, the circumstances (beyond the ones imagined) might suggest all sorts of possibilities, and you can't know in advance what the[y] possibilities are going to be. Now the consequentialist [cannot] has no footing on which to say "This would be permissible, this not"; because by his own hypothesis, it is the consequences that are to decide, and [s]he has no business to pretend that [s]he can lay it down what possible twists [one] a man could give doing this or that

pope contention:

Pope affirms [short card]. **CAMPBELL AND LIVINGSTON[[6]](#footnote-6):** During the civil rights era, Martin Luther King Jr. reminded us that there is a higher moral law of justice that people of conscience must follow. Today, Pope Francis reminds us that “money must serve, not rule” and that a moral economic system should “set about providing each inhabitant of the planet with the minimum wherewithal to live in dignity and freedom, with the possibility of supporting a family, educating children, praising God and developing one’s own human potential.” Ultimately, our faith compels us to be in solidarity with people who suffer at the margins of our economy. The Christian Scriptures say that we will be judged for what we have done for those in poverty. Using this moral standard, Obama’s executive order is more than justified; it is required. We know this because we have marched with these workers as they went on strike as part of the Good Jobs Nation campaign, and we brought a group of these workers to meet with senior White House officials on several occasions. One of these workers was Robyn Law, a fast-food worker in the Pentagon, who went on strike because she struggles to support her disabled mother and young child on a salary of $8.75 an hour. Another worker was Melissa Roseboro, a grandmother who earns $8.43 an hour and relies on food stamps to put food on the table because she makes so little at her job at the McDonald’s inside the Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum. We commend the president for his compassionate response to the needs of Robyn, Melissa and their co-workers. By using the power of his pen to lift the minimum wage for federally contracted workers, Obama is affirming the dignity and worth of all working people. As the CEO of the federal government, he is also sending a powerful message to the CEOs of private corporations that they too must honor their workers with just wages. Let’s pray that these CEOs, as well as our Congress, follow the president’s example. Still more need to be done. As people of faith, we must continue our efforts to make sure the government uses its contracting clout to ensure corporations pay workers living wages and benefits, follow labor laws and give workers a seat at the table so they don’t have to go on strike to have their voices heard.

1) The Pope occupies a unique position of authority. Few people are as carefully vetted morally as those given an established position over millions. The Pope has been chosen from a council of Cardinals who themselves gained positions through success as moral examples to others.

2) The Catholic moral tradition’s development over thousands of years helps weigh and evaluate concerns with a wider context than topics discussed today. It has permeated ethical traditions– like med ethics, natural law, just war, double effect — and has resources to represent the moral authority people reflexively recognize. By being grounded in long-standing moral tradition, the Pope has unique access and pull upon the moral authority of years of moral teachers like Jesus and Paul, multiplying the indirect authority of the Pope.

3) All Popes require orthodoxy and orthopraxy, reconciling academic and practical insights unlike many academics or leaders familiar only with the abstraction or particular. Popes are scholars and publish each year but have to do a lot of social advocacy and service.

4) Pope Francis has presented examples to billions with acts of justice. **OBAMA[[7]](#footnote-7):** Rare is the leader who makes us want to be better people. Pope Francis is such a leader. His Holiness has moved us with his message of inclusion, especially for the poor, **the** marginalized and the **outcas**t. But it has been his deeds, his bearing, the gestures at once simple and profound — embracing the sick, ministering to the homeless, washing the feet of young prisoners **— that** have inspired us **all. Pope Francis remind**s **us** in ways that words alone cannot **that** no matter our station in life, **we are bound by** moral **obligations to one another**. His example challenges us to live out those obligations through work — to alleviate poverty, reduce inequality and promote peace; **to feed the hungry, shelter the homeless, care for the sick and open** new doors of **opportunity** and visions of possibility **for everyone**. **His message of love** and inclusion, his regard for “the least of these,” distills the essence of Jesus’ teachings and is a tonic for a cynical age. May we heed his humble example.

Testimony of the Pope affirms. We should restrict inequality and exploitation. Greed is constant violence and government must work to counteract it. **POPE FRANCIS:**[[8]](#footnote-8)52. In our time humanity is experiencing a turning-point in its history, as we can see from the advances being made in so many fields. We can only praise the steps being taken to improve people’s welfare in areas such as health care, education and communications. At the same time we have to remember that the majority of our contemporaries are barely living from day to day, with dire consequences. A number of diseases are spreading. The hearts of many people are gripped by fear and desperation, even in the so-called rich countries. The joy of living frequently fades, lack of respect for others and violence are on the rise, and inequality is increasingly evident. It is a struggle to live and, often, to live with precious little dignity. This epochal change has been set in motion by the enormous qualitative, quantitative, rapid and cumulative advances occuring in the sciences and in technology, and by their instant application in different areas of nature and of life. We are in an age of knowledge and information, which has led to new and often anonymous kinds of power. No to an economy of exclusion 53. Just as the commandment “Thou shalt not kill” sets a clear limit in order to safeguard the value of human life, today we also have to say “thou shalt not” to an economy of exclusion and inequality. Such an economy kills. How can it be that it is not a news item when an elderly homeless person dies of exposure, but it is news when the stock market loses two points? This is a case of exclusion. Can we continue to stand by when food is thrown away while people are starving? This is a case of inequality. Today everything comes under the laws of competition and the survival of the fittest, where the powerful feed upon the powerless. As a consequence, masses of people find themselves excluded and marginalized: without work, without possibilities, without any means of escape. Human beings are themselves considered consumer goods to be used and then discarded. We have created a “throw away” culture which is now spreading. It is no longer simply about exploitation and oppression, but something new. Exclusion ultimately has to do with what it means to be a part of the society in which we live; those excluded are no longer society’s underside or its fringes or its disenfranchised – they are no longer even a part of it. The excluded are not the “exploited” but the outcast, the “leftovers”. 54. In this context, some people continue to defend trickle-down theories which assume that economic growth, encouraged by a free market, will inevitably succeed in bringing about greater justice and inclusiveness in the world. This opinion, which has never been confirmed by the facts, expresses a crude and naïve trust in the goodness of those wielding economic power and in the sacralized workings of the prevailing economic system. Meanwhile, the excluded are still waiting. To sustain a lifestyle which excludes others, or to sustain enthusiasm for that selfish ideal, a globalization of indifference has developed. Almost without being aware of it, we end up being incapable of feeling compassion at the outcry of the poor, weeping for other people’s pain, and feeling a need to help them, as though all this were someone else’s responsibility and not our own. The culture of prosperity deadens us; we are thrilled if the market offers us something new to purchase. In the meantime all those lives stunted for lack of opportunity seem a mere spectacle; they fail to move us. No to the new idolatry of money 55. One cause of this situation is found in our relationship with money, since we calmly accept its dominion over ourselves and our societies. The current financial crisis can make us overlook the fact that it originated in a profound human crisis: the denial of the primacy of the human person! We have created new idols. The worship of the ancient golden calf (cf. Ex 32:1-35) has returned in a new and ruthless guise in the idolatry of money and the dictatorship of an impersonal economy lacking a truly human purpose. The worldwide crisis affecting finance and the economy lays bare their imbalances and, above all, their lack of real concern for human beings; man is reduced to one of his needs alone: consumption. 56. While the earnings of a minority are growing exponentially, so too is the gap separating the majority from the prosperity enjoyed by those happy few. This imbalance is the result of ideologies, which defend the absolute autonomy of the marketplace and financial speculation. Consequently, they reject the right of states [are], charged with vigilance for the common good, to exercise any form of control. A new tyranny is thus born, invisible and often virtual, which unilaterally and relentlessly imposes its own laws and rules. Debt and the accumulation of interest also make it difficult for countries to realize the potential of their own economies and keep citizens from enjoying their real purchasing power. To all this we can add widespread corruption and self-serving tax evasion, which have taken on worldwide dimensions. The thirst for power and possessions knows no limits. In this system, which tends to devour everything which stands in the way of increased profits, whatever is fragile, like the environment, is defenseless before the interests of a deified market, which become the only rule. No to a financial system which rules rather than serves 57. Behind this attitude lurks a rejection of ethics and a rejection of God. Ethics has come to be viewed with a certain scornful derision. It is seen as counterproductive, too human, because it makes money and power relative. It is felt to be a threat, since it condemns the manipulation and debasement of the person. In effect, ethics leads to a God who calls for a committed response which is outside the categories of the marketplace. When these latter are absolutized, God can only be seen as uncontrollable, unmanageable, even dangerous, since he calls human beings to their full realization and to freedom from all forms of enslavement. Ethics – a non-ideological ethics – would make it possible to bring about balance and a more humane social order. With this in mind, I encourage financial experts and political leaders to ponder the words of one of the sages of antiquity: “Not to share one’s wealth with the poor is to steal from them and to take away their livelihood. It is not our own goods which we hold, but theirs”.[55] 58. A financial reform open to such ethical considerations would require a vigorous change of approach on the part of political leaders. I urge them to face this challenge with determination and an eye to the future, while not ignoring, of course, the specifics of each case. Money must serve, not rule! The Pope loves everyone, rich and poor alike, but he is obliged in the name of Christ to remind all that the rich must help, respect and promote the poor. I exhort you to generous solidarity and to the return of economics and finance to an ethical approach, which favours human beings. No to the inequality which spawns violence 59. Today in many places we hear a call for greater security. But until exclusion and inequality in society and between peoples are reversed, it will be impossible to eliminate violence. The poor and the poorer peoples are accused of violence, yet without equal opportunities the different forms of aggression and conflict will find a fertile terrain for growth and eventually explode. When a society – whether local, national or global – is willing to leave a part of itself on the fringes, no political programmes or resources spent on law enforcement or surveillance systems can indefinitely guarantee tranquility. This is not the case simply because inequality provokes a violent reaction from those excluded from the system, but because the socioeconomic system is unjust at its root. Just as goodness tends to spread, the toleration of evil, which is injustice, tends to expand[s] its baneful influence and quietly to undermine any political and social system, no matter how solid it may appear. If every action has its consequences, an evil embedded in the structures of a society has a constant potential for disintegration and death. It is evil crystallized in unjust social structures, which cannot be the basis of hope for a better future. We are far from the so-called “end of history”, since the conditions for a sustainable and peaceful development have not yet been adequately articulated and realized. 60. Today’s economic mechanisms promote inordinate consumption, yet it is evident that unbridled consumerism combined with inequality proves doubly damaging to the social fabric. Inequality eventually engenders a violence which recourse to arms cannot and never will be able to resolve. It serves only to offer false hopes to those clamouring for heightened security, even though nowadays we know that weapons and violence, rather than providing solutions, create new and more serious conflicts. Some simply content themselves with blaming the poor and the poorer countries themselves for their troubles; indulging in unwarranted generalizations, they claim that the solution is an “education” that would tranquilize them, making them tame and harmless. All this becomes even more exasperating for the marginalized in the light of the widespread and deeply rooted corruption found in many countries – in their governments, businesses and institutions – whatever the political ideology of their leaders.

This should start in rehabbing the dignity of work. Saying your work is worth a living wage endorses dignity; your life is worth its own existence. It is not about economic wellbeing, but an ideological shift in which we respect the dignity of work beyond economic value. This is endorsed by Pope Francis. **BISHOP BLAIRE**[[9]](#footnote-9)**:** We are here today to celebrate the 75th anniversary of the Fair Labor Standards Act, signed in 1938, which codified for the first time a national minimum wage and other important worker protections, and all but eliminated child labor. It is very appropriate that we undertake this discussion in the current economic and political climate. I will address later the bishops’ support for the Fair Labor Standards Act and subsequent efforts to raise the minimum wage, but here I will mention that the support is rooted in Pope Leo XIII’s seminal encyclical Rerum Novarum, which stated that a worker’s wages, to be just and consistent with human dignity, must be sufficient to support a family in comfort and even leave some for savings.1 I testify before you today not as an economist, a statistician, or a labor market expert, but rather as a pastor and teacher concerned with human development and the protection of human dignity. I will not speak to the specifics of policies, but rather to the conditions that must emerge in society and in the family to make those policies just. A just wage is a moral issue; however for me it is also a personal one. After being a widower twice in life and raising eleven children, my father in 1939 remarried at the age of 59. Eleven years later, at the age of 70, he was compelled by economic factors to re-enter the workforce to keep food on the table for his wife and three children, of which I was one. After a lifetime of professional work and retirement, he worked again until he was 80 packing groceries. Without this job we would not have had enough to eat or a roof over our heads as a family, and when he died there would have been no Social Security benefits earned for the surviving family. Five years into a desperately slow economic recovery, deep economic problems persist:  Over four million people have been jobless for over six months, and that does not include the millions more who have simply given up looking for work;  The gap between unemployed/underemployed job seekers and open positions is extraordinary: for every available job, there are as many as five people vying for it; 2  Millions of families live with anxiety and uncertainty as they cope with stagnant or falling wages, forcing them to take second or third jobs and even forcing some teenage children into the workforce prematurely to help support the family;  Half of the jobs in this country pay less than $27,000 a year3 , and Poverty remains high: there are over 46 million people living in poverty, 16 million of them children. In other words, over one in five children in our country lives in poverty.4 The causes of poverty and our broken economy are many, but as Pope John Paul II noted in Laborem Exercens: ...human work is a key, probably the essential key, to the whole social question, if we try to see that question really from the point of view of [hu]man's good. And if the solution--or rather the gradual solution--of the social question, which keeps coming up and becomes ever more complex, must be sought in the direction of “making life more human,” then the key, namely human work, acquires fundamental and decisive importance.5 In other words, if we are going to fix the American economy, then a discussion of workers’ wages is a good place to start. Work has an inherent dignity, so just wages gained from work support that dignity. Insufficient wages violate it. Mr. Chairman, the Church has a rich tradition on human labor rooted in the belief that work has an inherent dignity. The new bishop of Rome, Pope Francis, recently remarked that “[w]ork, to use a metaphor, ‘anoints’ us with dignity, fills us with dignity, makes us similar to God, who has worked and still works, who always acts; it gives one the ability to maintain oneself, one’s family, to contribute to the growth of one’s own nation.”6 Hence the importance of the worker’s wage: since work has an inherent dignity, then there must be little doubt that wages are more than a mere product of the economy. A just wage confirms the dignity of the worker. And conversely, a wage that does not even allow[ing] a worker to support a family or meet basic human needs tears her down and demeans her dignity. The worker becomes just another commodity. I think this is the type of situation Pope Francis was talking about when he said earlier this month: Man is not in charge today, money is in charge, money rules. God our Father did not give the task of caring for the earth to money, but to us, to men and women: we have this task! Instead, men and women are sacrificed to the idols of profit and consumption: it is the ‘culture of waste.’ If you break a computer it is a tragedy, but poverty, the needs, the dramas of so many people end up becoming the norm.7 The Working Poor Families Project recently reported that in 2011 there were 10.4 million lowincome working families.8,9 Those families include 23.5 million children. Work should be a ladder out of poverty for families, it should not trap them in poverty. Yet this is where we find ourselves--a growing number of families are working but do not make enough to live in dignity. It is a scandal that the richest country in the world has allowed over 23 million children in working poor families to become the norm. These families struggle to provide their children with the adequate nutrition, school supplies, clothes, and security they need for their educational, social, and emotional development. I am sure members of the committee will agree that we must not tolerate so many children living under such circumstances. Many of these low-income workers have to rely on charity or the safety net to supplement their wages in order to meet basic needs. For example, as you know funding for the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly known as food stamps) is currently being debated. Many people do not know that the majority of SNAP households with a capable, working-age adult are working. The percentage goes up in households with children. It is not difficult to identify the problem here: unjust wages. If Congress is concerned with rising costs in the SNAP program, Congress should raise the wages of those working families, so they can afford food on their own. The family is the fundamental unit of society, and work is the principal means by which families gain the resources to form and sustain themselves. The importance of the family for individual human development on all levels has been well established. It is in and among our family that we learn to love and accept love, forgive and be forgiven, argue and reconcile--we learn how to interact with each other as humans. In a certain sense, the family is organized around work. Without the remuneration that comes from our work, humans would not have the resources to form or sustain families. It was true two thousand years ago with the family that lived in Nazareth; it was true in 1891 at the time of Pope Leo XIII; and it is as apparent as ever now. If families are the fundamental seed of society, then decent jobs with just wages are the water that allows them to grow. Our diocese of Stockton, in the San Joaquin Valley of Central California, includes some of the deepest and most pervasive poverty in our country. Every day, I see families struggling to survive under the weight of too little food and too many bills. What do they pay for this month-- school clothes for the kids or gasoline to get to work? Fresh produce for healthy diets or the rent? No family should be faced with such extreme choices. So it is not just a lack of work that creates this pressure, but for many it is a lack of decent wages. Many if not most of the families I encounter with these problems have an income, but it is not enough to support them. Mom works at the supermarket. Dad has two jobs as a short order cook. And the people who are unemployed are desperate for work. Many families I encounter in this position, although they are grateful for the support of food pantries, donation centers, and the government, do not want to rely on the generosity of others. They want to be self-sufficient. Employers have a moral obligation to pay a just wage... Catholic teaching has long recognized that everyone and all institutions in an economy have an obligation to protect human life and dignity, and advance the common good. As the Catholic bishops have pointed out, “We judge any economic system by what it does for and to people and by how it permits all to participate in it. The economy should serve people, not the other way around.”10 A vital piece of the conversation that I believe has been missing is the obligation of employers to pay just wages. The Church teaches: A just wage is the legitimate fruit of work. To refuse or withhold it can be a grave injustice. In determining fair pay both the needs and the contributions of each person must be taken into account. “Remuneration for work should guarantee man the opportunity to provide a dignified livelihood for himself and his family on the material, social, cultural, and spiritual level, taking into account the role and the productivity of each, the state of the business, and the common good.” Agreement between the parties [does] not sufficient to justify morally the amount to be received in wages.11 Unfortunately, too many families are forced to work two or more jobs just to make enough money to purchase basic needs. Possibly this is because the current minimum wage yields an annual salary of about $15,080. This amount is below the poverty level for any size family that includes even one child, according to the Census Bureau.12 When the minimum wage does not even permit a family to raise a child, it has failed to guarantee a worker “the opportunity to provide a dignified livelihood for himself and his family.” This is unacceptable. Private enterprises, at their best, create decent jobs, contribute to the common good, and pay wages that help workers form and nurture families. Some businesses, unfortunately, chase profits and success at the expense of workers’ dignity and, in the most tragic cases--as we have seen recently in Bangladesh, Texas, Arizona, and Louisiana--their lives. Business leaders, who have been given much and have a legitimate vocation, must fight the urge to live a “divided life.... Dividing the demands of one’s faith from one’s work in business is a fundamental error which contributes to much of the damage done by businesses in our world today, including overwork to the detriment of family or spiritual life....”13 One of the great challenges of business leaders today is to bring moral values and ethics into the business world, so that the economy truly serves the person. Businesses certainly need to be profitable for the economy to function properly, but that profit must not come to at the expense of workers. ...And the government [ought to] has an obligation to ensure it. Mr. Chairman, I have been discouraged by those in Congress, with some notable exceptions, who seem to not have a real concern with the enduring decent jobs crisis in this country. There are some in Congress who seem to think our current situation is acceptable. While it is certainly the primary responsibility of employers to pay workers a just wage, it is proper for government to take steps to ensure this takes place. Catholic teaching has always endorsed the potential benefits and freedoms of a market economy. It also points out that the considerable energies and powers of the market shall not go unchecked, and must always be oriented toward protecting human life and dignity, and advancing the common good. Blessed John XXIII wrote about the obligation of the state: As for the State, its whole raison d'etre is the realization of the common good in the temporal order. It cannot, therefore, hold aloof from economic matters. On the contrary, it must do all in its power to promote the production of a sufficient supply of material goods, “the use of which is necessary for the practice of virtue.” It has also the duty to protect the rights of all its people, and particularly of its weaker members, the workers, women and children. It can never be right for the State to shirk its obligation of working actively for the betterment of the condition of the workingman.14 Setting a just minimum wage is merely one way government has historically acted to protect the dignity of the worker, encourage family formation, and ensure children have access to basic human needs. The Catholic Church has been a consistent and vocal supporter of just wages, in teaching and in action. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to be here to commemorate the 75th anniversary of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) because of its central importance in the history of protecting worker rights in this country. FLSA was a vital step in acknowledging the dignity of the worker, and it dovetailed with the established Church teaching on workers. In 1891, when Pope Leo XIII wrote Rerum Novarum in the context of the Industrial Revolution, his “central theme [was] the just ordering of society.”15 He established the necessity to safeguard the dignity of the worker, the moral imperative of a just wage, and the vital role of the government to assuring this. These principles of Leo have been affirmed and expanded by succeeding popes, the conference of Catholic bishops here in the United States and bishops around the world, and has been raised up in multiple forms by influential Catholic thinkers. In 1919 the National Catholic War Council, a precursor to our current USCCB, issued its recommendations for rebuilding America after World War I in its “Program for Social Reconstruction.” In it, the bishops unequivocally supported a living wage, saying: ...a living wage is not necessarily the full measure of justice. All the Catholic authorities on the subject explicitly declare that this is only the minimum of justice.... Since our industrial resources and instrumentalities are sufficient to provide more than a living wage for a very large proportion of the workers, why should we acquiesce in a theory which denies them this measure of the comforts of life? Such a policy is not only of very questionable morality, but is unsound economically.16 For the Catholic bishops of the United States, advocating a just minimum wage is foundational. Every time Congress or an Administration has suggested raising the minimum wage, the bishops have been supportive simply because it is consistent with our teaching and we see the effects firsthand in the families of our parishioners and our own communities. The Church will continue to be on the side of workers and their families in the struggle to build a just and fair economy. Mr. Chairman, to conclude, I am increasingly concerned with the growing scourge of inequality in our country. Recently, a study came out about Americans’ attitudes about inequality.17 The results were jarring: Americans believe we already have an intolerable level of inequality, and would like to live in a more equal society. The reality is much more severe than the perception, which makes our desired society even further away from the reality. Pope Emeritus Benedict XVI, in Caritas in Veritate, gave us a very clear measure of a just economy: The dignity of the individual and the demands of justice require, particularly today, that economic choices do not cause disparities in wealth to increase in an excessive[ly] and morally unacceptable manner, and that we continue to prioritize the goal of access to steady employment for everyone.... Through the systemic increase of social inequality... not only does social cohesion suffer, thereby placing democracy at risk, but so too does the economy, through the progressive erosion of “social capital”: the network of relationships of trust, dependability, and respect for the rules, all of which are indispensable for any form of civil coexistence.18 He could have been speaking about the United States. In recent decades, gains from economic growth have been spread very unevenly. Last year, the Congressional Budget Office reported that over the past 30 years, the average income of the wealthiest one percent has increased 275 percent. The income of the poorest 20 percent among us increased, on average, by less than 20 percent.19 Most recently, the disparity has grown more extreme. Over the last two years, median household income has flatlined for the poorest workers, but for the middle class it has actually gone down.20 Mr. Chairman, these severe imbalances are not inevitable, but the solutions are varied, numerous, and complicated. Addressing what ails our economy will take patience, persistence, and a steadfast commitment on the part of everyone to placing the common good above self-interest. We can begin the process of fixing our economy by returning the worker to the center of economic life. One of the best ways to do that is with decent jobs that pay just wages, thereby honoring human dignity and restoring hope to workers and families. Increasing the minimum wage to a level that reflects the real economic reality faced by families today would go far in building an economy worthy of the humans that operate in it.

pope contention frontlines:

**AT francis indict:**

1) only attacks him for not moving quickly enough, not that he’s a bad person.

2) the comments it quotes are the Pope saying women are different from men – and they are different. This is not an inherently sexist statement.

3) the man O’Brien criticizing Francis is just a pro-abortion activist, not some unequestionable authority.

4) Neglects the differene between inter-institutional reform and extra-institutional reform when you reform something from the inside, you have to take it as more of a process. there are complex historical issues at play, as well as an injunction to maintain Church unity.

5) turn: the actual article they cite is like both the left and right don’t think he is going far enough, which is probaly a good sign that he is committed to reform not pandering to an agenda.

**AT indicts of the faith’s application:**

1. Authorities like Francis are not unreliable just because the institution is not reliable. The fact that some really awful person attends a school doesn’t mean I don’t trust the principal. If Einstein went to a school, the fact that some awful person went there shouldn’t matter to my trusting him.

2. No link - these are fundamentally two different institutions – the popes the 1ac discusses only go back to the industrial revolution. The doctrines of the earlier church were radically different and unrecognizable today – things like the inquisition. Popes used to fight each other and sponsor wars.

3. Part to whole fallacy – yes there are bad and intolerant Catholics, but it doesn’t follow faith as a whole is a wrong method.

4. The things that have permeated are the ethical and philosophic traditions of the church, not the particular bad practices. This is evident by the fact we call the practices bad. It does not indicate that when dealing with a moral question that the pope is of no use.

**AT indicts of the faith *qua* faith:**

1. Francis is reformist in many ways – he’s supported gay rights, atheism and other more traditionally un-Catholic concepts.

2. Catholic church has historically attempted reform – that’s the point. As an institution that has made mistakes, it’s in a unique position to understand them. The church has had the longest to learn from what worked and what didn't in the widest set of contexts thus people like Pope Francis can be sensitive to issues like prior institutional abuse.

**AT you must defend the church at all:**

I am not defending the validity of Catholic doctrine

1. none of the warrants in the aff require God to exist or anything else. Claim is just that Popes are great moral teachers – that’s proven by the amount of attention their statements get from even the secular media. They are universally known as good people irrespective of the Church.

2. Domains of authority solve - I trust Einstein on science but not ethics. I trust the pope on ethics but not necessarily metaphysical philosophy. I have strong opposing testimony from excellent non-Catholic philosophers. Maybe the pope provides some force but I do have strong evidence to the contrary.

3. Only need to defend the Church possesses teachers - Pope will have studied very closely the work of people like Christ and Saint Peter so I coopt the testimony of all those people, not just as members of the church but also as individual moral authorities.

**AT Obama sucks:**

1. Not used as a normative authority - claim being made is Pope Francis has inspired a lot of people.

2. TURN: It’s better since he probably has a good thumb on the attitudes of the American people Specificity solves your offense – Obama is a politician so he knows how ordinary people tend to be influenced, that’s how he got elected.

pope francis cards:

Pope is not against gay marriage. **DENVER POST[[10]](#footnote-10):** Pope Francis has [made a couple of comments](http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/europe/italy/130919/pope-francis-catholic-church-interfers-gays-and-lesbians) on same-sex relationships and marriage. In September, he said the Catholic church had no right to "interfere spiritually" in the lives of gay men and women, and he criticized a church ministry "obsessed with the transmission of a disjointed multitude of doctrines to be imposed insistently." He urged ministers and officials to "find a new balance” and warned against focusing too much on gay marriage, gay rights, and abortion. These words came after a statement in July that attracted global attention. "If someone is gay and he searches for the Lord and has good will," he said, "who am I to judge?"

He literally opened up trade relations between US and Cuba. **USA TODAY[[11]](#footnote-11):** A personal appeal by Pope Francis played a key role in finalizing a deal to open relations between the United States and Cuba for the first time in 53 years. The pope wrote a personal letter to President Obama this fall — something he'd never done before — and a separate letter to Cuban President Raúl Castro. The letter invited the leaders to "resolve humanitarian questions of common interest, including the situation of certain prisoners," according to a Vatican statement congratulating the two countries Wednesday. The Vatican said it received delegations from both countries in October and helped facilitate a dialogue. That resulted in a major U.S. policy shift toward Cuba, including a prisoner swap between the two countries that freed American Alan Gross on Wednesday. Aside from President Obama and the Cuban president, the pontiff was the only other foreign leader directly involved in the talks, the official said. Francis' support was particularly important given Cuba's historical and cultural Catholic identity, the official said, and his election as the first-ever pope from Latin America gave him credibility.

He’s cleaning up the bureaucracy. **BBC[[12]](#footnote-12):** Pope Francis has sharply criticized the Vatican bureaucracy in a pre-Christmas address to cardinals, complaining of "spiritual Alzheimer's" and "the terrorism of gossip". He said the Curia - the administrative pinnacle of the Roman Catholic Church - was suffering from 15 "ailments", which he wanted cured in the New Year. Pope Francis - the first Latin American pontiff - also criticized "those who look obsessively at their own image". He has demanded reform of the Curia. Clearly Pope Francis is meeting opposition among the nearly 3,000 strong staff of the Italian-dominated Curia. He had never worked in Rome before his election as pope last year, and - as a Vatican outsider from the other end of the world - is clearly frustrated by the slow-moving and creaking Vatican bureaucracy. He is trying to reform it with the help of a new group of cardinal advisers he has called in from every continent to draw up a new Vatican constitution. Before his election in March 2013, the pontiff encountered internal opposition to some of the reforms he wants to carry out. He has set up a series of specialist bodies to fight corruption and poor management, appointing a team of advisers. The Pope also launched a cleanup of the Vatican Bank, officially known as the Institute for the Works of Religion (IOR). The IOR has long had a poor reputation, after a succession of scandals.

MLK contention:

Martin Luther King Jr. is a pioneering figure in race relations, winning a Nobel Prize and studying the example of Indian freedom fighters like Gandhi. His work directly led to the passage of the civil rights act. King is clear on the importance of establishing a living wage. **KING:**[[13]](#footnote-13) We know of no more crucial civil rights issue facing Congress today than the need to increase the federal minimum wage and extend its coverage. We believe it is imperative that farm laborers, among the most abused and neglected of all American workers, be included at last among those who benefit from the Fair Labor Standards Act. We want coverage extended to include those millions in retail trades, laundries, hospitals and nursing homes, restaurants, hotels, small logging operations and cotton gins who still work for starvation wages. While we are mindful of the shocking fact that less than one-half of all non-white workers are covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act, we do not speak for Negro workers only. A living wage should be the right of all working Americans, and this is what we wish to urge upon our Congressmen and Senators as they now prepare to deal with this legislation.

Saying your work is worth a living wage endorses dignity; your life is worth its own existence, not just the value of a slave wage. It is not about economic wellbeing, but a shift in which we respect the dignity of work beyond economic value. This was central to MLK’s mission; we cannot understand his call when divorced from concrete concerns like a living wage. **MLK the Third[[14]](#footnote-14):** Every year, on the anniversary of my father’s death, people pay tribute to his life and legacy—to the ideals and principles he worked so hard to achieve, not simply for the people of his time but ultimately for the many generations that would come after him. But exactly what he was doing the day he was killed is often forgotten. On April 4, 1968, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. was fighting for the creation of living wage jobs. In his view, it was both a moral necessity and a civil right that every working American should earn enough to live a decent life and not worry about basic survival. More than forty years later, we continue to fall woefully short of his vision. Far too many working people in our communities and neighborhoods across this great country still earn poverty wages instead of living wages. This is a collective failure, and we must address it together as one nation. New York City offers a national roadmap for continuing my father’s unfinished work of economic justice. Tonight elected officials, religious leaders, labor leaders, and local community members are gathering in Brooklyn and Bronx churches for mass meetings to build the next phase of the largest citywide living wage movement in the country. In recent months, the Living Wage NYC Coalition has quickly organized and mobilized thousands of residents to push for passage of the Fair Wages for New Yorkers Act. A majority of City Council members back the legislation. Now I urge the rest to embrace it. People see something very wrong happening: Corporations getting richer from tax subsidies offered in the name of economic development yet making people poorer with low-wage jobs. This extreme income disparity is the result of misguided public policy, and that’s why a movement has come together around getting better policy implemented: the Fair Wages for New Yorkers Act would ensure that tax dollars create living wage jobs. We need the living wage movement to succeed and spread to other parts of the country. Countless stories of the working poor today are about people making impossible choices: food or rent, clothing or electricity. When we pause over those stories, and understand their painful significance, we grasp something fundamental about a country as wealthy as ours: no working person should have to settle for surviving over living. It’s that simple.

Martin Luther King Jr. is respected in the field of race relations, renowned for his ethical and peaceful approach to potentially violent and polarizing issues. **NAACP[[15]](#footnote-15):**

Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. is considered the formative figure in the modern fight for civil rights, and his legacy looms large in the work of all those who follow him in his cause. Dr. King's involvement with the NAACP dates back to his position on the executive committee of the NAACP Montgomery Branch in the 1950's, through his leadership in the various boycotts, marches and rallies of the 1960's, and up until his assassination in 1968. In 1957 the NAACP awarded him the Spingarn Medal, its most prestigious honor. In 1964, he received a Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts. Dr. King pushed America to fulfill its promise of equal rights for all. We honor his life and his legacy by recommitting ourselves to keeping his dream alive.

MLK contention frontlines:

**Top level:**

Yes, King did some questionable things but you’ll have a hard time proving King was actually a bad overall person because you cannot use someone of lower moral authority to critique someone else. A high school teacher probably can’t assert the theory of relativity is wrong. Your default would obviously be that MLK was a good person, better than some right wing radical, so your objections begs the question.

**AT King indicts + K:**

Not responsive – yes king might have been a bad person, but that does not deny he was uniquely an expert on issues of race relations and racism - he combines practical and scholarly insight in those fields. Domains of authority solve – I might not trust King generally, but there is no denying he is uniquely qualified on the issues your K addresses as a civil rights activist and writer.

**AT MLK [general]:**

1) the author does make the classic mistake of fetishising sexual sin as some sort of categorically worse wrong than any other

2) yes he obviously did some bad things, everyone does bad things. But its only by taking a bizarre conservative moral ideology which exalts sexual sin above any other that allows you to conclude he is not an ethical visionary.

3) Complaceny in the face of systemic violence and injustice is probably a greater moral failing than even regular extra-marital affairs, we just don't like to admit it because such recognition probably stands to condemn us more than condemning extramarital affairs does.

mandela contention:

Mandela supported the concept of a living wage. **MANDELA[[16]](#footnote-16):** Poverty and the breakdown of family life have secondary effects. Children wander about the streets of the townships because they have no schools to go to, or no money to enable them to go to school, or no parents at home to see that they go to school, because both parents, if there be two, have to work to keep the family alive. This leads to a breakdown in moral standards, to an alarming rise in illegitimacy, and to growing violence which erupts not only politically, but everywhere. Life in the townships is dangerous. There is not a day that goes by without somebody being stabbed or assaulted. And violence is carried out of the townships into the white living areas. People are afraid to walk alone in the streets after dark. Housebreakings and robberies are increasing, despite the fact that the death sentence can now be imposed for such offences. Death sentences cannot cure the festering sore. The only cure is to alter the conditions under which Africans are forced to live and to meet their legitimate grievances. Africans want to be paid a living wage. Africans want to perform work which they are capable of doing, and not work which the Government declares them to be capable of. We want to be allowed to live where we obtain work, and not be endorsed out of an area because we were not born there. We want to be allowed and not to be obliged to live in rented houses which we can never call our own. We want to be part of the general population, and not confined to living in our ghettoes. African men want to have their wives and children to live with them where they work, and not to be forced into an unnatural existence in men's hostels. Our women want to be with their men folk and not to be left permanently widowed in the reserves. We want to be allowed out after eleven o'clock at night and not to be confined to our rooms like little children. We want to be allowed to travel in our own country and to seek work where we want to, where we want to and not where the Labour Bureau tells us to. We want a just share in the whole of South Africa; we want security and a stake in society.

**AT Mandela:**

The Mandela card is ignorant of history and current Palestinian oppression - Mandela was pro-Israel, but was legitimately upset that Israel allied with apartheid South Africa. **TIMES OF ISRAEL[[17]](#footnote-17):** In the name of reconciliation, he made no ongoing issue of Jerusalem’s strong long-term partnership with the apartheid regime after he was released from a lengthy prison sentence and became South Africa’s first black president in 1994. He professed the legitimacy of Zionism as Jewish nationalism and, upon receiving the 1993 Nobel Peace Prize, he said Yitzhak Rabin deserved it more (Rabin was co-honored the following year). But his primary concern in dealings with Israel’s government was the advancement of the peace process and the well being of the Palestinian people. “Mandela always strove to be scrupulously fair to both sides, even though his inclination was very much towards the Palestinian side,” said David Saks, the associate director of the South African Jewish Board of Deputies. “He was deeply supportive of the Palestinian struggle for independence, but never deviated from his view that this could only be attained through all parties recognizing Israel’s legitimate right to exist within secure borders.”

Jews played a crucial role in various stages of Mandela’s life, especially in his early decades. Indeed, the only white person he ever called “my boss” was Lazer Sidelsky, a Jewish lawyer from Johannesburg, who in the 1940s hired him as a legal clerk. “It was a Jewish firm, and in my experience I have found Jews to be more broadminded than most whites on issues of race and politics, perhaps because they themselves have historically been victims of prejudice,” Mandela wrote in his 1994 autobiography, “Long Walk to Freedom.” “The fact that Lazer Sidelsky, one of the firm’s partners, would take on a young African as an articled clerk — something almost unheard-of in those days — was evidence of that liberalism.” In 1995, a year after Mandela became president, he gave a signed copy of his book to “my former boss Laz,” calling him “a man who trained me to serve our country.” Mandela reportedly attended the bar mitzva of Sidelsky’s son Barry (Dov) Sidelsky, who now lives in Jerusalem. “When I was a boy, I met Mandela and what etched an indelible impression on me was that when he got married the wedding procession passed by our house in Johannesburg as a sign of tribute to and respect for my father,” Barry recalled during a 1999 television interview he gave in honor of Mandela’s first and only visit to Israel. Countless other Jews had close relationships with Madiba, as Mandela was called by friends and supporters. People such as Isie Maisels, Harry Schwarz, Joe Slovo, Lionel Bernstein and many others helped him during various stages of his decades-long struggle against apartheid. Some of Mandela’s former associates later relocated to Israel. Arthur Goldreich, for instance, helped hide Mandela and the African National Congress in the 1960s. Born in Johannesburg, Goldreich came to Israel in the 1940s to fight in the pre-state Jewish underground, yet moved back to South Africa in 1954 to fight apartheid. In the 1960s, he pretended to operate a farm outside Johannesburg, which really served as the underground headquarters of the ANC and its leaders, including Mandela, who posed as a worker on the farm. In 1963, South African authorities raided the farm and Goldreich was imprisoned. He escaped to Britain but immediately decided to move to Israel, where [he died in 2011 at an old-age home in Herzliya](http://www.haaretz.com/weekend/anglo-file/friends-remember-anti-apartheid-leader-who-hid-nelson-mandela-1.364319" \t "_blank). Cape Town-born journalist and social activist Benjamin Pogrund is another close associate of Mandela’s who has since moved to Israel. The former deputy editor of the Rand Daily Mail, the country’s leading newspaper, Pogrund was among the pioneers who reported about black politics in South Africa. In 1961, Pogrund helped Madiba organize an illegal strike. “Mandela and I met secretly and regularly,” Pogrund recalled in Saks’s 2011 book “Jewish Memories of Mandela.” “We had a system of sending messages to arrange to meet, which would either be at a friend’s house in Fordsburg, or when I would drive to a street corner at night, pick up Mandela — his worker’s overalls disguise did little to hide his tall, imposing figure — and we would sit in my car in a dark street and talk about the strike campaign.” Some 25 years later, Pogrund and his wife were the first non-family members to visit Mandela in his prison cell on Robben Island, where he was serving a life sentence for sabotage and conspiracy to violently overthrow the government. “During the nearly two hours of the visit, we mentioned that our youngest son, Gideon, was having his bar mitzva at the end of the month,” Pogrund, who today lives in Jerusalem, remembered. “A few days after our visit, Gideon received a letter from Mandela at our home in Johannesburg: It conveyed best wishes for his bar mitzva and for his future life. If getting a message like that from inside prison wasn’t surreal enough, it was written neatly on a whiteboard, which Mandela must have told his warders to buy for him. From a man serving a life sentence — and at that stage with no idea when he might be released — it was a kind and thoughtful action for a youngster he had not even met.” But in his fight against apartheid, Mandela also had Jewish adversaries. [Percy Yutar](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Percy_Yutar" \t "_blank), for example, was the chief prosecutor in the 1960s Rivonia trial in which the future president was sentenced to a lifelong prison sentence. Yutar served for many years as the head of a group of Orthodox synagogues in Johannesburg. Mandela: ‘South Africans of Jewish descent have historically been disproportionately represented among our white compatriots in the liberation struggle’ South Africa’s first Jewish attorney general, Yutar is remembered by anti-apartheid activists for the “unnecessarily abrasive, indeed often vindictive, manner in which he carried out his duties,” writes Saks. “Even Mandela, generally so ready to acknowledge the good in even his avowed enemies, cannot bring himself to recall Yutar with anything more than disdain,” Saks wrote. However, Mandela later had lunch with Yutar, reportedly offering him a kosher meal. Today’s Jewish community in South Africa likes to highlight the Jews fighting side by side with Mandela to marginalize the role of those who supported the regime. “South Africans of Jewish descent have historically been disproportionately represented among our white compatriots in the liberation struggle,” Mandela [said](http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=4096" \t "_blank) at a congress of the South African Jewish Board of Deputies in 1993. Yet the South African Jewish community’s relationship with the apartheid regime is a “very mixed picture,” according to Gideon Shimoni, the former head of The Hebrew University’s Institute of Contemporary Jewry, who was born and brought up in Johannesburg. While certain individuals were openly opposed to apartheid, as a collective the Jewish community adopted an “attitude of neutrality” to the racist rule in their country, he said. “Even Mandela kind of bought the line that those individuals who were active in the opposition kind of saved the record of the Jewish community. But it’s a much more complicated situation than that,” said Shimoni, who examined the issue in depth in his 2003 book “Community and Conscience: The Jews in Apartheid South Africa.” The Jews fighting the racist regime were in most cases very critical of the organized Jewish community, he said. “They believed that the Jewish community has to throw its lot in with the struggle against apartheid, irrespective of what happens to the Jewish community.” They also rejected the Jewish community’s allegiance to the Zionist cause, according to Shimoni. ‘His whole attitude — to everything — was not to look for vengeance but rather to work for a reconciliation and to look forward. The last thing he would do is raise Israel’s record’ Madiba himself was no declared enemy of Zionism. Although he was a staunch supporter of the Palestinian cause — and of Palestinian and other Islamist leaders — he believed that both Jews and Palestinians had legitimate national ambitions. “As a movement, we recognize the legitimacy of Palestinian nationalism just as we recognize the legitimacy of Zionism as a Jewish nationalism,” he said in 1993. “We insist on the right of the State of Israel to exist within secure borders, but with equal vigor support the Palestinian right to national self-determination.” As a statesman, Mandela’s relationship with Israel was businesslike and at times cordial, but never truly warm. When he became president in 1994, he maintained diplomatic relations and tried to focus on the hope for a better future rather than dwell on the disagreements of the past. Yet he never forgot Jerusalem’s strong alliance with the apartheid state. Israel and South Africa upheld very extensive military cooperation over decades, and Jerusalem was one of the last to join the international campaign to isolate the racist regime. “The ANC, in common with the international community, was extremely unhappy about the military cooperation between the State of Israel and the apartheid regime in South Africa. The refusal of Israel, over many years, to honor its international obligations to isolate the apartheid regime did influence our attitude towards that government,” Mandela said few months before being elected president. “He certainly was very sympathetic to Zionism in the sense of being a movement for freedom and self-determination of the Jewish people,” The Hebrew University’s Shimoni said. “But at the same time he had very strong loyalties to those who assisted him, whether it was [late Libyan leader Muammar] Gaddafi on the one hand, or Arafat, on the other. And he made it clear that those who are the enemies of the Jews are not necessarily his enemies.”

gandi contention:

Gandhi supported a living wage. **GUPTA[[18]](#footnote-18):** With a view to remove improprieties, Gandhi wanted to fix the maximum and minimum limits of income. He wanted laborer to be assured a living wage. Explaining the meaning of this living wage, he told the all-India Village Industries Association, “We should ensure all workmen with whom we deal, a wage which would give them a reasonably balanced diet. That a meal may cost an anna and half in Bihar and four annas in Gujarat and six annas in Bombay was a different question … a balanced diet must be devised.” Probably his method of calculating the living wage resembled the method followed by the trade boards and wage boards in the United Kingdom. An interesting problem was posed to Gandhi. He was asked ‘when the laborer works in a factory should the minimum wage be a living wage for [them] alone or should it be a living wage for [their] family. Gandhi was a keen observer of human psychology. He knew the tensions of a laborer, who has a herd instinct can never be satisfied till [they are] able to feed [their] family members properly. Gandhi, therefore, opined that the living wage must be sufficient for the family and not for the laborer alone.

**AT gandhi is a racist/hurt his wife on purpose:**

Your indicts are simply quotes out of context and misunderstand Gandhi’s transformation over time and actual viewpoint in South Africa. **NANDA[[19]](#footnote-19):** There is plenty of evidence in the Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi to indicate that if Gandhi had nurtured any such prejudice, he was fast outgrowing it. In his speech at the YMCA in June 1908, he stressed the complementary nature of various cultures and refuted the notion that differing civilizations could not coexist. Through his journal, Indian Opinion, he kept his readers informed of the problems of the Africans. He wanted each racial group to fight its own battle, but to be supportive to one another. He backed the demands of the Africans for franchise in Transvaal and Orange River Colony, and was deeply concerned about the insidious move of the whites that threatened Africans’ land rights. He denounced the jury system in South Africa. It was not racial prejudice but political realism that guided Gandhi in limiting his agenda in South Africa to the eradication of the disabilities of his countrymen. It is difficult for us to imagine the odds against which he was fighting. It was the heyday of European imperialism, when domination over ‘coloured races’ was accepted almost as a fact of nature. In 1897, when he was 27, he was nearly lynched by a white mob in Durban. The Indians in Natal and Transvaal were a socially and economically heterogeneous community. It was not an easy task for Gandhi to infuse a spirit of solidarity into Muslim merchants and their Hindu and Parsi clerks from western India and the semi-slave indentured labourers from Madras and the Indian Christians born in South Africa. Small in number, scattered in several colonies, the Indians lived in constant dread of fresh restrictions and humiliations. They did not have the right to vote and were defenceless against a whole arsenal of discriminatory law senates by the colonial legislature. Boers and Britons, whatever their differences, were united in their resolve to preserve the white monopoly of economic and political power. The Government of India, which had permitted emigration to the colonies in South Africa, was not conversant with the true state of affairs, and the Colonial Office in London was reluctant to interfere in what was described as the ‘internal affair’ of self-governing colonies. Gandhi evolved a strategy to suit the situation facing him in South Africa. He organised the Indian immigrants, presented their case on its merits, opposed the colonial regime, but at the same time sought support of world opinion. He based his case against racial discrimination on what he claimed were the inherent rights of British Indian subjects guaranteed to them in the British Empire by the Proclamation of Queen Victoria in 1858. If the black population did not figure in Gandhi’s campaign, it was partly because it did not suffer from the disabilities against which the Indians were protesting, such as the £3 tax on indentured labourers that turned them into semi-slaves, the restrictions on immigration from India, and the discrimination against Indian traders. Moreover, it is doubtful whether, at the turn of the century, the black population in South Africa would have readily accepted a young Indian barrister as its leader. In February 1936, Gandhi told a visitor that he had deliberately not invited the blacks to join his movement in South Africa. “They would not have understood,” he said, “the technique of our struggle nor could they have seen the purpose and utility of our nonviolence.”

The first part of your card just says Gandhi hated sexual relations, but so did Kant – that is not the hallmark of a bad person and arguably shows great self-discipline.

Gandhi did not allow doctors to save his wife because she was not in a position – she was a devout vegetarian who wouldn’t have taken it. **TUSHAR GANDHI[[20]](#footnote-20):** In later years, Bapu had refused to allow doctors to inject Penicillin made from animals to a very strict vegetarian Ba to save her life. The way the press has carried the story is sensationalist and an example of gutter journalism. Journalism is a noble profession and must be honourable, honest and ethical. The way the story has been reported has hurt us the descendants of Ba and Bapu and in particular the direct descendants of Harilal kaka and his daughter Manu foiba. What is a shame is that it is a work of uneducated translation and out of context accusations. The press should have exercised restraint and attempted to get at the truth before succumbing to the lure of sensationalism. I write this letter in anguish and with a desire to state the truth, least lies and untruth prevails.

helen keller:

Helen Keller was an incredible person who inspired many. **DRYJANSKI:**[[21]](#footnote-21) Helen was important to other people with disabilities because she inspired people. She showed that Deaf and blind people deserved respect.  She helped support various Deaf-Blind programs. Helen inspired people with disabilities because she was persistent. One way she showed persistence was when she applied to college. Another way was when she learned letters, words, and sentences. Anne kept showing her more letters, words, and sentences and Helen kept wanting to learn more and more.  Helen showed that it doesn’t matter if person has a disability. She showed that if a person works hard and has persistence, that person can make it. She founded an organization in 1915, "Helen Keller International;" which was dedicated to preventing blindness and teaching people how to live well. The organization printed books and music in braille and these books helped blind people so they could understand and learn new things.  Helen Keller inspired everyone. Some people thought she wouldn't be able to do anything like normal people do. Despite her disabilities, she was exactly like normal person but only just deaf-blind.

Her work was meaningful. **CENTER FOR THE VISUALLY IMPAIRED[[22]](#footnote-22):**

Today, Thursday, June 27, there will be a birthday celebration in Tuscumbia, Alabama in honor of one of the city's well-known residents of long ago. Helen Keller was born and raised there. She was known throughout the world for the many things she did; advocating, speaking, writing, and educating. But in Tuscumbia they have a weeklong celebration in her honor that brings a lot of people into the city in northwestern Alabama. This celebration is a good cause as it continues the legacy of someone who opened the eyes, ears, and hearts of the world to the plight of people with disabilities. Helen Keller, as many know, was a person who was deaf and blind. Back in her time people said she was deaf, blind, and mute. Times have changed and deaf and blind evolved into the term deaf-blind. Now, in a more conscious society deaf-blind is evolving into deafblind. Why the changes in terminology? To make the knowledge of the changes short; deaf-blind means a person has both a hearing and vision loss. The hyphen inserted between 'deaf' and 'blind' is an illustration of deaf-blind becoming more of a medical term than a single disability. Many people who are deaf-blind believe they have a dual disability of hearing and sight loss that in reality should be categorized as a single disability written as deafblind. They feel it is easier to distinguish between medically used terms and terms that give the disability more resemblance. So, the term deafblind is being used more often among disability communities.

But back to Helen Keller. She was an individual who has been highly honored as an inspiration to many people, and it should be noted that there are many deafblind individuals around the world who are more able to function independently in the world than Helen Keller was in her time. Maybe it is because resources now are much better than they were in the 1880s or maybe it is because in Keller's time people with a hearing and vision loss were seen as people who were limited in being able to function independently. We may never know but the point is that many deafblind individuals in modern times can be as inspiring and show more dedication than Helen Keller was able to do.

She is clear that living wages are good. **KELLER[[23]](#footnote-23):** As civilization has grown more complex the workers have become more and more enslaved, until today they are little more than parts of the machines they operate. Daily they face the dangers of railroad, bridge, skyscraper, freight train, stokehold, stockyard, lumber raft and min. Panting and training at the docks, on the railroads and underground and on the seas, they move the traffic and pass from land to land the precious commodities that make it possible for us to live. And what is their reward? A scanty wage, often poverty, rents, taxes, tributes and war indemnities. The kind of preparedness the workers want is reorganization and reconstruction of their whole life, such as has never been attempted by statesmen or governments. The Germans found out years ago that they could not raise good soldiers in the slums so they abolished the slums. They saw to it that all the people had at least a few of the essentials of civilization--decent lodging, clean streets, wholesome if scanty food, proper medical care and proper safeguards for the workers in their occupations. That is only a small part of what should be done, but what wonders that one step toward the right sort of preparedness has wrought for Germany! For eighteen months it has kept itself free from invasion while carrying on an extended war of conquest, and its armies are still pressing on with unabated vigor. It is your business to force these reforms on the Administration. Let there be no more talk about what a government can or cannot do. All these things have been done by all the belligerent nations in the hurly-burly of war. Every fundamental industry has been managed better by the governments than by private corporations. It is your duty to insist upon still more radical measure. It is your business to see that no child is employed in an industrial establishment or mine or store, and that no worker in needlessly exposed to accident or disease. It is your business to make them give you clean cities, free from smoke, dirt and congestion. It is your business to make them pay you a living wage. It is your business to see that this kind of preparedness is carried into every department on the nation, until everyone has a chance to be well born, well nourished, rightly educated, intelligent and serviceable to the country at all times. Strike against all ordinances and laws and institutions that continue the slaughter of peace and the butcheries of war. Srike against war, for without you no battles can be fought. Strike against manufacturing scrapnel and gas bombs and all other tools of murder. Strike against preparedness that means death and misery to millions of human being. Be not dumb, obedient slaves in an army of destruction. Be heroes in an army of construction.

**AT helen keller indict:**

This is not Helen Keller’s foundation, just a school namesd after her. It also doesn’t attack Helen Keller the person – the low salaries happened in 2010, so it doesn’t mean **she is** not a moral authority. Also if paying people too little is wrong, then that’s probably a reason to affirm – your turn concedes the authority of Keller, who wanted high wages. **SCHETER[[24]](#footnote-24):** When a non-profit provides Section 14 (c) workers to an outside business, it sets the salary and pays the wages. For example, the Helen Keller National Center, a New York school for the blind and deaf, has a special wage certificate and has placed students in a Westbury, N.Y., Applebee's franchise. The employees' pay ranged from $3.97 per hour to $5.96 per hour in 2010. The franchise told NBC News it has also hired workers at minimum wage from Helen Keller. A spokesperson for Applebee's declined to comment on Section 14 (c). Helen Keller also placed several students at a Barnes & Noble bookstore in Manhasset, N.Y., in 2010, where they earned $3.80 and $4.85 an hour. A Barnes & Noble spokeswoman defended the Section 14 (c) program as providing jobs to "people who would otherwise not have [the opportunity to work]."

dalai lama:

The Dalai Lama would be inclined to support a living wage. **TON[[25]](#footnote-25):** Last week, I had the privilege of presen[ed]ting my research to His Holiness the Dalai Lama.  My presentation was part of a panel in which scholars talked about the world’s big problems. Each of us spoke about what research in our field said about one of those problems, including what we could do to improve the situation.  Naturally, I talked about [on] jobs—bad jobs.  How bad a problem is that? Here’s how I started: We spend most of our waking hours either at work or thinking about our work.  We are often defined by our work, identified by it.   When our work gives us meaning and dignity, we feel fulfilled. We are happier.  When we are happier, society is healthier.  But according to the International Labor Organization, [M]ore than 900 million people in the world have jobs that do not provide a living wage, let alone dignity and meaning.  They have bad jobs. Then I went on to describe bad jobs in the retail industry in the U.S.  I started with low wages.  A typical full-time cashier or salesperson who works 40 hours a week—which is supposed to be the definition of a full-time job—does not earn enough money to take care of a family of four.  If he or she is the sole breadwinner in the family, that family will be below the poverty threshold.  And by the way, even so-called “full-time employees” in retail are not actually guaranteed 40 hours a week of work (and pay) because 94% of retailers consider anyone who works more than 32 hours to be a full-timer.  So their income can vary by as much as eight hours of pay from week to week. From work hours and pay, I moved on to work schedules. You might think that it doesn’t matter so much when the hours are as long as there are enough. If so, you haven’t worked in retail. Schedules can be all over the map; they change all the time and the workers only find out one or two weeks in advance. I showed the Dalai Lama the schedule of a full-time employee I recently interviewed. Let’s call her Jane to protect her privacy.  Jane is not even at the bottom of the heap; she’s a manager.  She handles customer problems, equipment problems, and employee problems.   But Jane is an *hourly* manager and her schedule looks different every single week. Here’s what her schedule looked like for one particular week.  You can see that, on Wednesday night, she worked from 5pm to 9pm, but the next morning, her shift began at 5am.  She lives about an hour from the store, so that leaves her 6 hours to eat, sleep, get ready to go to work again. Not to mention details like trying to wind down from work so she can get to sleep. And she’s in her fifties. Imagine having a life or taking care of a young family when your schedule changes like this every single week! The Dalai Lama doesn’t exactly work a 9-to-5 day, either, but I could tell that [H]e was surprised and perhaps even upset. There were many problems that he probably already knew about coming into the panel.  From the questions he asked, it was clear that he knew about climate change, hunger, and inequality in the world.  But I think [H]e was really surprised to see that jobs could look like this for millions of people, even in a developed country. He told me, “There should be an organization to look after these workers.” He was thinking of unions.  He’s right. It’s unreasonable for workers to be treated this way.  It’s unreasonable for companies to operate this way, especially when we know that it is possible and highly profitable to operate differently (see my HBR piece on this).

cesar chavez:

Cesar Chavez was a really good person who gained practical ethical insight and scholarly insight from Gandhi and endorsed a living wage. **UCFW[[26]](#footnote-26):** Eighty seven years ago this Monday, César Chávez, a hero of the labor and civil rights movements, was born on a small ranch in Yuma, Arizona. Like thousands of others Chávez’s family lost its land in the Great Depression and headed to work in the fields of California’s central valley, where he would spend the rest of his life fighting for the rights of migrant farmworkers. Growing up, Chavez experienced grinding poverty and rampant discrimination against Mexican Americans. He left school after 8th grade and began working in the fields full time to help support his family, but he never lost his appetite for education, teaching himself about Gandhi’s non-violent strategies for social change. Chávez’s passion for social justice led him to become a community organizer, registering Latinos to vote so they could fight for their civil rights, but he understood that farmworkers could only win dignity and respect by banding together to form a union in the fields. Even some of Chávez’s allies doubted that Spanish-speaking migrant workers could ever organize successfully, but he led the creation of the organization that would become the United Farm Workers in 1962. The organization struggled at first, but in 1965 Filipino workers on grape farms launched a strike demanding wages equal to the federal minimum wage (from which they were excluded) and approached Chávez for support. Chávez inspired Latino workers in the grape industry to stand in solidarity with the strike, which spread rapidly through the California fields. During the strike, Chávez pioneered unprecedented strategies that have become invaluable to all of us in the labor movement. He led workers in long marches that crossed the state of California to raise awareness of the strike, sent workers and students to cities to lead consumer boycotts of table grapes, and even put his body on the line in a series of hunger strikes. After a grueling five year campaign, the UFW won the strike and secured living wages and a union voice in the grape fields. After the triumph in the grape fields, the UFW grew dramatically until it represented more than 50,000 farmworkers, and farmworkers’ right to join together and bargain with their employers was enshrined in California law. Chávez continued to lead the UFW and fight for the rights of workers, immigrants, and Latinos until his untimely death in 1993.

FDR contention:

FDR supported a living wage – his position is pretty explicit. **TRITCH[[27]](#footnote-27):** In the more than 75 years since Congress first enacted a federal minimum wage — at 25 cents an hour — lawmakers have increased it nine times, reaching the current level of $7.25 an hour in 2009. And with every increase the same objections have been raised. Today, instead of dismantling these arguments on my own I decided to get a little help from President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who had to fight Republicans, conservative Democrats, the Supreme Court and corporate leaders to pass the initial minimum wage in 1938. Objection: Raising the minimum wage will hurt business and reduce employment. “No business which depends for existence on paying less than living wages to its workers has any right to continue in this country.” (1933, Statement on National Industrial Recovery Act) Objection: $10.10 an hour is too much, maybe $9. “By living wages, I mean more than a bare subsistence level — I mean the wages of a decent living.” (1933, Statement on National Industrial Recovery Act) Objection: Once you add in public assistance and tax credits, $9 an hour is plenty, and business could survive that. “Do not let any calamity-howling executive with an income of $1,000 a day, who has been turning his employees over to the Government relief rolls in order to preserve his company’s undistributed reserves, tell you – using his stockholders’ money to pay the postage for his personal opinions — tell you that a wage of $11.00 a week is going to have a disastrous effect on all American industry.” (1938, Fireside Chat, the night before signing the Fair Labor Standards Act that instituted the federal minimum wage) Objection:   The minimum wage is a government mandate that interferes with the free market. “All but the hopelessly reactionary will agree that to conserve our primary resources of man power, government must have some control over maximum hours, minimum wages, the evil of child labor and the exploitation of unorganized labor.” (1937, Message to Congress upon introduction of the Fair Labor Standards Act) It took five years from F.D.R.’s first inauguration in 1933 to enact the federal minimum wage. The period encompassed “Black Monday” on May 27, 1935, when the Supreme Court invalidated the new labor standards in the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, and “White Monday” on March 29, 1937, when the Court reversed course by upholding the minimum wage in Washington state, setting the stage for passage of a federal version.

FDR had negative qualities, but he is recognized as an authority on moral issues in economic policy. **NEWSMAX[[28]](#footnote-28):** Polls of historians and ordinary Americans generally agree that Franklin D. Roosevelt, the creator of the New Deal, ranks as the greatest U.S. president of the 20th century. A survey of 65 American historians by C-SPAN completed in 2009 cited FDR as the third best president overall, behind only Abraham Lincoln and George Washington. The Siena College Research Institute has asked 238 presidential scholars to rank the presidents five times since 1982. The most recent poll showed Franklin Roosevelt on top as their favorite. A report from the National Constitution Center in February of this year also ranked Roosevelt as the best president of the 20th century and fourth best overall behind Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and Lincoln. Who Is Your Favorite President? You Can Vote in Newsmax’s Presidential Survey – Click Here Now A Newsweek magazine survey in 2012 ranked FDR as the best president overall. "In the last 25 years FDR's reputation seems to have risen higher than ever before," historian Doris Kearns Goodwin writes. "While historians have long considered Roosevelt one of our greatest presidents, he has now been embraced by the country as a whole — by Republicans as well as Democrats." William E. Leuchtenburg observed: "The presidency as we know it begins with Franklin Delano Roosevelt. "So powerful an impression did FDR leave on the office that in the most recent survey of historians he ranked as the second greatest president in our history, surpassed only by the legendary Abraham Lincoln." Is Obama or Jimmy Carter the Worst President in History? Vote in National Survey Here. Presidential historian Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. wrote in an essay for Time magazine: "Take a look at our present world. It is manifestly not Joseph Stalin's world. That ghastly world self-destructed before our eyes. Nor is it Winston Churchill's world. Empire and its glories have long since vanished into history. The world we live in today is Franklin Roosevelt's world." Schlesinger noted that when a movement to replace Roosevelt's image on the dime with Reagan's image was gathering support, Nancy Reagan issued a statement that set the controversy to rest: "When our country chooses to honor a great president as Franklin Roosevelt by placing his likeness on our currency, it would be wrong to remove him and replace him with another." FDR is hailed for shepherding the nation through two tremendous trials — the Depression and World War II — and instituting Social Security and other government programs that were part of the New Deal. But he is not without his critics. Some take him to task for misleading the American public about his disability, and accuse him of "selling out" to the Russians at Yalta in part due to his illness. Others say he could have acted more decisively to admit more Jewish refugees, or to advance civil rights for African-Americans. And many believe he made the wrong decision to intern Japanese-Americans after Pearl Harbor. But a report analyzing the results of 15 surveys conducted since 1948 showed FDR finishing first or second in eight of the polls and no lower than No. 3 in any of them, the best showing among all 20th-century presidents. Schlesinger also wrote that "no stouter-hearted Republican than Newt [Gingrich] rates FDR as the greatest 20th-century president. FDR's New Deal is no longer to be condemned as a mortal threat to the American way of life. Instead, as George W. Bush discovered when he tried to fool around with Social Security, New Deal reforms are generally blessed. And their architect is admired and adored."

gompers contention:

Samuel Gompers wanted a living wage. **GLICKMAN**[[29]](#footnote-29)**:** Wages should reflect the expanding consumption habits of the workers. “The American of today,” noted George McNeill, “wants something today that yesterday knew nothing of: tomorrow he will have a new want.” Stressing the consumerist dimension in his well-publicized 1898 defense of the living wage, Samuel Gompers demanded a wage that would enable workers to maintain the American standard of living; it should, he declared, prevent the breadwinner from becoming what he called a “non-consumer.” Gompers refused to be pinned down to a specific definition since, as he put, a “a living wage today may be denounced as a starvation wage in a decade.” Placed in this context, Gompers’s famous demand for “more, more” emerges as part of a long working-class tradition of political economy. The notion of the ever-increasing living wage was an ideal to which all groups of workers aspired.

Gompers fought for the rights of workers against the greedy. **EWB[[30]](#footnote-30):** The American labor leader [Samuel Gompers](http://www.notablebiographies.com/knowledge/Samuel_Gompers.html) was the most significant person in the history of the American labor movement (the effort of working people to improve their lives by forming organizations called unions). He founded and served as the first president of the American Federation of Labor. Youth and education Samuel Gompers was born on January 27, 1850, in east London, England, to Solomon and Sarah Gompers. His family was Dutch-Jewish in origin and had lived in England for only a few years. The family was extremely poor, but at the age of six Gompers was sent to a free Jewish school, where he received the beginnings of an education practically unknown to poor people in his day. The education was brief, however, as Gompers began to work, first making shoes and then in his father's [cigar](http://www.notablebiographies.com/knowledge/Cigar.html)-making trade. In 1863, when Gompers was thirteen, the family immigrated to the United States and settled in the slums of New York City. The family soon numbered eleven members, and Gompers again went to work as a cigar maker. Cigar-makers' union Full of energy and naturally drawn to other people, Gompers joined many organizations in the immigrant world of New York. But from the start nothing was as important to him as the small Cigar-makers' Local Union No. 15, which he joined with his father in 1864. Gompers immediately rose to leadership of the group. At the age of sixteen he regularly represented his fellow workers when confronting their employers, and he [discussed](http://www.notablebiographies.com/knowledge/Debate.html) politics and economics with well-spoken workingmen many years older than himself. This was a time of technological change in cigar making (as it was in practically every branch of American industry). Machines were being introduced that replaced many highly skilled workers. The cigar makers were distinguished, however, by the intelligence with which they studied their problems. The nature of their work—the quietness of the process of making cigars, for example—permitted and even encouraged discussion of economic questions, and this environment provided Gompers with an excellent kind of schooling. The most important influence upon his life was [Ferdinand](http://www.notablebiographies.com/knowledge/Ferdinand.html) Laurrel, a once prominent Scandinavian socialist (someone who think goods and services should be owned and controlled by the government), who taught Gompers that workingmen should avoid both politics and unrealistic dreaming in favor of winning immediate "bread and butter" gains in their wages, hours of work, and working conditions. In fact, Gompers had many contacts with [socialists](http://www.notablebiographies.com/knowledge/Socialism.html), though from his earliest days he had little time for their ideas. [Basing](http://www.notablebiographies.com/knowledge/Old_Basing.html) his own thinking about unions on a "pure and simple" concrete approach, he built the Cigar-makers' International Union into a functioning organization despite modern technology and unsuccessful strikes (an event in which a group of workers stop working in an attempt to gain rights from their employer). American Federation of Labor In 1881, with several other union leaders, Gompers helped to set up a loose organization of unions that, in 1886, became the American Federation of Labor (AFL). Founded during the height of the Knights of Labor, the AFL was different from the older [labor organization](http://www.notablebiographies.com/knowledge/Trade_union.html) in nearly every way. Most importantly, the Knights wished for a society in which cooperation would govern the economy, whereas the AFL unions were interested only in improving the day-to-day material life of their members. The socialists' attempt to take control of the AFL in 1894 did succeed in removing Gompers from power for a year, but he was firmly back in control by 1895 and, if anything, more opposed to socialism in the unions than ever. "Socialism holds nothing but unhappiness for the human race," Gompers said in 1918. "Socialism has no place in the hearts of those who would secure the fight for freedom and preserve democracy." Throughout his career he argued against the thriving Socialist Party. Although there were many reasons that socialist thought did not take root in American unions, Gompers's influence as the head of the labor movement for forty years was important. Even if Gompers was hostile to the socialists, however, he was as devoted to the cause of unions as any other American labor leader before or since. He was the first national union leader to recognize and encourage the strike as labor's most effective weapon. In 1906 he defied a court order concerning a union activity and was sentenced to a year in jail, though he ended up spending only one night behind bars. The way in which Gompers spoke against greedy businessmen matched anything of his time. (Gompers first became known as a speaker and always delivered a speech well. He spoke widely for the cause of the AFL and, thanks to a quick mind, rarely lost in debate. However, none of his books was distinguished

thomas perez contention:

Thomas Perez is moral inspiration who has fought against injustice. **CORN:**[[31]](#footnote-31) Whether or not the Democrats lose their Senate majority on Tuesday, President Barack Obama will need to show some fight after the midterm elections. If the Republicans triumph, Obama must do something to rally his discouraged supporters and show he won't spend his final two years as a truly lame-duck president. If the Dems manage to hold the Senate, the president, who has been pinned down by ISIS, Ebola, and other crises, will still be looking for a way to take back the political narrative and flex his political and policy muscle. Either way, he has a good option: nominate Tom Perez as attorney general. The chatter in Washington is that Obama will announce his pick to replace the outgoing Eric Holder soon after Election Day, and Perez is on the White House's short list. Based on his resumé, Perez, who is now secretary of labor, is a reasonable choice. He's also one of the administration's most stalwart progressives. Before taking charge of the Department of Labor in July 2013, Perez was the assistant attorney general of the Justice Department's civil rights division. The office had been eviscerated under George W. Bush, and Perez revitalized it by mounting voting rights cases and legal challenges to discrimination against gays and lesbians. During his tenure, the division opened a record breaking number of investigations into police abuse and forged wide-ranging agreements to clean up various police forces accused of misconduct, no small matter given recent national debates and controversy sparked by the Ferguson episode and the Trayvon Martin shooting. As *Mother Jones* previously [reported](http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/03/tom-perez-justice-department-trayvon-martin" \t "_blank): Using its authority to compel institutional changes in local law enforcement agencies that have engaged in systemic violations of Americans' constitutional rights, Perez's office has helped to overhaul the police department of Puerto Rico and New Orleans police force. (New Orleans police officers shot several civilians in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.) It has scrutinized the Miami and Seattle police departments and exposed the civil rights abuses of Arizona's notorious anti-immigrant Sheriff Joe Arpaio. Perez has long demonstrated a commitment to civil rights and a robust role for government. As a federal prosecutor during George H.W. Bush's administration, he won notable convictions of several neo-Nazis who had committed a string of murders designed to spark a race war. He later worked for Sen. Ted Kennedy before being elected to the Montgomery County council in Maryland and joining the board of an immigration rights group. Since the financial meltdown, the Justice Department has faced criticism that it did not prosecute the Wall Streeters most responsible for triggering the catastrophic recession that hit in 2008. That wasn't Perez's call. But as chief of the civil rights division, he did target[ed] big banks by bringing enforcement actions against financial institutions for racial discrimination and for foreclosing on active-duty military service-members in violation of federal law. He created a fair lending unit within the division that went on to w[o]n a $335 million settlement against Bank of America and a $175 million settlement against Wells Fargo. These were the two largest fair-housing settlements in Justice Department history. After being promoted to run the Labor Department, Perez also fired up that bureaucracy. As Politico recently [noted](http://www.politico.com/story/2014/10/tom-perez-labor-112241.html" \t "_blank), It was one of the federal government's sleepier outposts for most of the dozen years that preceded Perez's arrival just over one year ago. But Labor has been newly energized under Perez. "Enforcement activity is up," Alfred Robinson Jr., who was an acting wage and hour administrator for the Labor Department during the George W. Bush administration, noted earlier this month in a blog post. The department has also raised its public profile on issues like minimum wage and paid medical leave and lavished favorable attention on companies that give employees what Perez calls "voice." So the guy has the legal, policy, and management chops to be attorney general. And if Obama nominated him, the president would send a resounding message that he remained committed to a progressive agenda. Now for the politics: Perez is the son of exiled Dominican immigrants.

He’s also studied the example of other moral authorities like MLK. **PEREZ[[32]](#footnote-32):** A few weeks ago, I saw *Selma*, a remarkable movie about the unbreakable persistence and moral leadership of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. in the struggle to secure voting rights for African-Americans in the Jim Crow South. But what the movie didn't reveal was the role played by the labor movement in the 1965 march from Selma to Montgomery and its part in propelling the civil rights movement forward at so many pivotal moments. As we mark Dr. King's 86th birthday, it is my hope that Americans will remember another less-celebrated element of his dream -- a belief in the importance of unions, labor rights and robust worker voice. As the U.S. Secretary of Labor, and also the former Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, my work is animated by Dr. King's view that civil rights and labor rights are inextricably intertwined. "The duality of interests of labor and Negroes," he told the AFL-CIO Constitutional Convention in 1961, "makes any crisis which lacerates you, a crisis from which we bleed." Both movements are rooted in the idea that empowerment comes when many people speak with one voice, rallying as a community, taking collective action. Going back to the Montgomery Bus Boycott nearly a decade earlier, the key strategist was a local leader of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters named E.D. Nixon, who saw the galvanizing potential of Rosa Parks' refusal to give up her seat at the front of the bus. Labor leaders like Walter Reuther, A. Philip Randolph and Bayard Rustin were also the driving organizational force behind the 1963 March on Washington, a demonstration that was about economic justice as well as racial emancipation (the full name was actually "The March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom"). Dr. King's ties and fellowship with the labor movement were deep. *Selma* opens with King accepting the Nobel Peace Prize -- it doesn't mention that one of his first tasks upon returning from Oslo to his hometown of Atlanta was to picket with striking workers at the Scripto pen factory. Union members, from the rank-and-file up to representatives of the AFL-CIO Executive Council, came to march in Selma. Among those locking arms on the Edmund Pettus Bridge was Reuther of the United Auto Workers. It was also Reuther who posted bail after Dr. King's 1963 arrest in Birmingham. And the UAW provided the Detroit office space where King wrote his most iconic speech, "I Have a Dream." Civil rights activists and union activists shared not just common values and objectives, but also common enemies. The same mounted posse that bashed and brutalized marchers on Bloody Sunday, a harrowing scene vividly reenacted in *Selma*, was first assembled by Sheriff Jim Clark to harass union organizers at a local packing plant several years earlier. Central to King's philosophy was the idea that men and women of all races deserve the dignity of work, the right to earn more than poverty wages. And he knew that goal was not attainable without full-throated worker voice. Here is Dr. King speaking to the Illinois AFL-CIO in 1965: "The labor movement was the principal force that transformed misery and despair into hope and progress. Out of its bold struggles, economic and social reform gave birth to unemployment insurance, old age pensions, government relief for the destitute, and, above all, new wage levels that meant not mere survival but a tolerable life." Dr. King's last campaign was a labor struggle. Many people are aware that King was assassinated in Memphis in the spring of 1968. Less well-known is what drew him there: solidarity with city sanitation workers, who, without the benefit of union representation, were rising up to protest humiliating pay and deplorable working conditions. The catalyzing event was the gruesome death of two workers, crushed by a malfunctioning hydraulic ram in the back of a sanitation truck. The hard-working civil servants who picked up Memphis' garbage were tired of being treated like garbage. They walked off the job and organized under the proud, defiant banner, powerful in its simplicity: "I Am a Man." Representatives from the American Federation of State County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) came to town to help negotiate, but the recalcitrant Mayor, Henry Loeb, refused to come to the table. Mayhem broke out in the streets when police turned mace and nightsticks on marching strikers. Arriving in Memphis on March 18 and declaring that "all labor has dignity," King spontaneously urged a general work stoppage -- not just in sanitation, but workers of all kinds throughout the city. He would return twice in the coming weeks. And on April 3, in his final speech, he seemed to foreshadow his own personal demise even as he imagined the ultimate triumph of the movement: "I may not get there with you. But I want you to know tonight that we, as a people, will get to the promised land." Less than 24 hours later, he was gunned down while standing on the balcony of the Lorraine Motel. Within two weeks, the strike was settled. The city recognized the union and granted the sanitation workers a raise. Nearly half a century later, workers' struggle for fair pay, decent benefits and economic security remains one of the pressing challenges of our time. With a declining percentage of workers belonging to unions, wages have stagnated and the middle class has suffered. Around the country, reactionary forces continue to exert their considerable power to try to muzzle worker voice. But time and again, we see Dr. King's influence in mass mobilizations of people peacefully petitioning for their rights at work. We see it in the ongoing campaign by fast food workers to get the raise they deserve. We saw it in Madison, Wisconsin in 2011 -- thousands descending on the state capitol to protest a state law stripping public employees of collective bargaining rights. To ensure an economy based on shared prosperity, we must grow these movements, identifying new and innovative ways to lift up worker voice. And as we do, we must continue to turn for inspiration to Dr. King. The King Holiday is a celebration of many things -- his pursuit of racial justice, his commitment to non-violent resistance, his belief in service and doing for others. But you might also call it the other Labor Day.

He strongly favors raising the minimum wage. **NOAH[[33]](#footnote-33):** “We suck,” Labor Secretary Tom Perez said last week in a roomful of reporters. “We really do.” Perez was talking about the minimum wage. At $7.25, it represents only 37 percent of the median hourly wage, which ranks the U.S. near the bottom in a [survey](http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=RMW" \t "_blank) by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Only in Mexico and the Czech Republic are legal minimums smaller relative to medians. Not long ago, Perez might have uttered that same blunt assessment about the Labor Department itself. It was one of the federal government’s sleepier outposts for most of the dozen years that preceded Perez’s arrival just over one year ago. But Labor has been newly energized under Perez. “Enforcement activity is up,” Alfred Robinson Jr., who was an acting wage and hour administrator for the Labor Department during the George W. Bush administration, noted earlier this month in a blog post. The department has also raised its public profile on issues like minimum wage and paid medical leave and lavished favorable attention on companies that give employees what Perez calls “voice.” (Sign up for the Morning Shift newsletter) Even the department’s employees seem to have a bit more vim. Governmentwide, federal “employee engagement” and “global satisfaction” have declined since 2011, according to an Employee Viewpoint Survey conducted by the Office of Personnel Management, the federal government’s human resources office. But at the Labor Department, these indicators have been rising since 2013. The policy changes began under Perez’s predecessor, Hilda Solis, appointed by President Barack Obama. Under Solis, the amount of back pay Labor collected for workers in wage and hour enforcement actions rose to $250 million in fiscal 2013, up from $173 million in fiscal 2009 — an increase, after inflation, of more than a third. Since the start of the Obama administration, Perez crows, the agency has “recovered over $1 billion” in lost wages. Meanwhile, the number of man-hours spent on enforcement rose nearly half, to 1.3 million, up from 880,000. By 2011, the Labor Department’s more aggressive enforcement was prompting Bush wage and hour administrator Tammy McCutchen to complain to Congress that it represented a departure not just “from Bush administration policies” but “from historic policies and practices.” (POLITICO's 2014 race ratings) Perez is en route to the Florida Avenue Grill, a soul food restaurant revered locally but invisible to the Beltway elite. He had just toured a UPS training facility that teaches new hires how to minimize risk of injury. He was going to have lunch with two workers, who wrote him about the need for paid leave, and their spouses joined them. He made clear he wastes little time worrying what the Bush administration might have thought of his priorities. “They weren’t seeking to repeal [labor] laws,” he says. “They just didn’t enforce ’em.” The “quintessential example,” he says, was an agreement the department struck with a major retailer to give a heads-up before investigators showed up to look for potential wage-and-hour violations. Which retailer? “Rhymes with ‘small,’” Perez says. It was Walmart. Under a compliance agreement struck early in 2005, Walmart agreed to pay $135,000 in fines for child labor violations. In exchange, the Bush Labor Department agreed that Walmart would, over the next year, receive “fifteen (15) days prior notice of any WHD audit or investigation.” When the document inevitably leaked, House Democrats expressed fury, the Labor Department’s inspector general issued a blistering report, and the agreement was allowed to expire quietly in 2006. Under Perez, unannounced inspections are much more frequent. (Full 2014 election results) Much of the instigation for the Labor Department’s higher profile is coming from the White House. Labor and workplace issues were a low priority during Obama’s first term, a sore point with many union officials. The president was seen as largely AWOL on the Employee Free Choice Act, or “card check,” a labor-favored bill that would have removed some legal obstacles to organizing. Lacking a veto-proof majority, the bill never got a Senate vote. Obama also had little to say in his first term about raising the minimum wage. That White House stance, combined with Solis’ quieter style, kept the Labor Department out of the news. But by the time Perez arrived in July 2013, unemployment was ticking down, and fast-food workers were taking to the streets to demand higher pay. By March of this year, the White House was [directing the Labor Department](http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/03/13/fact-sheet-opportunity-all-rewarding-hard-work-strengthening-overtime-pr" \t "_blank) to extend overtime pay protections to more white-collar workers. On Labor Day, Obama said, “If I were busting my butt in the service industry and wanted an honest day’s pay for an honest day’s work, I’d join a union.” Such a statement, once unexceptional coming from any president, sounds today like a rallying cry as private-sector union density falls below 7 percent. Perez, whose last gig was running the Justice Department’s civil rights division — and whose next gig may be running all of DOJ — upped the enforcement ante with the arrival this past May of Boston University economist David Weil as wage and hour administrator. “His appointment, to me, is so critical,” Perez says. Before Weil, the department had not had a Senate-confirmed wage and hour administrator for nine years. (McCutchen, who left in 2004, was the last.) Shortly before Weil arrived, he published The Fissured Workplace, a much-cited book documenting the proliferation of contracting, subcontracting and franchise arrangements that separate workers from large corporations they often work for in all but name and how those arrangements reduce pay and benefits. “We can’t act as if the world is this simple employer-employee relationship,” Weil says.

Weil had been advising the wage and hour division about “fissuring” since the Bush years, and [largely at his instigation](http://www.dol.gov/whd/resources/strategicEnforcement.pdf" \t "_blank) the Labor Department began under Solis targeting industries that had particularly bad records on labor violations, including fast-food and janitorial services. Now Weil oversees that enforcement effort himself. A new focus is on the fracking industry, where the misclassification of workers as independent contractors, Weil says, is rife. Just as important as cracking the whip, say Weil and Perez, is cheering employers who resist pressures to shed workers or pay them the bare minimum. Perez routinely makes reference to the living wages paid by companies like UPS, which employs its drivers directly (rather than treat them as independent contractors, as FedEx Ground does) and Costco, which pays more than Walmart. At a meeting with managers from Market Basket, the New England supermarket chain that last summer made headlines with its management-organized strike to reinstate worker-friendly CEO Arthur Demoulas, Perez is visibly moved by the Frank Capra spirit in the room. “We all succeed,” he says, “only when we all succeed.”

It’s not just about economic prosperity, but ensuring workers have a voice. **NBC quotes Perez[[34]](#footnote-34):**

You speak often about the middle class, but frankly, it’s not all that clear what the middle class means now. At one time, we were talking about access to education, a stable job that made it possible to buy a home. Things like the GI bill, union salaries, and pensions secured the middle class, but increasingly, [these things are relics](http://www.nbcnews.com/feature/in-plain-sight/two-americas-many-brace-have-not-holiday-season-n238536). When you talk about the middle class, what are you talking about? Perez: The middle class is a timeless concept that is as much a values set as it is a number that denotes median family income. The values part is about people who have the capacity to have a home, retirement, healthcare and employment security. It’s the ability for people to help their children do a little better than they did. That’s the moral contract, and that’s what makes us the greatest country on earth. The challenge out of the Great Recession is to ensure that we continue to maintain this social compact with America. And we must continue to strive to ensure that we have shared prosperity. We see encouraging job growth, and we’re on pace to have more; the challenge is to make sure that the rising tide lifts all boats and not simply the yachts. There is an argument that low wages are a product of globalization. But low wages are a choice, not a necessity. In every business model across America I can give you examples of employers that reject the false choice between the shareholder, worker, and customer. NBC: Yet because the minimum wage remains at an historic low in terms of buying power, many employers are making the opposite choice: to cut worker pay and impose difficult scheduling policies to grow profits. Among the workers at the bottom of the scale are [tipped workers](http://www.nbcnews.com/business/economy/minimum-wage-fight-turns-tips-n153046) who are entitled to just $2.13 per hour under federal minimum wages law. So, what percent do you tip? And how much are we supposed to tip, say, at a coffee shop when you buy a $1.85 cup of coffee. What does the Secretary of Labor put in the tip jar for the barista? Perez: Well, I am the wrong guy to ask. I save a lot of money because I don’t drink coffee, because I don’t go to Starbucks. I don’t drink tea either. It’s healthier. Look at me I’m drinking water. It’s interesting: I’ve traveled internationally a fair amount recently, and I always ask what the custom is around tipping. *In Spain* I was instructed not to tip at all. I bring this up because *restaurateurs* there say it is their responsibility to *pay their workers fairly*. That’s not how it works here, and as a result while *everyone has monthly overhead*—rent utilities and the like—*when you’re a tipped worker*, *you have no guarantee of how much* money *will come in*. *That’s colossally unfair.* When the government shut down, I’d go into restaurants that were ordinarily packed at lunchtime and they were ghost towns, and those *workers relied on tips, but they were not going to get that money back*. *"It’s understandable that there continues to be angst."* All too frequently, *while an employer is supposed to compensate them* for the difference between $2.13 and the full minimum wage, *that does not always happen*. That’s why my office has a pretty aggressive enforcement operation going after back wages and penalties for employers who don’t pay. The federal minimum wage is too low to begin with *in and the tipped wage results* tipped workers, *disproportionately women, really taking it* on the chin.

NBC: Speaking of disproportionality, racial inequality is a persistent feature of the economy—unemployment and underemployment rates are[higher in communities of color](http://www.nbcnews.com/feature/in-plain-sight/dying-out-here-u-s-job-gains-leave-black-women-n202376). How is your department addressing persistent racial inequality in work? Perez: There is not one magic bullet. If there was one magic bullet to increase wages and to ensure shared prosperity that bullet would have been shot. There are many things that we need to do. For one, 70 percent of GDP growth is from consumption, and we need to take actions to stimulate consumption, including but not limited to raising the minimum wage. More broadly, we are dramatically reforming how we upscale America. I was at Lorraine County Community College this morning talking to people who were out of work, surviving on public benefits and have now punched their ticket to the middle class because they got onto the skills super highway that we are constructing. It’s allowed them to get the skills that match them with in demand jobs. When you look at unemployment rates, they’re coming down for all demographics. But at the same time, the African American and Latino unemployment rates were higher, so even though they’re coming down, but they are still unconscionably high. If you look at where it was a year ago, and where it is now, it’s moving in the right direction, but it’s all too slow. For black workers, if you look at incarceration rates of young black men compared to the rest of the population, they are very high. We have done a number of investments, often in partnership with the Department of Justice, to help people coming out of prison, including but not limited to young black men, to have access to the skills they need, and the support systems they need to get access to a job and not recidivate. *"If there was one magic bullet to increase wages ... that bullet would have been shot."* At the same the [Equal Employment Opportunity Commission] has been looking into the use of criminal histories as a filter in the hiring process and whether that implicates Title VII [anti-discrimination laws]. And that’s something that they continue to look at on a case by case basis. The largest private employer in the state of Maryland is [Johns] Hopkins [University]. It is also one of the most prolific employers of former offenders. They are not doing it as an act of charity. They are doing it because they find a great, loyal and productive workforce. NBC: Young workers are also having a tough time in this recovery. Many internships in the U.S. [are unpaid](http://www.nbcnews.com/feature/in-plain-sight/no-one-should-have-work-free-end-unpaid-internship-v20262899), so college and post-college aged people work for free because it’s “good experience.” The Labor Department has[issued guidelines](http://www.propublica.org/article/how-the-labor-department-let-companies-off-hook-for-unpaid-internships) saying an intern can be unpaid if they’re doing work that furthers their education and that a paid employee wouldn’t do otherwise. Yet recent reporting has shown that the DOL has not prioritized enforcement of internship laws. Perez: We do have an active [enforcement] focus on the individual cases of folks who should be classified as employees but are treated as interns and we’ll continue to do that, but at the same time if your focus is entirely on strategies to use enforcement to make sure that you get people into the workforce to make money, I think at best we’ll see fleeting progress. So we’re looking to alternatives. I was in the U.K. and Germany and went to Volkswagen and learned about their apprenticeship model—young people become paid apprentices in trades. It’s not a coincidence that youth unemployment is far lower in Germany than the United States because there are paid opportunities for young people to get experience. So, yes we need to and do investigate [internship violations], but I think the broader solution will help more people faster to transform the culture of America around this earn-while-you-learn idea. *"It’s not a coincidence that youth unemployment is far lower in Germany."* We’re going to do a $100 million competitive grant to help develop apprenticeship models in the U.S. I expect that a typical recipient will be a partnership that will include business, non-profits and educators that will not be focused only on skilled trades, but also in emerging areas like healthcare, cyber security, IT. I expect that these grants will help get minorities and women into apprenticeships. NBC: [I wrote a story](http://www.nbcnews.com/feature/in-plain-sight/whats-making-these-selma-alabama-auto-parts-workers-so-sick-n150136) about workers in a foam plant in Selma, Alabama, that that sells cushions to Hyundai. Workers say that chemicals in the plant are making them sick, and they want to hold their employer accountable, but they say it’s not entirely clear if they should complain to Hyundai or the contractor that employs them directly. Subcontracting like this has reshaped the American labor market, and for workers, that can be a tremendous challenge. Perez: You’re talking about the fissured workplace. When we talk about the challenges of shared prosperity, the fissured workplace poses a challenge to shared prosperity. The fissured workplace has different forms—there are workers that act like and quack like employees but are called contract workers. There are business models that contract out essential services, like in your story. In your story, you wrote about Denise Barnett [a worker at the Alabama plant]. What she’s dealing with, I see that all the time: accountability becomes and feels unclear. If we are going to build shared prosperity in society and address wage challenges that you and I have discussed, we need to make sure we treat people as employees. We need to make sure that workers have voice. When you don’t have voice, [employees] BRACKETS IN ORIGINAL feel much more vulnerable.

Even more evidence. **PEREZ[[35]](#footnote-35):** It's time to give America a raise. That was one of the basic, core messages in President Obama's [State of the Union address](http://www.whitehouse.gov/sotu" \t "_hplink) Tuesday night. He called on Congress to do what 21 states and the District of Columbia have already done -- increase the minimum wage so that working people have enough in their paychecks to provide for their families. Forward-looking companies get that this makes smart business sense. That's why the president and I visited a Costco store in Lanham, Md., the morning after his speech. Costco pays their workers good wages with benefits, while selling good products at competitive prices and remaining quite profitable. You see, [as the President pointed out](http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/2014/01/29/remarks-president-minimum-wage" \t "_hplink), Costco CEO Craig Jelinek isn't doing this just for fun; he's got his eye on the bottom line just like any good businessman. But he understands that he can't keep his business on top by running a race to the bottom. That's why I shop at Costco. My wife and I have been members for more than 17 years -- ever since we were buying diapers for our first-born who's now on her way to college. But they're not the only company following this model. I just got back from a [visit](http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/federal-eye/wp/2014/01/30/labor-secretary-to-echo-obamas-minimum-wage-message/" \t "_hplink) to the 5th Street Ace Hardware store in Washington, where all employees make more than the federal minimum wage, most earning $10 per hour or more. A few weeks ago, I met with a restaurant owner from Brooklyn who told me that he's been able to retain his dishwashers for more than a year, thus reducing high training costs. That's a tall order for a position known for high turnover, but he did it by paying them $11 per hour. It stands to reason: Higher wages means higher loyalty and morale, which means higher productivity, which means a more profitable business. But we can't wait for every employer to see the light. So the president is using his authority to sign an executive order mandating that federal contractors pay their federally-funded employees at least $10.10 an hour. Because, as he put it in the State of the Union: "If you cook our troops' meals or wash their dishes, you shouldn't have to live in poverty." But I would support one step that would render that Executive Order moot -- to make a $10.10 minimum wage the law of the land for everyone. The legislation has been introduced. It's just waiting for Congress to show the leadership, to take a common-sense step that, by the way, enjoys the support of more than three-quarters of Americans. Increasing the minimum wage is part of the president's vision of opportunity for all, a fair chance to get ahead if you're willing to work hard. It will help families and it will help businesses. It's the right thing to do and the smart thing to do. So let's give America a raise.

Perez has consistently supported raising the minimum wage significantly. **PEREZ[[36]](#footnote-36):**

When you put more money in the pockets of working families, they spend it on groceries, gas, school supplies, and other goods and services. And that helps businesses grow and create jobs. So many forward-looking employers, large and small, understand this. When we talk about the kind of folks whose lives will be made better by raising the minimum wage, we're not talking about a couple teenagers earning extra spending money to supplement their allowance. We're talking about providers and breadwinners. Working Americans with bills to pay and mouths to feed. When we lift the wage floor, it not only betters the lives of those whose wages are directly affected, it also lifts the economy as a whole. We are indeed a nation of immigrants. People who choose to come to America have always been one of our greatest sources of national vitality. They keep our economy strong and our communities dynamic. They are some of our greatest patriots. Union members not only earn higher median wages; they are more likely to have paid sick leave, short-term disability, and employer-provided child care. Giving people a voice at work - the ability to organize and negotiate for their fair share of the value they helped create - is absolutely essential to a growing, vibrant middle class. To realize President Obama's vision of opportunity for all, it's all about making the right match. The way we do that is through job-driven training - connecting ready-to-work Americans with ready to be-filled jobs. It helps more people secure a foothold in the middle class and helps businesses to profit and grow. To fulfill the promise of economic opportunity, we must remain true to the principle that collective bargaining is a cornerstone of a free society and indispensable to a strong middle class. The typical minimum wage earner is a provider and a breadwinner - most likely a woman - responsible for paying bills, running a household and raising children. It stands to reason: Higher wages means higher loyalty and morale, which means higher productivity, which means a more profitable business.

More evidence. **WOLF[[37]](#footnote-37):** Labor Secretary Tom Perez blamed former President George W. Bush Wednesday for the Great Recession, arguing that the minimum wage, labor unions and Obama are vital to recovery. “I come here with a sense of optimism because I remember where we were, we all remember where we were, the three months before this president took office,” Perez declared, speaking to a crowd at the AFL-CIO National Summit on Raising Wages. “The economy shedded two million jobs,” Perez said. “The housing crisis, the bubble had burst, the American dream had been transformed, the American nightmare through the corrosive power of fine print.” “This president was a community organizer,” Perez said. “He continues to be a community organizer. He understands change comes from the bottom up.” Throughout his speech Perez focused primarily on the minimum wage, arguing that it won’t just help the poor, it will help aide in the country’s economic recovery. “It starts by making every effort we can to lift wages,” Perez argued. “We’re moving in the right direction but today is about the unfinished business,” Perez said. “And it starts with the minimum wage.” The minimum wage debate has been a driving force for many protests in the past year. Fight for 15, an affiliate of the Service Employees International Union, has advocated for higher wages by organizing fast food worker protests. While supporters say raising the minimum wage will help raise many out of poverty, opponents argue it will actually hurt the lower-income earners by reducing jobs. “This has been a consumption deprived recovery,” Perez noted. “Why? Because of the reason we are here today, because wages have been flat, prosperity has not been shared.” “Low wages are a choice, not a necessity,” Perez argued. “We can have an economy of shared prosperity. You led the economy into shared prosperity; the labor movement was about leading the economy for decades into a nation of shared prosperity, where everyone who worked hard and played by the rules can realize the American dream.”

frances perkins contention:

Frances Perkins, Labor Secretary under FDR, supported living wages. **SPRAGUE[[38]](#footnote-38):** During her two-decades-long career in New York State, first as an activist and then as a public official in the administrations ofGovernors Al Smith and Franklin D. Roosevelt, Frances Perkins advocated for minimum wage and maximum hour laws governing employment. When, in February, 1933, President-elect Roosevelt asked Perkins to serve in his cabinet as Secretary of Labor, she outlined for him a set of policy priorities she would pursue: a 40-hour work week; a minimum wage; unemployment compensation; worker’s compensation; abolition of child labor; direct federal aid to the states for unemployment relief; Social Security; a revitalized federal employment service; and universal health insurance. Frances Perkins recognized the compassionate need to pay America’s workers a living wage, but also the connection between wages and the economic health of the country. In her first book in 1934, People at Work, she wrote: It was no new thing for America to refuse to let its people starve, nor was it a new idea that man should live by his own labor, but it had not been generally realized that on the ability of the common man to support himself hung the prosperity of everyone in the country. The President shared that viewpoint. In calling upon Congress in 1937 to consider his wage and hour legislation, as well as a prohibition against child labor, Roosevelt issued a message stating, “The exploitation of child labor and the undercutting of wages and the stretching of the hours of the poorest paid workers in periods of business recession has a serious effect on buying power.” The Fair Labor Standards Act, enacted in 1938, was the last major legislation of the New Deal. It prohibited child labor and established statutory minimum wages and maximum hours and fulfilled, at last, Perkins’ goals of nationwide protections for workers engaged in interstate commerce. The Act set the minimum wage in 1938 at $.25/hour, to be increased in seven years to $.40/hour, with a forty-four hour work week, decreasing to forty hours in three years. A Wage and Hour Division was established within the Department of Labor to enforce the Act. In her book, The Roosevelt I Knew, published in 1946, Frances Perkins noted: At this writing, the law seems to be a permanent part of the legal structure and economic pattern of the United States.

Perkins was an American hero guided by an incredible moral compass. DOWNEY[[39]](#footnote-39): Book Description Frances Perkins is no longer a household name, yet she was one of the most influential women of the twentieth century. Based on eight years of research, extensive archival materials, new documents, and exclusive access to Perkins’s family members and friends, this biography is the first complete portrait of a devoted public servant with a passionate personal life, a mother who changed the landscape of American business and society. Frances Perkins was named Secretary of Labor by Franklin Roosevelt in 1933. As the first female cabinet secretary, she spearheaded the fight to improve the lives of America’s working people while juggling her own complex family responsibilities. Perkins’s ideas became the cornerstones of the most important social welfare and legislation in the nation’s history, including unemployment compensation, child labor laws, and the forty-hour work week. Arriving in Washington at the height of the Great Depression, Perkins pushed for massive public works projects that created millions of jobs for unemployed workers. She breathed life back into the nation’s labor movement, boosting living standards across the country. As head of the Immigration Service, she fought to bring European refugees to safety in the United States. Her greatest triumph was creating Social Security. Written with a wit that echoes Frances Perkins’s own, award-winning journalist Kirstin Downey gives us a riveting exploration of how and why Perkins slipped into historical oblivion, and restores Perkins to her proper place in history. Housing prices had been pumped up by crazy new kinds of loans, and foreclosures of homes and farms were surging as borrowers faltered under the payments. Companies had enjoyed record profits and ploughed the money into machinery designed to boost productivity, cutting their workforces. The unemployment rate skyrocketed. Companies slashed the wages of the remaining workers, and asked them to work longer and longer hours. And then Wall Street imploded as the stock market crashed. This was the scenario Franklin Delano Roosevelt faced as he entered the presidency in 1933. An era of rampant speculation had come to an end. A women stepped in to put things right. FDR turned to a long-time friend for guidance about how best to proceed, and asked her to join his Cabinet as Secretary of Labor. The middle-aged woman, a social worker named Frances Perkins, had spent a lifetime preparing for the job. She had studied economic boom and bust cycles, and knew they were a recurring pattern in modern industrial economies. She had a vision for how to blunt the worst of the hardship that American families were suffering, until business recovered again on its own. She proposed a system of unemployment insurance, so that when workers lost their jobs through no fault of their own, they would have some income to keep their families fed while they looked for new jobs. Senior citizens had lost their life savings as real estate values fell and the stock market tumbled, and they needed some sort of income support, some kind of social security, when they grew too old to work. Employed people were stumbling under long work hours. She advocated the creation of a 40-hour workweek and a minimum wage. Companies were hiring teenagers instead of adults to save money, and she thought the time was ripe to place new restrictions on child labor. “Nothing like this has ever been done in the United States before,” she told him. “You know that, don’t you?” Within weeks she would head to Washington, D.C. by his side. The challenges they would face would be great. The conservative Supreme Court, businessmen, free-market ideologues and even some labor leaders would oppose them. They would try to block her work. They would argue that the poor should be left to fend for themselves. They would savage Frances’s reputation, they would eventually try to impeach her. But she would not give up. Frances Perkins, the first woman to take a position in the top tier of federal government, would succeed. The institutions she created would help future generations cope with the recurring economic downturns that she had predicted would come again. Her extraordinary achievements make her one of the most influential women of the twentieth century, one whose legacy should be widely celebrated.

extensions:

**Extend Lewis:** Deriving ethics doesn’t work.

1) Ethics is a learnt practice through training – it’s developed since you don’t start kindergarten with categorical imperative. Just because your grandma hasn’t studied ethics, it doesn’t mean she lacks knowledge of right and wrong – she is still an authority.

2) Any philosophic movement already presupposes the nature of ethical commitments. A commonsense ethical community comes first since otherwise there is no incentive to engage in ethical derivation unless you trust people and respect *knowing* the truth. You can’t derive the value of truth, since the reason to engage in that derivation already is presupposed.

3) From fact, no ethical conclusion can be drawn since you cannot make up an imperative from an indicative since a prior normative concept previously existed in your mind to derive it. *If you look at any ethical system, already presupposes things. Rawls thought he rethought all of justice and ended up coming up with standard liberalism. Kant – totally rethink ethics and ends up German piety.*

4) You can’t be a skeptic since otherwise the foundation is lost. If you don’t accept normativity, you cannot critique it from the outside since a) there is no basis on which to attack it since you can always be *skeptical* about the skeptical reason provided b) there is no basic *reason* to be moral, the code only exists because we are constantly engaged in ethical lives. You can ask why, but any practice’s justification must end somewhere, so a coherent view is better since it’s a question of what assumptions are most consistent with other beliefs.

*More arguments:*

- Sentiments already presuppose normative understanding since we must pre-judge them.

- Objective values do exist – for example the writing of a book proves that we think certain things are actually good to have objectively rather than only good *for* us. **KORSGAARD[[40]](#footnote-40):** But this way of describing the situation implies a strange description of my own attitude. It suggests that my desire to have my book required is a product of raw vanity, and that if I want to write a good book, this is merely as a means to getting it required. This does not correctly reflect the structure of my ambition. Part of the reason that **I want to write a good book** on Kant’s ethics is that **I think that such a book would be a good thing**, and my ambition is not conceivable without that thought. It is an ambition to do something good, and it would not be served by people’s requiring my book regardless of whether it was good. For now, let us describe this by saying that **I think *someone* should write a book** on Kant’s ethics good enough that it will be required reading. I think that this would have neutral value. This doesn’t, however, mean that my ambition is just a disinterested response to that neutral value. It is essential not to sanitize the phenomena here, or we shall go wrong. I may be interested in personal adulation, I may really like the idea of my book’s being required reading, and I may even harbor competitive feelings towards other engaged in similar projects. I don’t just want it to be the case that someone writes the book. **I want to *be the someone*** who writes that book. That element in my ambition is ineliminably agent-relative; no one else, except possibly my friends, has a reason to care whether I write the book or someone else does. So the structure of this ambition is not: i) I want my book to be required reading (where that’s an agent-relative end) ii) therefore: I shall write a good book (as a means to that end) but rather: i) Someone should write a book on Kant good enough that it will be required reading. (where that’s an agent-neutral end) ii) I want to be that someone (agent-relative motive) In other words, **to have a personal project** or ambition **is** not to desire a special object which you think is good for you subjectively, but rather **to want to stand in a special relationship to something you think is good objectively.** Ambition so characterized clearly does have an agent-relative component: you want to stand in a special relationship to what is good. Is this component the source of subjective normative reasons for action? On the one hand, the agent-relative component does seem to *motivate* me to do a lot of work I would not otherwise do. It is often true that without the personal element in ambition, people would not be able to bring themselves to carry out arduous tasks. There are therefore neutral reasons for encouraging the personal desires associated with ambitions. But should the agent herself treat these personal desires as the sources of reasons? If **I[f]** took it seriously that **my desire that *I*** should be the one to **write the book was a reason** for action, then **I would [forcibly]** have a reason to **prevent one of the** other Kant **scholars from writing *her* book.** But in fact, neither I nor anybody else thinks I have a reason to do this, even if in competitive moments I am tempted to feel it. This is not an expression of ambition, but rather a very familiar perversion of it. It is important to see that reasons of personal obligation almost always have this form. Although I may not suppose that the happiness of my loved ones is objectively more important than that of anyone else, I certainly do suppose that their happiness is objectively good. The structure of reasons arising from love is similar to that of reasons of ambition. **I think that someone should make my darling happy, and I want** very much **to *be that someone*.** And others may have good reason to encourage me in this. **But if I try to prevent someone else from making [her]** my darling **happy or** if I **suppose that [her]** my darling’s **happiness has no value unless it is produced by me, that is no longer an expression of love**. Again, it is a very familiar perversion of it.

**Extend Reader:** Explanatory accounts fail - ethics cannot be derived from non-ethical facts since ethics cannot be rationalized anymore than anything else we *already* do, like chess games. And the way we justify arguments is also part of our life. It is not knowable in itself, but rather a product of how we live rather than objective truth.

**Extend Lewis (2):** We should default to moral experts – there are always conflicts and disagreements, but since we can’t derive ethics it should be based upon gained understanding of learnt values. The only authority to determine ethics and modify it comes from within ethics, from those who lived ethically and have practical wisdom.

**Extend Gadamer:**

1)It is rational and wise to trust those who know better than us, which means that authority represents true practical rationality, not blind obedience.

2) We obviously don’t need a meta-ethic to understand normative facts. We obviously aren’t like I don’t know if I can kill until I derive it deductively or we need to study philosophy to know anything – my grandma has never taken an ethics class, but I think I’m justified in trusting her wisdom on ethical principles.

3) All moral education depends on authority – when I articulate the authority of some particular moral judgment it’s an aggregate of those that came before. That’s the real reason we feel morals have *force* and *move* us – it’s because of the importance and influence of our traditions. You don’t figure it out yourself, we appeal to others.

**Extend Chesterton:** Truly independent thinking doesn’t develop progress, only repetition, so we must rely on the testimony of those people who came before us.

**Extend the #3 and #4:** 3) The way to conform to the true principle is through testimonial. Other moral principles are not competitive with the AC. They may be true, but if were likely already synthesized by the AC moral experts and do not act as counter evidence anymore than an anecdote can disprove a study that uses that anecdote as a data point. 4) Testimony is inescapable. You accept the testimony of your authors. The judge accepts your testimony in believing your authors. We accepted the testimony of the tournament staff. We cannot reason without accepting testimony to provide reasonable starting points.

*Gandhi contention:*

**Extend Gupta:** Gandhi supported a living wage that was enough to support an entire family.

*Keller contention:*

**Extend Dryjanski:** Helen Keller inspired many disabled individuals and founded/supported organizations that improved their lives and made a historical difference.

**Extend Keller:** Keller advocated for a living wage – the transcript from her speech proves.

*Pope Contention:*

**Extend the reasons to prefer Pope Francis:** Popes are a good moral source since 1) they occupy a position over millions and are vetted by other ethical Cardinals 2) the Catholic tradition provides a longstanding moral tradition and Pope draws on other moral teachers like Paul/Jesus 3) Obama says the current Pope stands for love and kindness and has inspired millions 4) Popes combine both scholarly and practical insights, which is uniquely key as a moral viewpoint.

**Extend Francis:** We should restrict inequality and exploitation of the poor. This greed is a source of constant violence and commodification and governments must combat it.

**Extend Blaire:**  We must rehab the dignity of work. It’s an ideological shift; we respect work beyond economic value by requiring a living wage. Dignity of work is crucial since it’s part of the praxis of human life, allows care for families that are vital for development, allows contribution and progress, and prevents exploitation/commodification that erodes social trust.

*Martin Luther King contention:*

**Extend King:** We have a right to a living wage to ensure people are not earning poverty/starvation wages for their work.

**Extend King III:** This was integral to King’s vision – social justice requires a living wage since otherwise the rich get richer and people make impossible choices.

*Mandela contention:*

**Extend Mandela:** In a speech, Mandela declared his support for a living wage.

reasons to prefer fwk:

1. My framework helps solve for our epistemic biases. **SLIWA:**[[41]](#footnote-41) Worries about bias are an important motivation for seeking out moral advice. Figuring out what the right thing to do is often requires us to take an impartial perspective on our action and to bracket morally irrelevant factors in our moral reasoning. But that’s not easy. It’s hard to know whether or not on a given occasion our reasoning is being influenced by morally irrelevant factors. And then even when we suspect that our reasoning is infected by biases, it’s hard to know the extent to which this has happened. So, even if we do realize that our reasoning is biased, we may still not be in a position to fix it. In situations like this, we should rely on moral advice. We should rely on the judgment of someone who isn’t subject to our biases. us, in FRIENDS, Susan might worry that she’s not reliable in judging whether the girl is being bullied because it’s her friends who are involved. After all, we’re less likely to judge our friends harshly and more likely to make up excuses for their behavior. But just knowing this may not help her do better. In fact, if she tries to compensate for the bias, she might even err too much on the side of caution and end up overreacting to even harmless jokes. us, asking for advice is he best she can do. Similarly, in WEDDING, Sara and Tom might worry that their own interests can influence their judgment of whether it’s fair to ask Tom’s family for the greater contribution. After all, if the combined contribution of their parents doesn’t amount to the full cost of the wedding, they will either have to pay the rest out of their own (slim) pockets or they will have to change their plans to cut some costs. So it’s in their own interest to think that it would be fair to ask Tom’s parents for a greater contribution. Moral judgments often either require us to set our own interests and preferences aside or they require us to weigh self-interested reasons against the interests of others. In such cases, we seek out moral advice because we don’t trust our own moral judgment. We take the other person to be in a better epistemic position because they don’t share our interests and hence cannot be biased by them.

2. Only virtue emulation paradigms can both provide principles that can extend in application and be socially bounded. **MAYO:[[42]](#footnote-42)** No doubt the fundamental moral question is just ‘What ought I to do?’ And according to the philosophy of moral principles, the answer (which must be an imperative ‘Do this’) must be derived from a conjunction of premisses consisting (in the simplest case) firstly of a rule, or universal imperative, enjoining (or forbidding) all actions of a certain type in situations of a certain type, and, secondly, a statement to the effect that this is a situation of that type, falli**ng under** that rule. In practice the emphasis may be on supplying only one of these premisses, the other being assumed or taken for granted: one may answer the question **‘What ought I** to do?’ either by quoting a rule which I am to adopt, or by showing that my case is legislated for by a rule which I do adopt. To take a previous example of moral per plexity,1 if I am in doubt whether to tell the truth about his condition to a dying man, my doubt may be resolved by showing that the case comes under a rule about the avoidance of unnecessary suffering, which I am assumed to accept. But if the case is without precedent in my moral career, my problem may be soluble only by adopting a new principle about what I am to do now and in the future about cases of this kind. This second possibility offers a connection with moral ideals. Suppose my perplexity is not merely an unprecedented situation which I could cope with by adopting a new rule. Suppose the new rule is thoroughly inconsistent with my existing moral code. This may happen, for instance, if the moral code is one to which I only pay lip-service; if (in the language of IX , 7) its ; authority is not yet internalised, or if it has ceased to be so; it is i ready for rejection, but its final rejection awaits a moral crisis such as we are assuming to occur. What I now need is not a rule for deciding how to act in this situation and others of its kind. I need a whole set of rules, a complete morality, new principles to live by. Now according to the philosophy of moral character, there is another way of answering the fundamental question‘What ; ought I to do?**’** Instead of quoting a rule, we quote a quality **of '** character, a virtue: we say ‘Be brave’, or ‘Be patient’ or ‘Be lenient’. We may even say ‘Be a man’: if I am in doubt, say, whether to take a risk, and someone says ‘Be a man’, meaning a morally sound man, in this case a man of sufficient courage. (Compare the very different ideal invoked in ‘Be a gentleman’. I shall not discuss whether this is a moral ideal.) Here, too, we have the extreme cases, where a man’s moral perplexity extends not merely to a particular situation but to his whole way of living. And now the question ‘What ought I to do?**’** turns into the question ‘What ought I to be?’ — as, indeed, it was treated in the first place. (‘Be brave.’) It is answered, not by quoting a rule **or a set of rules,** but **by** describing a quality of character or a type of person. And here the ethics of character gains a practical simplicity which offsets the greater logical simplicity of the ethics of principles. We do not have to give a list of characteristics or virtues, as we might list a set of principles. We can give a unity to our answer. Of course we can in theory give a unity to our principles: this is implied by speaking of a set of principles. But if such a set is to be a system and not a mere aggregate, the unity we are looking for is a logical one, namely the possibility that some principles are deducible from others, and ultimately from one. But the attempt to construct a deductive moral system is notoriously difficult, and in any case ill-founded. Why should we expect that all rules of conduct should be ultimately reducible to a few? 9. Saints and Heroes But when we are asked ‘What shall I be?’ we can readily give a unity to **our answer**, though not a logical unity. It is the unity of character. A person’s character is not merely a list of dispositions; it has the organic unity of something that is more than the sum of its parts.And We can say, in answer to our morally perplexed questioner, not only ‘Be this’ and ‘Be that’, but also ‘Be like So-and-So’ — where So-and-So is either an ideal type of character, or else an actual person taken as representative of the ideal, an exemplar. Examples of the first are Plato’s ‘just man’ in the Republic; Aristotle’s man of practical wisdom, in the Nicomachean Ethics; Augustine’s citizen of the City of God; the good Communist; the American way of life (which is a co lective expression for a type of character). Examples of the second kind, the exemplar, are Socrates,Christ, Buddha, St. Francis, the heroes of epic writers and of novelists. Indeed the idea of the Hero, as well as the idea of the Saint, are very much the expression of this attitude to morality. Heroes and saints are not merely people who did things. They are people whom we are expected, and expect ourselves, to imitate. And imitating them means not merely doing what they did; it means being like them. Their status is not in the least like that of legislators whose laws we admire; for the character of a legislator is irrelevant to our judgment about his legislation.The heroes and saints did not merely give us principles to live by (though some of them did that as well): they gave us examples to follow.

3. Only my framework accounts for the practical dimension of ethics. **SLIWA:**[[43]](#footnote-43)

What could make one person more competent with a particular moral norm than others? If, for example, seeing that a situation is unfair is an ability, a form of practical knowledge, then practice and experience matters. Learning to apply a given moral concept may be a lot like learning how to read an X-ray. You have to have seen a whole bunch of them to learn to distinguish the white blotches and patterns that are just artifacts from the ones that are evidence for disease. And the more experience you have, the better you become at distinguishing the tricky cases. Similarly, learning how to distinguish situations in which someone is being treated fairly from the ones where she’s being treated unfairly, you may have just had to experience a number of such cases. The fact that we have different backgrounds means that some of us get to practice applying some moral concepts and making certain moral distinctions more than others. Someone who grew up with many siblings may be more sensitive to considerations of fairness than someone who grew up as a single child. A student from a minority group may be more sensitive to whether a given remark is racis[m] than her white peers. us, even if they believe that racism is wrong, her peers may still want to defer to her whether some particular joke is racist or merely distasteful. Similarly, one may want to defer to one’s female friends whether some particular remark is sexist, even if one is fully committed to combat sexism.10 Of course, there is no easy route from background to competence with a given moral norm. e mere fact that someone grew up in a large family, doesn’t guarantee that they will be better judges of fairness just as being a woman doesn’t guarantee that someone will be a good judge of sexism--she might see sexist remarks where there are none. But it still seems plausible that *some* backgrounds can make a person more reliable in applying some particular moral norm. If making some moral distinctions is in fact a matter of practical knowledge, this gives us a further reason to seek out advice from someone whom we regard as better at them than we are. Not only will it help us to do the right thing but it might help us become better at making the distinctions ourselves. If you’re learning how to read an X-ray, you do well in asking your more experienced supervisor for advice in cases in which you are unsure. Similarly, in relying on her friend, Anna might actually get better at recognizing rudeness herself. And trusting one’s female friend’s judgments about sexist remarks, might help one learn how to make that distinction yourself.

4. given that ethics is presupposed, emulating virtuous character is the only way to be moral. **READER[[44]](#footnote-44):** Virtue is a free disposition to act in certain ways under certain condi tions. Virtue ethics claims thatwhat is to count as a good action or what is a good outcome is conceptually dependent on claims about the virtue of an agent. How is this dependence supposed towork? Where those after an explanatory account seek a conceptual connection with something like a normative 'in itself, virtue ethicists instead explore the concrete depend ence of moral activity on the possibility of learning from already virtuous agents. They hold that the key tomoral rationality is found inmoral edu beginner-agents learn from the experienced, wise moral agent by copying ?by mimicking in their actions the actions of the virtuous agent. This mim icking, or 'going on in the same way', does not presuppose that the learner agent acquires any representations of how theworld is (i.e., beliefs), nor that they acquire the ability to report on or provide justifications for what they do. Virtue is learned by cottoning on to virtuous ways of doing things, going on to do the same, then going on to do the same in new ways, once they have mastered the skill.16 The way virtue and character is supposed to be basic here is simply displayed in the analogy: there is? and can be ? nothing 'behind' the expertise of thephronimos which can explain or jus tify it (any more than there is anything 'behind' the expertise of the doctor or the navigator, touseAristotle's examples atNE 1104b7-l 1).Of course, plenty more can be said about it, and shortcuts can be found to aid the learn ing of those who have already mastered other skills (so competent rule-fol lowers can learnfrom being given rules, just as competent grammarians can learn a new language from the grammar). But we should not confuse what it is possible to say about the skill of being moral, with what constitutes it.

contention frontlines:

**AT politicians are moral authorities:**

Politicians do not qualify as moral authorities because:

a) they subject their decisions to constituents which means their testimony does not strongly correlate to their actual testimony as they must watch themselves too closely.

b) being politically savvy requires one to render themselves attractive to the masses which is inconsistent with the definition of a moral authority which speaks out against the populous moral confusion.

c) political activity requires compromise, which is inconsistent with moral authority – you should stand up for what is right.

**AT attacks on person generally:**

1. You need a moral expert to trust an indict that someone is not a moral expert, but the \_\_\_ are probably better people than [the source you use] in making that determination.

2. Epistemic authority of any type is a scalar not binary quality. Its best to listen to a medical specialist, but if you don’t have access to one you are still better off listening to your ordinary doctor than even your well researched high school friend.

3. Even if you are correct, it’s not a turn – all that means is that the person is not trustworthy. For example, Bill Clinton might have been a bad person because he cheated on his wife, but it doesn’t mean Republicans are correct about everything else.

**AT testimony of academics:**

My arguments outweigh:

1. \_\_\_ affected more people and understand a broader swath of ideological concerns, draw on a larger set of experiences, since they interacted with more real moral people trying to go about normal lives.

2. Academics do cite \_\_\_, and those men read plenty of academics, means I solve back for your weighing. But mine comes first since academics only have influence over other academics, but great moral pioneers are acknowledged as such by everyone.

3. Knowing a lot about philosophy doesn’t make you a good person – i.e. Rousseau revolutionized social contract theory and then abandoned his kids to an orphanage because they were too much trouble.

**AT policy experts:**

*[A lot of the contention is not dependent on some pragmatic manifestation, but human dignity and its relation to work].*

1. Look at great moral experts – tend to not be super pragmatic people. Mother Teresa didn’t really care about being a good citizen in a government or making a good living, nor did Gandhi actually craft policy as an administrator. They focused more on orientation and living lives according to fixed principles.

2. Epistemic authority of any type is a scalar not binary quality. Its best to listen to a medical specialist, but if you don’t have access to one you are still better off listening to your ordinary doctor than even your well researched high school friend.

coherentism stuff:

Objective morality provides reasons for taking actions. These reasons must be either inferential – that we can deduce them based on higher order moral claims, or non-inferential. They are either unfounded assertions or infinitely regressive. **MACINTYRE[[45]](#footnote-45): An agent can only justify a particular judgment by referring to some universal rule from which it may be logically derived, and can only justify that** rule in turn **by deriving it from some more general rule or principle; but** on this view **since every chain of reasoning must be finite, such a process of justificatory reasoning must always terminate with the assertion** of some rule or principle for which no further reason can be given. Each individual implicitly or explicitly has to adopt his or her own first principles on the basis of such a choice. **The utterance of any universal principle is in the end an expression of the preferences of an individual will and for that will its principles have and can have only such authority as it chooses to confer upon them by adopting them.** However, that does not mean morality in and of its self cannot exist, therefore, I present the following burden analysis an individual will and can have only such authority as [one] chooses to confer upon [it].

However, if objectivity is true, the methodology for arriving at moral truths is coherentism – beliefs are justified if they cohere with our total body of knowledge.

A. regress – trying to arrive at truth deductively through linear justification leads to infininte regress because we need a reason for some premise and some reason for that reason, so on. Every deductive justification devolves into certain base premises, we need coherence to determine whether we can accept these assertions.

B. moral uncertainty – since there must be some premise for which no further reason can be given, so we should compare a wide range of beliefs to reach the best conclusions.

C. motivation – agents would be motivated to act under coherentism since moral theories would accord with existing convictions, otherwise moralty wouldn’t be a guide to action.

And any objection to coherentism presupposes truth since objections prove that statements do not cohere.

It is impossible for knowledge to exist with some fundamental foundation. **BONJOUR[[46]](#footnote-46):**

My suggestion here is that no such account can be given. As indicated above, **the given-ist is caught in a fundamental dilemma: if** his **intuitions or immediate apprehensions are construed as cognitive**, then **they will be both capable of giving justification and in need of it themselves; if they are non-cognitive, then they do not need justification but are also apparently incapable of providing it.** This, at bottom, is why **epistemological given-ness is a myth.**

Explanation of coherentism. **MURPHY:[[47]](#footnote-47)** Coherentism, however, proposes a “holistic” view of justification. On this kind of view, **the primary bearer of epistemic justification is *a system of beliefs***. Seen in this light, both charges seem to be question begging. Some have argued that the move to holistic justification fails to really answer the circularity and self-support charges. For even granting that it is a system of beliefs that is primarily justified, it is still true that a system of beliefs is justified in virtue of the fact that the individual beliefs that make up the system relate to one another in a circular fashion. And it is still true that a belief must support itself if it is to be justified, since this is needed if the relevant system of beliefs (and hence the individual belief) is to be justified. It is not so clear, then, that the reply which highlights the holistic nature of justification is successful. However, by conjoining the appeal to epistemic holism with another appeal, a coherentist might have a fully satisfactory reply. This second appeal identifies another misconception about coherentism that might lie behind the circularity charge and the self-support charge. This misconception has to do with the variety of ways in which our beliefs can support one another so that they come out justified. **Coherentists are fond of metaphors like rafts, webs, and bricks in an arch. These things stay together because their parts support one another. Each part both supports, and is supported by, other specific parts. So too with justified beliefs: each is both supported by, and supports, other beliefs.**

Prefer my ethical framework because it is the only one consistent with how people actually reason. **KVANVIG[[48]](#footnote-48):**

The best-known example of a theory that employs the language of degrees of belief is also a useful example of a subjective account of the coherence relation. Such a subjective account can be developed by identifying a subjective theory of evidence that determines whether and when a person's belief, or degree of belief, is justified. A beautiful and elegant theory of this sort is a version of probabilistic Bayesianism. The version in question identifies justified beliefs with probabilistic coherence, so that a (degree of) belief is justified if and only if it is part of a system of beliefs against which no dutch book can be made. (A dutch book is a series of fair bets which are such that, if accepted, are guaranteed to produce a net loss.) In addition, this version of Bayesianism places a conditionalization requirement on justified changes in belief. Conditionalization requires that when new information is learned, one's new degree of belief match[es] one's conditional degree of belief on that information prior to learning it. So i[I]f p is the new information learned, one should change one's degree of belief in q so that it matches one's degree of belief in q given p (together with everything else one knows) prior to learning q. **The idea is that** e[E]ach person has an internal, subjective theory of evidence at a given time, in the form of **conditional** beliefs concerning all **possible** future **courses of** experience, so **that** when new information is acquired, all one needs to do is consult one's prior conditional degree of belief to determine what one's new degree of belief should be. **Further, it is this subjective theory of evidence that defines the relation of coherence on the system of beliefs in question:** **coherence obtains when a belief conforms to the subjective theory of evidence in question, given the other items in the set of things over which coherence is defined.**

Relying on reasoning about the world leads to a regress problem. **OLSSON[[49]](#footnote-49) On the traditional** justified true belief **account** of knowledge, **a person cannot be said to know** that a proposition ***p* is true without** having **good reasons** for believing that *p* is true. If Lucy knows that she will pass tomorrow's exam, she must have good reasons for thinking that this is so. Consider now Lucy's **reasons**. They will presumably **consist of other beliefs** she has, e.g., beliefs about how well she did earlier, about how well she has prepared, and so on. For Lucy to know that she will pass the exam, these other beliefs, upon which the first belief rests, must also be things that Lucy knows. **Knowledge**, after all, **cannot be based on something less than knowledge**, i.e., on ignorance (cf. Rescher 1979, 76). Since the reasons are themselves things that Lucy knows, **those reasons must in turn be based on reasons**, and so on. Thus, **any knowledge claim requires a never-ending chain**, or “regress”, of reasons for reasons. This seems strange, or even impossible, because it involves reference to an infinite number of beliefs. But most of us think that knowledge is possible. What is the coherentist's response to the regress? The coherentist can be understood as proposing that **nothing prevents the regress from proceeding in a circle**. Thus, ***A* can be a reason for *B* which is a reason for *C* which is a reason for *A***. If this is acceptable, then what we have is **a chain** of reasons that is **never-ending but which does not involve** an **infinite** number of **beliefs**. It is never-ending in the sense that for each belief in the chain there is a reason for that belief also in the chain. Yet there is an immediate problem with this response due to the fact that justificatory circles are usually thought to be vicious ones. If someone claims *C* and is asked why she believes it, she may reply that her reason is *B*. If asked why she believes *B*, she may assert *A*. But if prompted to justify her belief in *A*, she is not allowed to refer back to *C* which in the present justificatory context is still in doubt. If she did justify *A* in terms of *C* nonetheless, her move would lack any justificatory force whatsoever. **The coherentist** may respond by denying that she ever intended to suggest that circular reasoning is a legitimate dialectical strategy. What she **objects to is** rather the assumption **that justification should** at all **proceed** in a **linear[ly]** fashion whereby reasons are given for reasons, and so on. **This** assumption of linearity **presupposes that what is**, in a primary sense, **justified are individual beliefs**. This, says the coherentist, is simply wrong: it is not individual beliefs that are primarily justified, but entire belief systems. **Particular beliefs can also be justified** but **only in a secondary** or derived **sense, if they form** part of **a justified belief system.** This is a coherence approach because what makes a belief system justified, on this view, is precisely its coherence. **A belief** system **is justified if it is coherent to a** sufficiently **high degree**. This, in essence, is Laurence BonJour's 1985 solution to the regress problem. This looks much more promising than the circularity theory. If epistemic justification is holistic in this sense, thena central assumption behind the regress is indeed false, and so **the regress never gets started.**

That means we should default to coherentism as a methodology for determining truth on the frameworks debate. **RADZIK**[[50]](#footnote-50) writes:

In epistemology, foundationalism lost its position of dominance years ago. One of the main competitors these days is coherentism.19 The idea here is that what justifies a particular belief for an agent is the way in which the belief fits with the rest of the things that the agent believes. A particular belief is justified if it coheres with rest of the agent's belief-set. But the belief-set is not counted as foundational, as beyond doubt itself. The agent can question each of these supporting beliefs as well, but she can only do so from the point of view of other beliefs that she holds. In this way, t[T]he believer is (to use Otto Neurath's image20) like a sailor repairing his ship while at sea. Any plank in his ship is subject to evaluation and replacement, but in order to examine one of the planks, the sailor must be standing on some other plank. Similarly, t[T]he only way an agent can question and evaluate the soundness of her beliefs is by depending on other beliefs of hers. What else could she use?

fwk frontlines:

**AT moral understanding objection:**

This is a not a disadvantage to my framework – having moral understanding is always good, but it’s about doing the best we can. **SLIWA:**[[51]](#footnote-51) Even if in some cases testimony may not be sufficient in order to acquire understanding, it doesn’t follow that we have reasons to avoid it. In fact, testimony may sometimes be necessary in order to achieve moral understanding. is is no different in the moral case than in nonmoral cases. We value not just moral but also, for example, scientific understanding. And while testimony may not always be sufficient to acquire understanding of physics, testimony is nevertheless crucial--for example through textbooks and lectures.25 But suppose you act on moral testimony in a case in which moral testimony is not sufficient for you to acquire moral understanding. Does your action then have moral worth? Note that moral testimony is a means to resolving moral uncertainty in situations. When I am uncertain about whether p is the right thing to do, I have moral reason to resolve my uncertainty in a way that will make it most likely that I get it right. If I reasonably believe that someone else is in a better epistemic position to get the right answer than I am, then I have moral reason to ask that person for moral advice. us, an agent who seeks out and trusts reliable testimony because she wants to get it right *is* doing the right thing (namely, resolving her uncertainty) *for the right reasons* (she needs to resolve her uncertainty to do the right thing) and she has *moral understanding* (she reasonably believes that someone else is in a better epistemic position to find out what the right thing to do is). Her seeking out and trusting moral testimony is thereby a morally worthy action. If she didn’t seek out the testimony or didn’t take it, even though she believed it to be reliable, she would be blameworthy for it. And she would be even more blameworthy if she avoided or failed to trust moral testimony that she regards as reliable because she wanted her action to be morally worthy. So, asking and taking moral advice is an action that can be morally worthy and for which an agent can deserve praise or blame. But McGrath’s and Hills’ concern was with the action that results from moral testimony. Even if asking for and accepting moral testimony that one regards as reliable is morally worthy, is the action that results from it also *maximally* morally worthy? If Sam relies on his friend’s testimony for his belief that he ought to jump into the lake and save the child, is his saving the child a morally worthy action?26 Even if an action that is based on moral testimony isn’t *maximally* morally worthy, this does not show that the obstacle to moral worth is moral testimony.27 Rather, given the agent’s moral ignorance, performing a maximally worthy action simply may not be one of her options. Consider again Sam’s case: Suppose Sam doesn’t call his friend and hence doesn’t ask for moral testimony. Instead, he relies on his own reasoning even though he knows that his friend is more likely to get to the right answer than he is. But suppose that he does happen to rightly conclude that he needs to save the child. It’s not clear that in this case his saving the child really is morally praiseworthy--after all, he took a risk in relying on his own deliberation. And even if it is morally praiseworthy, at the same time, he deserves blame for not seeking out moral testimony. After all, he had reason to think that his friend was more likely to find out what the right thing is than he was. In this case, if there is an obstacle to his action’s having maximum moral worth, this obstacle is Sam’s ignorance rather than his reliance on moral testimony.

**AT need an independent external check to determine the reliability of testimony:**

The “external metric” is circular and false since we cannot assess or trust our own reliability in using a metric since we do not have independent access to the truths we are trying to seek. **SLIWA:**[[52]](#footnote-52)The requirement of an “independent check” in order to determine expertise is problematic. Recall that what we wanted to explain is why it seems that an agent should come to her own moral conclusions, rather than rely on others for her moral beliefs. But if what makes moral testimony epistemically problematic is the lack of an “independent check,” then it’s hard to see why [would] it would be any better for an agent to rely on her own judgment rather than on that of her friend’s. After all, the lack of an “independent check” doesn’t just preclude her from assessing other people’s reliability. It also makes it impossible to assess her own reliability--she is no more in a position to check whether she herself got it right than she is in a position to check whether someone else got it right. Hence, relying on others or relying on herself is epistemically on a par. us the fact that we don’t have an “independent check” for moral truths, cannot explain why relying on moral testimony, rather than on one’s own judgment, is epistemically suspect. More importantly, it’s simply implausible that we should need an “independent check” in order to be able to rely on testimony. I can rely on other’s testimony about what they saw and heard. But I am not in a position to assess the reliability of their perceptual faculties without relying on *any* deliverances of my own senses, just as I cannot assess someone’s moral judgments without relying on moral reasoning of my own. Similarly, I can rely on someone’s mathematical testimony. But I don’t have “independent access” to mathematical facts and the only way I can asses your reliability is by relying on my own mathematical reasoning or the mathematical reasoning of others’ whom I trust. Thus, in order to be epistemically justified in relying on someone’s testimony in some domain, you need neither establish that they can correctly answer controversial questions in that domain, nor do you need to have “independent access” to facts in this domain. You need to have reason to believe that the other person is reliable on *this particular issue at hand*. It’s not hard to see how you could come to have such a justified belief. As I have shown earlier, you could easily have good reason to believe that the other person is more reliable than you are with respect to some moral question, either because you think that your own judgment is impaired in this particular case or because you have reason to think that the other person is better at making the particular moral distinction at hand. Maybe you have seen the person make good moral judgments before and you know that they have thought about the issue at hand. Or maybe they have been recommended to you as a good advisor by someone whose judgment you trust. Maybe you have asked them some related moral questions and seen that they give reasonable answers. None of this is very different from how you are justified in relying on others’ for nonmoral testimony.18

**AT your framework cannot resolve moral controversy:**

You are identifying the wrong problem. **SLIWA:**[[53]](#footnote-53) Can you rely on testimony by one of the experts to resolve your uncertainty about whether your painting is real or a fake? It seems obvious that you can’t. is is a controversial question. Much as you’d like to sleep in peace, you can’t just go with one of the sides. is brings us back to the issue of expertise that I discussed above. Clearly, in this case, the fact that the authenticity of your painting is controversial and you’re not in a position to ascertain which of the purported experts has it right doesn’t establish that there are no art experts or that you are never justified in trusting one. It’s just that you cannot trust their testimony on controversial questions because you have no means to identify who is right in these cases. Similarly, the problem with Eleanor’s reliance on moral testimony about Vegetarianism isn’t a general problem about ascertaining moral reliability. Rather, the problem is that Eleanor isn’t in a position to identify who is right about the particular question of whether she ought to eat meat. She has no means of figuring out who got it right not because it’s a moral question but because it’s a controversial question. It doesn’t imply that moral testimony is problematic. It’s just a consequence of the principle that testimony is not a reliable source of belief about questions that are controversial--a principle that rules out *some* cases of moral and nonmoral testimony alike.

**AT encourages moral ignorance:**

This is neither a unique nor problematic aspect of my ethic. It’s the best we have. **SLIWA:**[[54]](#footnote-54)

What’s troubling then about these cases is the agents’ ignorance of basic moral truths. But are they in addition doing something wrong by relying on moral testimony for their beliefs? is just doesn’t seem plausible at all. For one, it’s just not clear what a better alternative would be. After all, left to their own devices, these agents are likely to come to the wrong conclusions and make terrible moral mistakes. So relying on testimony is exactly what they should do. We might worry that someone who is so insensitive to moral facts might also be no good at recognizing people who are reliable in their moral judgments. But even if they aren’t terribly good at assessing the reliability of other people’s judgment, they can still rely on moral testimony since almost anyone is in a better position to make moral judgments than they are. Their situation is rather like someone’s who suffers from severe colorblindness and must therefore rely on others for accurate color judgments. Even though such a person isn’t well posed to evaluate other people’s reliability about color judgments, her reliance on testimony isn’t problematic. That’s because almost anyone’s color vision is better than hers. I argued that what makes some of these extreme cases of testimony problematic isn’t the testimony but rather the ignorance that motivates the request for it. And it seems that this isn’t any special feature of moral testimony, nor is it a special feature of moral ignorance. Nonmoral ignorance can be problematic and when it is it can make cases of nonmoral testimony look intuitively odd, too.

**AT Hitler was trusted by the Germans as an authority:**

1. Germans were wrong. Hitler had not lived a good life. The question is not can one misapply the framework but what is most likely to lead one right.

2. non-unique; plenty of people who derived their ethic through argument got it wrong as well.

3. Misapplication is not a problem. Sure your doctor might suck and kill your child. Had you not listened to the doctor you would have even better off. But no one treats that remote possibility as a reason to not trust doctors. We don't condemn calculus because we can miss place a decimal and crash a space ship.

4. Obviously the Germans were not using the right criteria to determine a good authority. One could easily have the debate 'is Hitler reliable or not' just like one can debate 'are Jews inferior and evil.' And they can argue the MLK is Hitler if they would like. But I think we all know he is not.

**AT Lewis is a shitty person:**

NOT contradictory – he’s summarizing wise moral leaders.

**AT testimony against testimony:**

1) That quote is saying don't wait for someone to follow. Act on what you know is right. Not decide for yourself what is right.

2) Besides even if the author were making the epistemic claim rather than the normative one then it is no longer an expert.

**AT X person says death/suffering are bad, which means utilitarianism:**

1. prefer aff offense on specificity – there may be immoral dimensions of negating which you have not considered but they have. You presume the only ethical dimension of policy is implementation, but there might be illegitimate means, issues of dignity to work, or the employer-employee relationship. your interpretation of how we approach poverty, death and suffering might not be correct – the synthesizing of experts who have the better moral method concluded aff.

2. My framework never claimed poverty is not bad, but that we are not always certain the best say to fight it. Global extinction events would eliminate poverty but we would hardly consider that to be the right way to pursue the particular good. Just as killing off those in poverty is the wrong way to eliminate it, so too stealing from people just remuneration for their work is not the way ethical authorities suggest we act.

3. you are not qualified to make the derivation from moral experts saying things like poverty are bad to the appropriate response to those harms, since you are not an expert.

**AT outrageous moral demand:**

1. Not a reason to reject testimony, just a reason to reevaluate beliefs. **ZAGREBSKI**:[[55]](#footnote-55) Suppose the authority’s belief is something outrageous. Cant that count as a defeater of your belief that it is an authority? Yes it can, but that does not count against preemption. Suppose your physician tells you to take 4,000 pills an hour for the rest ofyour life.121assume that you trust your belief that you should not take so many pills more than you trust your judgment that your physician is an authoritative guide to your health. To determine whether the physician is a better guide to your health than you are, you have a right to take into consideration anything that you find trust­ worthy when you are conscientious. But as long as you conscientiously think the physician is a better guide, you have reason to take the physicians directive as one that preempts your own decision about what you should do in that domain. And, of course, the same point applies to your beliefthat you ought to take 4,000 pills an hour. Epistemic authority has the conse­ quence that trust in ourselves in some domain is replaced by trust in the authority, but it remains the case that a general trust in ourselves leads us to trust the authority, and the judgment that someone is an authority can be withdrawn.

2. Just a reason to reevaluate your opinion of the expert. **SLIWA:**[[56]](#footnote-56) Suppose I go to the doctor, whom I take to be reliable and trustworthy, to ask him what to take for my headache. e doctor tells me that my headache could be cured by taking a generous spoonful of cyanide. Now, even if prior to his testimony, I regarded the doctor as reliable and trustworthy, I would be epistemically irrational (and most likely dead) if I “simply believed what was said” to me. at’s because even reliable testimony is in general just one piece of evidence that I have. In this case, I have other evidence about headaches and the likely effects of cyanide. What I need to do is to weigh the evidence from testimony against all the other non-testimonial evidence that I have. at requires critical reflection about the testimony itself. Even in cases in which a speaker’s testimony is the only evidence I have about some question, epistemic rationality may still require me to think about the plausibility of what I have been told. After all, even someone who’s usually reliable and trustworthy can be tired or drugged or joking on that particular occasion. Asking “What makes you think so?” is an easy way to check whether the speaker has really thought the problem through, whether she really has got your question right and to rule out that she’s not just trying to get rid of us, or joking or drunk. at’s why we often don’t just simply believe as we’re told without any further questions and that’s why scenarios in which the agent doesn’t do so may seem intuitively odd.13

generic perm strat:

Perm; do both:

1. Mere economic good has a massive solvency deficit.

a) aff offense is specific to dignifying work by having the employer pay a living wage. The case is about respecting work as a core human activity – which is part of an ethical life for reasons like progress, family, relation to our humanity, and dignity in the \_\_\_\_ card.

b) offense is specific to having a ‘right’ to a living wage. The \_\_\_ evidence and ESPECIALLY \_\_\_\_ indicate moral importance to an actual interpersonal claim individuals have to dignity and worth rather than a product of market forces.

Doing something economists say is good does not coopt my advantage.

a) My authors may have considered your alternative but dismissed it for moral reasons. With reliable moral testimony there may be an immoral dimension to your policy that I cannot think of, but that a moral expert might. Since a moral expert endorses my position that provides an advantage to the aff.

b) Because we are not moral experts we cannot effectively decide what to take and reject testimony of experts without some sort of guidance. One requires a moral authority to inform an attempt to coopt testimony.

2. My case indicates moral value to obedience to authorities. The perm as an act of obedience to moral testimony thus has a unique net benefit to the CP alone.

*And prefer my offense - there is no principled distinction that allows one to carve off agency as a unique space where we don’t have to trust experts. Anyone can claim that what they are thinking of no one else has considered, but it seems unlikely that a high school debater will construct a position so brilliant that the copious experts who support the living wage have missed it. Thus, the fact that my experts are addressing federal government provides advantage to the perm.*

AT Ks about bias:

Even if there are issues of bias, we need to improve our own epistemic position to grasp the implications. My moral authorities address and deal with the reality of these issues since they have experienced oppression. **SLIWA**[[57]](#footnote-57)Why can taking someone’s moral advice be a good thing? In relying on someone else’s moral judgment, we acknowledge that the other person is in a better epistemic position with respect to the particular moral judgment than we are. And we can have excellent reasons for doing so. Why should we take someone else to be better placed to make a given moral judgment? ere are at least two good reasons for doing so: For one, we might be concerned that our own judgment is compromised by bias or self-interest. Secondly, we might think that the other person is just better at making certain moral judgments than we are. Worries about bias are an important motivation for seeking out moral advice. Figuring out what the right thing to do is often requires us to take an impartial perspective on our action and to bracket morally irrelevant factors in our moral reasoning. But that’s not easy. It’s hard to know whether or not on a given occasion our reasoning is being inﬂuenced by morally irrelevant factors. And then even when we suspect that our reasoning is infected by biases, it’s hard to know the extent to which this has happened. So, even if we do realize that our reasoning is biased, we may still not be in a position to ﬁx it. In situations like this, we should rely on moral advice. We should rely on the judgment of someone who isn’t subject to our biases. us, in FRIENDS, Susan might worry that she’s not reliable in judging whether the girl is being bullied because it’s her friends who are involved. After all, we’re less likely to judge our friends harshly and more likely to make up excuses for their behavior. But just knowing this may not help her do better. In fact, if she tries to compensate for the bias, she might even err too much on the side of caution and end up overreacting to even harmless jokes. What could make one person more competent with a particular moral norm than others? If, for example, seeing that a situation is unfair is an ability, a form of practical knowledge, then practice and experience matters. Learning to apply a given moral concept may be a lot like learning how to read an X-ray. You have to have seen a whole bunch of them to learn to distinguish the white blotches and patterns that are just artifacts from the ones that are evidence for disease. And the more experience you have, the better you become at distinguishing the tricky cases. Similarly, learning how to distinguish situations in which someone is being treated fairly from the ones where she’s being treated unfairly, you may have just had to experience a number of such cases.

Implications:

a) case turns the K - neither of us is going to decide those issues since we’re privileged in different ways. We look to experts and see what they say. Academics are often equally privileged in terms of socioeconomic status and lack lived experience, so we might as well defer to authority.

b) my experts will be better at considering all the opinions than you or I will, so they coopt the advantage of equitable discourse

c) you assume experience is not necessary, but that is crazy. I could not decide which of two mathematicians are right if I hear them arguing about some complex proof because I lack the *experience* to synthesize it; the best argument should win but moral experts should decide.

d) You are a debater with a big school program and an agenda to win – how do you expect to know anything about issues of privilege or oppression? Why do we trust you with a radical solution to all the problems rather than a person like \_\_\_ who had no agenda to keep their leftist academic job but actually lead people to salvation?

AT K of testimony:

*defense:*

1. non-unique – testimony is inevitable – [cross apply extension].

2. no link – testimony is not some unequivocal appeal to authority – they can be challenged.

**ZAGREBSKI**:[[58]](#footnote-58) Suppose the authority’s belief is something outrageous. Cant that count as a defeater of your belief that it is an authority? Yes it can, but that does not count against preemption. Suppose your physician tells you to take 4,000 pills an hour for the rest ofyour life.121assume that you trust your belief that you should not take so many pills more than you trust your judgment that your physician is an authoritative guide to your health. To determine whether the physician is a better guide to your health than you are, you have a right to take into consideration anything that you find trust­ worthy when you are conscientious. But as long as you conscientiously think the physician is a better guide, you have reason to take the physicians directive as one that preempts your own decision about what you should do in that domain. And, of course, the same point applies to your beliefthat you ought to take 4,000 pills an hour. Epistemic authority has the conse­ quence that trust in ourselves in some domain is replaced by trust in the authority, but it remains the case that a general trust in ourselves leads us to trust the authority, and the judgment that someone is an authority can be withdrawn.

We still can trust basic evidence. **SLIWA:**[[59]](#footnote-59) Suppose I go to the doctor, whom I take to be reliable and trustworthy, to ask him what to take for my headache. e doctor tells me that my headache could be cured by taking a generous spoonful of cyanide. Now, even if prior to his testimony, I regarded the doctor as reliable and trustworthy, I would be epistemically irrational (and most likely dead) if I “simply believed what was said” to me. at’s because even reliable testimony is in general just one piece of evidence that I have. In this case, I have other evidence about headaches and the likely effects of cyanide. What I need to do is to weigh the evidence from testimony against all the other non-testimonial evidence that I have. at requires critical reflection about the testimony itself. Even in cases in which a speaker’s testimony is the only evidence I have about some question, epistemic rationality may still require me to think about the plausibility of what I have been told. After all, even someone who’s usually reliable and trustworthy can be tired or drugged or joking on that particular occasion. Asking “What makes you think so?” is an easy way to check whether the speaker has really thought the problem through, whether she really has got your question right and to rule out that she’s not just trying to get rid of us, or joking or drunk. at’s why we often don’t just simply believe as we’re told without any further questions and that’s why scenarios in which the agent doesn’t do so may seem intuitively odd.13

*offense:*

1. TURN: oppression is something we should fight. But people like \_\_\_\_ know that as well.

a) They experienced oppression and dedicated their lives to fighting it, and will be better at recognizing it than anyone else.

b) We should consider other opinions, but just as I rely on my math friends to synthesize math debates for me, because I cannot evaluate everyone's opinion myself, I use moral people to synthesize opinions in an inclusive and democratic way. They can be more charitable and equitable than we could since we’re biased by competitive incentives and financial privilege.

2. TURN: Asking people without an MD for medical advice isn't oppressive; people like \_\_\_are better equipped than average to have views that aren't oppressive or bigoted. Trusting everyone or giving it equal weight seems equally problematic since they will be *even more* biased.

3. TURN: Epistemic authority is scalar not binary. Its best to listen to a medical specialist, but if you don’t have one you should listen to ordinary doctors rather than a well-researched debater. Giving degrees of credence to opinions is good practice, not oppressive.

4. err affirmative - the AC framework was more detailed and robust on the issue of goodness or badness and oppression […] so you cannot use a less robust framework to critique a more nuanced one in the same way you cannot use a random autonomy framework to attack a detailed Kantian standards.

5. Your Scofield evidence just says we should consider people opinions, not that we should individually consider them rather than rely on those who understand the issue better to report back for us.

6. your K is about trusting philosophers, not trusting actual people who have learnt ethics through practice, so there is no link.

[more] testimony inevitable:

1. The value of testimony is obvious. You trust your doctor and the FDA based on their domains of authority on faith, even though you don’t know about safety standards or the detailed workings of your body. You default to their judgment on the *assumption* that they know it better. In the same way, people with moral experience can be trusted morally.

2. Moral testimony is inevitable – we ask our friends for help. **SLIWA:**[[60]](#footnote-60) But relying on others for our moral beliefs isn’t exotic. It’s something all of us do by asking for and taking moral advice and it’s something we do for good reasons. To get a better picture of the role of moral testimony, it’s therefore important to look at a wider range of cases. In this section I will therefore look at some mundane cases in which agents rely on moral advice. I will argue that these cases are intuitively unproblematic and that the agent’s reliance on moral advice is a good thing. But, I will argue, there is no difference between relying on moral advice and relying on moral testimony. So any general principle like NO TESTIMONY must be false. I want to start with some fairly ordinary cases of moral advice. WEDDING: Tom and Sara are planning a wedding and both of their families have offered to contribute money towards it. Sara’s family, who are less wealthy than Tom’s, offered a certain sum, which will cover less than half of the expenses. The couple is now wondering whether it would be permissible for them to ask Tom’s family (which is wealthier) for a greater contribution. In particular, they worry that it wouldn’t be fair of them to ask one set of parents for more. They decide to ask a friend whose judgment they trust. TRIP: Anna is a journalist who is preparing to go on a reporting trip to a dangerous and conflict-ridden area. She has to tell her family that she will be away but she really doesn’t know what to tell them. If she tells them where exactly she’s going and why, they will be extremely worried. On the other hand, she worries that by evading the questions she would be lying. She goes back and forth but cannot decide what the right thing to do is and eventually decides to ask a friend whose judgment she trusts. FRIENDS: Susan’s friends have been playing pranks on a new girl in her class. Susan worries that they might be going too far and that they are bullying the girl. But when she talks to them, they insist that they are just teasing her. Susan doesn’t know what to do. If her friends are being bullies, she should step in. But they are her friends and she doesn’t want to get them in trouble and she’s not quite sure whether what they are doing is bullying. Eventually, she decides to ask a friend for advice. Intuitively, there isn’t anything wrong or disturbing about these cases. In all of them, it seems fine for the agent to rely on their friends’ judgments and to take their friends’ advice. You might worry that in these cases, the agents aren’t really relying on someone else’s *moral* judgment. After all, “fairness”, “lying” and “bullying” are thick terms, so you might be worried that in asking for advice, the agents aren’t really asking for any *moral* information. Now, it does seem true that not all instances of apparent moral advice really do involve a request for moral information. When asking their friend “Would it be okay for us to ask Tom’s parents for a greater contribution?” the couple might just be unsure about how Tom’s parents would react to the proposal. ey might not be so much worried about whether asking more of Tom’s parents really *is* fair, but rather whether Tom’s parents would *think* that it’s fair. And in this case, they aren’t relying on their friend’s moral judgment but rather on her psychological acuity. Suppose that their friend tells them, “Don’t do this, Tom’s parents will be upset”, and they accept that they shouldn’t do it. ey might be just relying on their friend for the belief that Tom’s parents would be upset and use this nonmoral information to make their own moral judgment. However, it seems clear that not all requests for moral advice are just requests for psychological information in disguise. We are sometimes uncertain about what the right thing to do is, not because we lack non-moral information, but because we are genuinely uncertain about the *moral* status of the action or the situation. In particular, we can imagine that Tom and Sara have a very good idea about how Tom’s parents would react to their request and they know that they would be happy to contribute a greater part. But even so, Tom and Sara might still be unsure whether it would be *reasonable* to ask them to do so. Similarly, Anna might know that her family will be terribly upset [but] if she doesn’t keeps quiet about the nature of her trip and they will accuse her of having lied should they find out. Nevertheless, she might be unsure whether they would be *justified* in their accusations. at’s because she is unsure about whether what she contemplates doing really does amount to a lie. And finally, Susan might be aware of the psychological effects that her friends’ behavior has on the girl but she might still be unsure if what they’re doing really is *bullying* as opposed to just teasing. So, in taking someone’s moral advice, we are really relying on their moral judgment. And in the cases I considered, this seems like a good thing.

3. You have to assume people have equal faculties, which means we trust them based on the relevant domains of their experience since they have some authority – otherwise it’s epistemic egoism. **ZAGREBSKI**:[[61]](#footnote-61) My response is that she cannot do so if she cares about truth. If she does not trust others, she must ignore her own evidence that other persons are trustworthy; she must ignore the beliefs to which she is led when she is conscientious—when she forms beliefs out of a reflective desire for truth. The only way to do that is to care about her own faculties and their outputs more than the truth; to care about her own evidence, not be­ cause she thinks it indicates the truth, but because it is hers; to care about her own conscientious beliefs, not because as a conscientious person she cares about truth, but because they are her beliefs. She must epistemically trust herself, not because of her conscientiousness or even because of her natural human faculties, but because she is herself. And that is very implausible. This problem arises whenever I trust myself more than others when my evidence or the conscientious use of my faculties indicates that they are as conscientious as I am. To the extent that I epistemically trust myself more than I trust them, the fact that my faculties are mine trumps the desire for truth, and so I must be valuing my own faculties more than the truth. That is ethical egoism in the realm of the intellect.7 Assuming I do not want to be an ethical egoist; I am rationally com­ mitted to not only thinking of others as trustworthy, but to actually trusting them on the same grounds as I trust myself. I must have the same attitude of general defeasible trust in all others that I have towards myself because they have the same faculties I trust in myself, and I must acknowledge that the level of trust that I have in myself when I am conscientious applies to many other persons whose conscientiousness I conscientiously discover.

AT keller K:

1. Helen Keller was a good person irrespective of her disability – the evidence says that she founded a good organization and was an activist.

2. Argument is not that she was some sort of hero, but rather that she has a unique epistemic vantage point as a person with a disabilities, in the same way you should include women in discussions of racism and black scholars in discussion of racism.

3. TURN: you reify a strong distinction between social disability and other forms of disability. Physical disability is equally socially constructed – poverty is a disability, being excluded by racism is a disability. Treating physical disability differently treats you as fundamentally disabled. To make it something that cannot be valorized is to treat it as different from other obstacles; that reinforces the idea that disability is “different” and puts down those who actually suffer.

AT jesus property rights:

Domains of authority solve – even if [Pope Francis is not a good person], he is still an authority on what the Bible says – probably the best one, so domains of authority take out your turns. Who is better at knowing what Jesus wanted and then deriving implications with regards to the resolution – you with your link chain and extrapolation or the direct testimony of the pope.

1. C.S Lewis [British novelist, poet, academic, medievalist, literary critic, essayist, lay theologian, and Christian apologist, employed at both Oxford and Cambridge] “the Abolition of Man” 1943. http://www.columbia.edu/cu/augustine/arch/lewis/abolition2.htm [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Soran Reader. “New Directions in Ethical Naturalism.” http://www.jstor.org/stable/27504153. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 3, No. 4 (Dec., 2000), pp. 341-364 Published by: Springer. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Hans-Georg Gadamer [Sick philosopher who wrote a book that will change your life]. “Truth and Method”. 1960. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. G.K. Chesterton [was an English writer, lay theologian, poet, philosopher, dramatist, journalist, orator, literary and art critic, biographer, and Christian apologist] “Heretics” 1905. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Modern Moral Philosophy: G. E. M. Anscombe Originally published in Philosophy 33, No. 124 (January 1958). [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Campbell, Simone; Livingston, Michael; “An Executive Order With Moral Authority;” (February 12th. 2014); Religious News Service; Commentary; <http://www.religionnews.com/2014/02/12/commentary-executive-order-moral-authority/>  [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. TIME 100 ICONS Pope Francis By Barack Obama April 23, 2014. Time Magazine. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. APOSTOLIC EXHORTATION EVANGELII GAUDIUM OF THE HOLY FATHER. November 2013. APOSTOLIC EXHORTATION *EVANGELII GAUDIUM* OF THE HOLY FATHER FRANCIS TO THE BISHOPS, CLERGY, CONSECRATED PERSONS AND THE LAY FAITHFUL ON THE PROCLAMATION OF THE GOSPEL IN TODAY’S WORLD. <https://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/apost_exhortations/documents/papa-francesco_esortazione-ap_20131124_evangelii-gaudium.html#I.%E2%80%82Some_challenges_of_today%E2%80%99s_world> [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Stephen E. Blaire [Bishop of Stockton and chairperson of the Committee on Domestic Justice and Human Development United States Conference of Catholic Bishops] Testimony before the Senate Committee on Health, Employment, Labor, and Pensions “Building a Foundation of Fairness: 75 Years of the Federal Minimum Wage.” June 25, 2013. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. http://www.denverpost.com/smart/ci\_24532680/15-reasons-love-pope-francis [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/12/17/pope-key-role-in-us-cuba-deal/20533525/ [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30577368 [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Statement on minimum wage legislation, March 18, 1966. Recorded in: “Martin Luther King Jr. spoke for workers and unions. His last campaign was a labor fight” September 2012. Speech Excerpt can be found: http://www.dailykos.com/story/2012/09/03/1126088/-Martin-Luther-King-Jr-spoke-for-workers-and-unions-His-last-campaign-was-a-labor-fight# . [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. http://observer.com/2011/04/mlk-iii-electeds-to-make-major-living-wage-push-today/ [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. NAACP; “Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.;” (NA); Fights for Civil Rights; <http://www.naacp.org/pages/king>  [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2013/12/06/249210908/listen-two-mandela-speeches-that-made-history [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. http://www.timesofisrael.com/nelson-mandela-was-close-to-jews-resolutely-loyal-to-palestinians/ [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Economic Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi Front Cover Shanti Swarup Gupta Concept Publishing Company, Jan 1, 1994 [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Tarring the Mahatma By B. R. Nanda http://www.mkgandhi.org/articles/tarring.htm HindustanTimes.com [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Great-grandson of Mahatma Gandhi - The truth behind news report suggesting Mahatma Gandhi accused his son Harilal of raping his own daughter: Tushar Gandhi's open letter to media Thursday, 15 May 2014. http://www.dnaindia.com/analysis/standpoint-the-truth-behind-news-report-suggesting-mahatma-gandhi-accused-his-son-harilal-of-raping-his-own-daughter-tushar-gandhi-s-open-letter-to-media-1988627 [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Hellen Keller By Alexandra Dryjanski 5/2/2012 Helen Keller: An inspiration [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. http://www.cviga.org/sightseeing/safe\_sight\_helen\_keller/ [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Strike Against War by [Helen Keller](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Helen_Keller) American author and public speaker Speech at Carnegie Hall, New York City, January 5, 1916, under the auspices of the Women's Peace Party and the Labor Forum. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. http://investigations.nbcnews.com/\_news/2013/06/25/19062348-disabled-workers-paid-just-pennies-an-hour-and-its-legal [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Ton, Zeynep [Adjunct associate professor in the operations management group at MIT Sloan School of Management] “Telling the Dalai Lama about Bad Jobs in Retail” *ZeynepTon*. October 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. http://www.ufcw.org/2014/03/28/remembering-the-legacy-of-cesar-chavez/ [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. F.D.R. Makes the Case for the Minimum Wage By [TERESA TRITCH](http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/author/teresa-tritch/) MARCH 7, 2014. NY Times. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. http://www.newsmax.com/TheWire/President-Barack-Obama-Presidents/2014/08/08/id/587737/ [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Lawrence B. Glickman. A Living Wage: American Workers and the Maker of Consumer Society. Cornell University Press. 1 March 1999. Page 77. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. Why Picking Tom Perez for Attorney General Would Be a Smart Move for Obama Win or lose, a nomination battle would rally Democrats—and put Republicans on the defensive. —By [David Corn](http://www.motherjones.com/authors/david-corn) Mon Nov. 3, 2014 http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/10/tom-perez-attorney-general-obama [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. 'All Labor Has Dignity': King's Other Legacy Posted: 01/16/2015 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/thomas-e-perez/all-labor-has-dignity-kin\_b\_6487008.html [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. Labor gets aggressive under Tom Perez By TIMOTHY NOAH | 10/29/14 http://www.politico.com/story/2014/10/tom-perez-labor-112241.html [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. <http://www.nbcnews.com/feature/in-plain-sight/u-s-labor-secretary-tom-perez-how-fix-inequality-america-n252741> First published November 20th 2014 [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/thomas-e-perez/america-deserves-a-raise\_b\_4698221.html [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. http://www.whoquotes.com/thomas-perez-quotes/ [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. CONNOR D. WOLF Contributor Perez Argues Minimum Wage And Unions Are Vital To The Economic Recovery 01/07/2015 http://dailycaller.com/2015/01/07/perez-argues-minimum-wage-and-unions-are-vital-to-the-economic-recovery/ [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. Frances Perkins and the Minimum Wage– By Leah Sprague http://francesperkinscenter.org/?page\_id=382 [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. The Woman Behind the New Deal: The Life and Legacy of Frances Perkins, Social Security, Unemployment Insurance, Paperback – February 23, 2010 by Kirstin Downey [Amazon Review]. http://www.amazon.com/The-Woman-Behind-New-Deal/dp/1400078563 [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. Korsgaard, Christine. 1993. The reasons we can share: An attack on the distinction between agent-relative and agent-neutral values. In Altruism, ed. Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred Dycus Miller, and Jeffrey Paul. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Previously published in Social Philosophy and Policy 10, no. 1: 24-51. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. Paulina Sliwa writes: Sliwa, Paulina [College Fellows and Staff, Sidney Sussex College] “In Defense of Moral Testimony” Philosophical Studies, 2012 [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. Bernard Mayo. *Ethics and the Moral Life*. New York, ST Martin’s Press. 1958 [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. Paulina Sliwa writes: Sliwa, Paulina [College Fellows and Staff, Sidney Sussex College] “In Defense of Moral Testimony” Philosophical Studies, 2012 [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. Soran Reader. “New Directions in Ethical Naturalism.” http://www.jstor.org/stable/27504153. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 3, No. 4 (Dec., 2000), pp. 341-364 Published by: Springer. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. *[Alasdair MacIntyre 1, “After Virtue,” 1981. Page 20.]* [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation? Laurence Bonjour *American Philosophical Quarterly* Vol. 15, No. 1 (Jan., 1978), pp. 1-13 [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. Murphy, Peter (University of Indianapolis). Coherentism in Epistemology. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. October 15, 2006. <http://www.iep.utm.edu/coherent/> [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. http://stanford.library.usyd.edu.au/archives/spr2004/entries/justep-coherence/ [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. Olsson, Erik, "Coherentist Theories of Epistemic Justification", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*(Spring 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/justep-coherence/>. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. A Coherentist Theory of Normative AuthorityAuthor(s): Linda RadzikSource: The Journal of Ethics, Vol. 6, No. 1 (2002), pp. 21-42Published by: Springer Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25115713 .Accessed: 24/07/2011 23:21 [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. Paulina Sliwa writes: Sliwa, Paulina [College Fellows and Staff, Sidney Sussex College] “In Defense of Moral Testimony” Philosophical Studies, 2012 [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. Paulina Sliwa writes: Sliwa, Paulina [College Fellows and Staff, Sidney Sussex College] “In Defense of Moral Testimony” Philosophical Studies, 2012 [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. Paulina Sliwa writes: Sliwa, Paulina [College Fellows and Staff, Sidney Sussex College] “In Defense of Moral Testimony” Philosophical Studies, 2012 [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. Paulina Sliwa writes: Sliwa, Paulina [College Fellows and Staff, Sidney Sussex College] “In Defense of Moral Testimony” Philosophical Studies, 2012 [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. Linda-Zagzebski. Epistemic\_Authority [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. Paulina Sliwa writes: Sliwa, Paulina [College Fellows and Staff, Sidney Sussex College] “In Defense of Moral Testimony” Philosophical Studies, 2012 [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. Paulina Sliwa writes: Sliwa, Paulina [College Fellows and Staff, Sidney Sussex College] “In Defense of Moral Testimony” Philosophical Studies, 2012 [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. Linda-Zagzebski. Epistemic\_Authority [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. Paulina Sliwa writes: Sliwa, Paulina [College Fellows and Staff, Sidney Sussex College] “In Defense of Moral Testimony” Philosophical Studies, 2012 [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. Paulina Sliwa writes: Sliwa, Paulina [College Fellows and Staff, Sidney Sussex College] “In Defense of Moral Testimony” Philosophical Studies, 2012 [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. Linda-Zagzebski. Epistemic\_Authority [↑](#footnote-ref-61)